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On the Concept of Evil: An Analysis of Genocide and State Sovereignty
Jason J. Campbell
ABSTRACT

The history of ideas and contemporary genocide studies conjointly suggests a
meaningful secular conception of evil. I will show how the history of ideas supplies us
with a cumulative pattern, or an eventual gestalt, of the sought-for conception of
universal secular evil. This gestalt is a result of my examination of the history of
ideas. The historical analysis of evil firmly grounds my research in the tradition of
philosophical inquiry, where I shift the focus from the problem of evil, which is indebted
to theological discourse, to an analysis of the concept of evil. Next, I show how this
gestalt applies to genocide studies. Specifically, I show how a secular concept of evil
meaningfully functions in this research program. The examination of genocide studies
serves as a test-bed for the fruit of my historical examination. There, I show, first, in what
way a secular notion of evil is irreducible, or elementary; second, how the concept used
in genocide studies compares to the cumulative historical pattern; and third, in what way
genocide studies have progressively enriched the pattern. Armed with these results, I then
engage with the contemporary literature that criticizes the possibility of a meaningful
concept of evil, and attempts to reduce this notion of secular evil to relativistic
particulars. Here, I describe relevant arguments and objections. It is interesting to explore
whether, and if so, how, some aspects of the objections may lend themselves to an actual
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refinement of the concept of evil. Finally, then, I present a summary account of evil on
the basis of my findings.

iv

Introduction

The primary focus of my dissertation is simply to define and describe the existence of
evil. Questions such as, “what is evil?” “How can it be identified?” “How can we
understand it?” are the governing questions guiding my analysis. For over a millennium
the analysis and investigation of evil has remained firmly within the domain of
theological discourse and discourses in theodicy, which is properly classified as the
problem of evil. In traditional accounts, evil has been described as either moral evil or
natural evil. Moral evil results from human agency and our ability to freely act within the
world, which is simply represented by the violence and murders that plague our
existence, whereas natural evil results from catastrophic acts of nature.
In discussing moral evil, then, the traditional approach, which has remained nearly
unchallenged for over 2000 years, is to account for evil in terms of a theodicy, that is, a
description of evil as the problem of evil, wherein the existence of evil undermines the
characteristics of God. Thus, the problem of evil specifically pertains to the
complications that arise for the theist once both the existence of evil and the existence of
God are simultaneously affirmed. If God is understood to be all knowing, all powerful
and all loving, then at least one of these characteristics must be false if one is also to
account for the existence of evil. For if God were all knowing, he would know of the
existence of evil, and if he were all powerful he would have the ability to prevent its
occurrence. Finally, then, if he were all loving, his love would motivate him to act on our
v

behalf. Thus, the solutions to the problem of evil are attempts to preserve the existence of
God and also account for the existence of evil. Throughout the centuries, many have
tackled the problem of evil, using various methods to reconcile this difficulty. Due to the
brevity of these introductory remarks, I will only discuss the most salient historical
arguments concerning the problem of evil and identify the contributions these
philosophers have made to my contemporary philosophical understanding of the concept
of evil.
For example, St. Anselm realized that all too often those who discuss and analyze the
problem of evil are equivocating in their use of the term. Anselm’s account of the
distinction between ‘evil as nothing’ and ‘evil as something’ is an important contribution
to a philosophical investigation of evil. We cannot use the term ‘evil’ to mean both that
which is not-good, in the sense of privation, and that which results from one’s voluntary
actions to do evil. We are certainly justified in asking, “In what sense is the term ‘evil’
being used.” In formulating an argument, we can use the former or the latter but not both.
Thus, St. Anselm contributed to the discussion of evil by insisting that our use of the term
remain consistent throughout our argument.
In my present description of the philosophy of evil, I have incorporated this and other
historical conceptions but I have tried to move beyond the description of evil in terms of
the problem of evil, which has traditionally been couched in theological terms. I have
also tried to account for the causes and ultimately the concept of evil. These distinctions
among the problem, the causes, and concept of evil, serve as the foundation for my
analysis.

vi

My intention to move beyond the notion of describing evil in theological terms is
indebted to Professor Schonfeld’s readings of Immanuel Kant’s distinctions between
entropy and order, of Chinese philosophy, particularly the works of Mencius, and
Professor Guignon’s account of authenticity and the need, in the process of socialization,
to disentangle our propensities to do evil from our capacities to live virtuously. It was in
reading their accounts that I recognized the possibility that one could articulate the
existence of evil in purely secular terms. Schonfeld’s expertise in Kant’s early works and
Chinese philosophy would offer me the conceptual framework with which I could begin a
cosmological articulation of this tension. The battle between good and evil harkens to the
primordial forces of nature, between order and disorder, diversity and uniformity. It
begins to situate the discussion of evil in naturalistic rather than spiritualistic terms. It is
the start and the point of departure from theological discourse to secular understandings
of the existence of evil.
Within the works of Mencius the interchange between Mencius and King Hwuy of
Leang, serves to demonstrate the corruptive forces of greed and the responsibility of
governance, which the King has long since forsaken. The king’s obligation arises as a
direct consequence of the function of his role as king. The word ‘king’ carries a very
specific meaning, which obligates him to fulfill his duties, as directed by meaning;
otherwise, he fails to fulfill his duties as king, by failing to uphold the functions of a king.
In attempting to discuss the process of our socialization it is of the utmost importance
that we recognize that we are already thrown into a world of sociopolitical interactions,
though evil clearly affects our embodiment, the attempt to articulate the problem of evil
moves beyond the body. It need not, however, move beyond this world. It is within this
vii

world that evil exists. It moves beyond our embodiment and infects our social relations.
One of the fundamental purposes of the political is to contain and control the spread of
evil within society. Even then it cannot be contained; evil moves beyond the social to
infect the political, wherein it manifests in its greatest instantiation, namely, in the act of
genocide, from the body, through the social, into the political, evil manifest in its most
heinous form in the act of genocide.
I would not have been able to propose a definition of evil, one of the primary aims of
this dissertation, without the contributions of Professor Edward Kissi’s comparative
analysis of the Cambodian and Ethiopian genocides. His work challenged a decade long
misconception and forged the path for my interdisciplinary account of evil and genocide.
Briefly, Kissi’s analysis demonstrates how genocide occurs and the similarities between
the practices of the Khmer Rouge and the Mengistu regime. His description of the
relationship between the state and the population was the point at which I recognized
exactly what philosophy could contribute to genocide scholarship.
My investigation into the nature of genocide and evil, then, begins where Kissi’s
analysis ended, with an explicit formulation of the necessary conditions for converting a
civilian into an enemy of the state, i.e., explaining how political power and a state
endorsed ideology of exclusion are used to justify genocidal intentions. I then
demonstrate how state intentionality can be assessed through the analysis of codified law
and a politics of discrimination. My investigation draws from an interdisciplinary
discourse on genocide, combining key conceptions of selectivity and jurisdiction with
philosophical notions of power and ethical prescriptions on fairness. As I argue, this
ability to convert members of the population into enemies of the state initiates the process
viii

of extermination and, moreover, serves as the foundation for the possibility of discussing
evil.
In describing how this process of genocide unfolds, I account for three phases of
exclusion, which I have crafted as conceptual tools to articulate precisely how the state
justifies genocidal acts. The description of these phases is a pedagogical tool to facilitate
in describing how enemies of the state are created. The phases are the selective phase,
were dissenters are identified, the transformative phase, where these dissenters are
transformed into enemies of the state and finally the purgative phase, where they are
purged by exile or extermination from the state demography.
Thus, my definition of evil is informed by the history of philosophy and genocide
scholarship. My definition of evil is a practical account of evil, and my subsequent
descriptions of assessing state intentionality in endorsing genocide, has direct legal
implications. Thus I propose the following definition of evil:
Evil, within the discourse of state sovereignty, is the intentional reduction of domestic
diversity within state demography, by the formulation and pursuit of an exclusionary
ideology for the purpose of enforcing a homogeneous society.
I then undertake a description of the notion of state purity, which I argue, is a direct
result of subscribing to an exclusionary ideology. If a state’s demography is naturally
heterogeneous and the state assumes an ideology of exclusion to enforce or create a
homogeneous state, then such actions are counter to the natural occurrences within the
state and thereby unnatural. Furthermore, the attempt to purify the state presupposes that
there exists an imperfection within the natural occurrences of diversity in state
demography. It assumes that the natural occurrence of a diverse state demography is
ix

contaminated by the incorporation of groups that the state seeks to expel. Thus, to
decontaminate or purify the state, those in power must endorse an exclusionary ideology
and seek to expel targeted groups from the state demography. The expulsion of these
targeted groups from state demography is the act of purification. In using the term
purification, I refer to the act of expelling targeted groups from the state demography
once it has assumed an exclusionary ideology. I then offer a description of the Fascist and
totalitarian state to demonstrate how this process is enacted.
The Fascist state seeks to subordinate the individual to the will of the state, ruled by a
single party, and is thereby driven by the “movement” of supporters of the political party.
The idea that the party is a movement of the people is merely a muse to attain political
power; it is the framework with which the leaders of the party articulate their intentions
to the masses. The masses support the movement because the movement is allegedly a
representation of the will of the masses, which in the case of Fascism is clearly false. The
Fascist state is solely concerned with total domination. It functions to ensure that its sole
party occupies every facet of political power and challengers to that power threaten the
existence of the Fascist state. Thus, totalitarianism is a natural consequence of a Fascist
state because the drive for omnipresence is reinforced by the will to omnipotence. The
desire to represent the party in every position of political power (omnipresence) is
reinforced by the totalization of that power (the omnipotence of the state).
Despite my many examples, there are those, however, that will invariably deny the
existence of evil. The majority of the second half of the dissertation, at the suggestion of
Professor Steven Turner, focuses on defending the existence of evil from those that
would deny its existence. I offer a historical account of various philosophical attempts to
x

deny the existence of evil, and demonstrate the errors in reasoning for each account. For
example, historically, the debate between the traditionalist and non-traditionalist
theologians over the existence of God and the problem of evil has taken many forms,
nontraditionalist invariably articulating the imperfection of God, which accounts for the
existence of evil, and traditionalists denying the existence of evil, which preserves the
characteristics of God. The nontraditionalist stance, however, has the typical consequence
of also resulting in the denial of God, while the traditionalist stance has the peculiar
consequence of denying the existence of evil. For the traditionalist, then, the denial of
evil is logically necessary to preserve the characteristics of God. The argument becomes
dogmatic, because no attempt to challenge the characteristics of God can be entertained
because to do so would undermine one of the three characteristics mentioned earlier.
Thus, the traditionalist denial of evil is necessitated by the refusal to question God’s
characteristics more so than it is a critique of the ontological existence of evil, as one
could still on theological grounds account for the existence of evil as a consequence of
personal autonomy, while preserving the characteristics of God. This is but one of many
attempts at denial that I account for and defend against throughout the second half of the
dissertation.

xi

Chapter 1: Conceptions of Evil in the History of Ideas

1.1.

The Historical Approach to Evil

I intend to outline various arguments surrounding both the problem and the concept
of evil. The problem of evil, as will be discussed, is specifically a problem for the theist.
Accounting for the existence of God and explaining the existence of evil has presented
unique challenges for monotheistic philosophers throughout the history of ideas. The
concept of evil more fully speaks to the nature of evil and the relation of its existence to
the moral implications posed to humanity.
Throughout this chapter I will address the role of humanity. Without acknowledging
our shared humanity no analysis of evil can be complete. Evil affects human beings and
as such, it is specifically a problem because of our sentience and our rational constitution.
Understanding how evil manifests and shapes the nature of human existence has been
the goal of philosophers in East and West. It has served as the conceptual foundation on
the basis of which scholars have theorized on the formation of the state. It is operative in
all accounts of social contract theory. In short, evil is a plague to every facet of humanity.
Understand the relationship between evil and human agency, or between evil and our
propensity toward the good requires that we firmly situate the discussion of evil within
the history of idea; this chapter, then, serve precisely that purpose.

1

1.2.

Confucian Conceptions of Evil: 551-301 BCE
Our journey through the history of philosophy and our analysis of the concept of evil

begins in ancient China where I will focus on four great thinkers, viz., Confucius,
Mencius, Laozi and Zhuangzi. The investigation will span more than 250 years, from 551
BCE to 301 BCE, covering both Confucian and Daoist traditions, and concluding with an
account of Zhuangzi’s mysticism. While the investigation is not an account of Confucian
and Daoist philosophies, I will, throughout, refer to the system of beliefs that support
Confucian and Daoist texts, further aligning my interpretations into a specific discussion
on the concept of evil.
Confucian philosophy is a moral philosophy in which the distinction between good
and evil manifests itself in relation to the moral agent’s obligation to live virtuously. The
good is always moral and the moral is always virtuous. Thus, the actions of those that live
virtuously are good and the actions of those that fail to live virtuously are evil. This
conception of virtue is embodied by the gentleman, jùnzi, who represents a life lived
within the mean, governed neither by excess nor deficiency. In contrast, however, the
small man, shăo rén, is represented by the individual led by his desires. His desires for
wealth, for social status, and for recognition, have corrupted his sensibilities, making the
virtuous life impossible for the small man.
In Confucian thought, the small man is a representation of evil because of his
ignorance and small-mindedness, and ultimately his refusal to live virtuously. The
gentleman, however, is a friendly man. He identifies himself with humanity and
understands his role in society. His modesty enables him to live virtuously and thus his
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actions are good. The actions of the small man are antithetical to the good. He is led by
desire not reason. He is prideful instead of being modest. The most damaging of his traits,
however, is his inability to recognize the humanity of the other person. His smallmindedness and self-centeredness contaminate his ability to empathize with the plight of
the other. Where they are famished, he is filled. Where they are wanting, he has excess.
The moral of Confucianism is to live by virtue and not by vice because even the king, if
not led by virtue, can act like the small man. When he does, however, his kingdom fails.
Where his actions are governed by virtue, his kingdom flourishes.
At the heart of Confucianism are the so called four books, which are: the Analects,
The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean and the Works of Mencius. Briefly,
Confucianism emerges from the philosophies of Confucius and Mencius, though
Confucius predated Mencius by nearly one hundred years. Confucius and Mencius’s
philosophy, as represented through these four texts, are the grounding for Confucianism,
which more accurately stated is a moral philosophy. Within these four texts, then, it is
possible to distill a conception of evil since Confucianism is primarily an applied moral
philosophy, wherein the moral agent is taught how things are and how they should be.
In formulating my account of evil, I will offer an interpretation of these four books by
analyzing the key conceptions presented within the text. I will proceed from the Analects
to the Works of Mencius, which is not, however, to suggest that my account will be
exhaustive. Rather, I will present my findings on the basis of their explanatory
importance in an attempt to understand the concept of evil. My discussions of these texts
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are surveys into the concept of evil more so than methodological investigations into the
nature of Chinese thought.
Within the Analects a number of students discuss the nature of virtue with their
master, and as the dialogue unfolds, the master makes reference to both government and
the nature of goodness, insights that will factor into our discussion later. In James
Legge’s translation of the text, the master explains the nature of the good, saying,
If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be
given them by punishment, they will try to avoid the
punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by
virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules
of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and
moreover will become good. 1
The emphasis of this initial quote arises from a keen sense of duty that the moral agent
has to that which is virtuous. In fact, Kant’s account of the Categorical Imperative
harkens to this conception of a rigorous deontological ethic. If one merely follows the
law to avoid punishment, as noted by Confucius, then though his actions may be lawful,
they will not be moral, i.e., the moral agent will have no sense of shame, according to this
Confucian ethic. If, however, the moral agent acts in accordance with both the law and a
profound sense of his obligation to that which is virtuous, then his path will follow the
path of the good, and he will understand the nature of morality. Thus, morality arises
from one’s obligation to living a virtuous life, rather than trying to avoid punishment. It

1

Confucius, Mencius. trans. James Legge. 1900. The four books: Confucian analects, the great
learning, the doctrine of the mean, and the works of Mencius, with English translation and notes. Shanghai,
China: Commercial Press. (Analects Book II, Chap. III, 1-2).
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is the moral agent’s respect for the moral law, the obedience to virtue, and not fear of the
legal rules that determines morality. 2
Within the Analects, then, Confucius warns of such temptations toward wickedness
and the pitfalls of corruption. 3 The Confucian gentleman, jùnzi, is a representation of a
virtuous life, and the small man, shăo rén, represents a corrupted lifestyle. From the
differences in how these men choose to live their lives, emerges a greater conception of
morality.
The gentleman is always concerned with mankind. He has situated his actions within
the context of a greater social setting. He is aware of the plight of others. His is a life of
reflection and contemplation, whereas, the small man is concerned with himself. The one
is concerned with humanity, the other motivated by selfishness. These simple distinctions
will invariably corrupt the small man and lead him toward evil, whereas the gentleman
will always be a force for goodness.
According to the master, the fundamental difference between the gentleman and the
small man arises from a difference in thinking and acting. The master says, “The mind of
the gentleman is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the mean man is conversant
with gain” 4 This distinction can be understood in terms of altruism and greed, giving and
taking. There is a balance that must be maintained between these two forces and
understanding one’s relations to these forces allows the moral agent to empathize with
another’s lack or loss. The gentleman is capable of giving to those in need, of sharing, of

2

Ibid., (Book II, Chap. IV, 5).
Legge, 1900, (Book IV, Chap. IV).
4
Ibid., (Book IV, Chap. XVI)
3
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understanding his role in the community. The small man, however, is concerned and
motivated by his unending desire for more. He is consumed with and by possessions. His
desire for gain supersedes his desire to act righteously. Thus, the small man will forever
act immorally, as his motivation is one of selfishness. In a Hobbesian sense, the small
man is motivated by his psychological egoism, as he is fueled by his desire for that which
he does not possess.
If the consumerist desire for possessions, however, is coupled with anxiety and fear,
the conditions for immorality are sure to be met. In an insightful passage, Confucius
notes, “The gentleman has neither anxiety nor fear…what is there to be anxious about,
what is there to fear?” 5 The fear of loss, especially for the small man, who, as we have
seen, is obsessed with his attachments, combined with the ensuing anxiety, which often
dominates his thoughts, can and often does lead to the most deplorable acts of
immorality, in an attempt to preserve one’s possessions or defend one’s self from an
unknown threat. These angst-ridden obsessions often lead to the most heinous forms of
brutality by defy the natural course of events, including death and loss.
The source of angst is a cause for the manifestation of evil within the world. It is
because of this cause, i.e., one’s angst-ridden obsessions, that the small man remains so
transfixed on trivialities. As a cause for the manifestation of evil within the world,
anxiety serves to remove the small man from the calm demeanor of the gentleman. The
Analects, then, is a lesson in patience, a lesson in the virtuous way of the gentleman,
which is antithetical to the ways of the small man. His ways are governed by selfishness

5

Ibid., (Book XII, Chap. IV, 1, 3)
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and greed. His motives are grounded in response to the fear and anxiety of an impending
unknown. One, then, must live like the gentleman rather than the small man.
The contrast of small man and gentleman is actually a continuum, with the small man
and gentleman being opposite extremes. The continuum between these men is comprised
of the necessary learning, education and growth needed to transition from a small man to
a gentleman. The small man – the ‘evil man’ – requires cultivation to transition and
evolve into the gentleman – the ‘good man’. Thus, as the small man transitions into the
gentleman along this continuum, that which is good point to an evolutionary progression
toward learning, education and growth, and that which is evil points to ignorance,
misology and destruction.
In The Great Learning there is an evolutionary progression toward the good. This
progression begins with self-knowledge. It is written that,
Things being investigated, knowledge became complete.
Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were
sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were the
rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were
cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families
were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states
were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed,
the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy. 6
From self knowledge the moral agent is able to progress to tranquility and happiness. The
cultivation of this knowledge allows the individual to progress away from those forces
that would seek to undermine these ends. Within the fourth chapter of this analysis I will
return to the conception of the progression of knowledge from the individual to the state
and synthesize how evil unravels this evolutionary progression toward the good.
6

Ibid., (Book I, V).

7

The very basis of this evolutionary progression toward the good is itself contingent on
the cultivation of the self and the social and communal networks that support this
progression. Where one’s actions are governed by and concerned with the relationship of
the individual with the surrounding world, the individual’s knowledge will be rooted in
the experience of his kinsmen, his country men, and the world itself, this being the
greatest realization of his self understanding.
In Doctrine of the Mean, Confucius explains the proper mode of being in the world,
through his descriptions of the way and the path one must take to living virtuously. He
notes, “The gentleman cultivates a friendly harmony—without being weak,” (Chap. 10,
5). The misconception, even within a contemporary context, is that friendliness and
amiability are signs of weakness, whereas aggression and haughtiness are signs of power.
The gentleman, however, understands the falsity in this claim. There is power in
friendship and amiability, which increases one’s worldview and is itself buttressed on
conceptions of diversity and inclusiveness. Inclusiveness and diversity are antithetical to
the concept of evil, which unfolds as an exclusionary and monolithic ideology of hatred.
The conception of friendly harmony is the point to the discussion in the Doctrine of
the Mean. To be good, i.e., to evolve, means to attain a friendly harmony with one’s
surroundings. Surroundings refer both to culture and nature—it refers to the social
community as well as the cosmic environment. It is the awareness that we are intimately
connected to the world and insofar as we exist within the world we all share a common
dependence. Thus, attuning one’s self to the plight of others and understanding the shared
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nature of our experiences, requires that one recognize the friendly harmony of one to all.
Without this realization, the good is unattainable.
The notion of a friendly harmony relates to the importance places on human
interaction and inevitably humanity. Humans are social beings and ascribing to a
conception of friendly harmony supports and furthers the existence of all humans. It
specifically situates concerns for one’s surroundings and one’s countrymen as directly
influencing one’s progression toward the good.
Incorporated within Confucian ethic, Mencius applies the tenets of living virtuously
to the political realm. His contribution to Confucianism relates to his ability to
demonstrate the application of Confucian thought to both the political and social, both the
king and his subjects. Mencius understands that Confucianism is an applied moral
philosophy, one that is accomplished in the everyday practices of its people and the
obligation to live virtuously is an obligation that even the king cannot escape. Thus, in
attempting to understand the influence of Confucian thought, one must first recognize
that Mencius is applying the very same tenets of morality that govern the everyday
practices of the individual to the political.
Mencius even illustrates the small-mindedness of King Hwuy of Leang, which only
serves as a reminder that even he can be corrupted by evil. The actions of both the king
and his subject must be virtuous. Both he and his subjects must accept the responsibility
to live virtuously and in so doing Mencius argues that the kingdom will flourish. Thus,
since virtue is a means to goodness and living virtuously results is flourishing, then the
good too results in flourishing.

9

Mencius skillfully contrasts this conception against the small-mindedness of King
Hwuy of Leang who has allowed his greed and desires to govern his actions. As noted
earlier, these traits are excess and deficiencies from the mean and as such the king too
represent how evil can pollute the political. As a result of his failures as king, his people
starve and death plagues his kingdom. The atrocity of this destruction is a direct result of
his action. Thus, where the good leads to flourishing evil leads to death and decay.
In the Works of Mencius the account is wholly more political in tone, though the
political nature of the discourse is firmly influenced by a Confucian mode of
interpretation. What was true for the gentleman is also true for moral agents, but more
importantly, within the Works of Mencius, it is also true for government. Mencius, with
great care, draws light to the disparities between the corruption of government and the
impoverishment of its subjects. The greed for power and control of the government,
mimic the corruption and immodesty of the small man. He notes,
King Hwuy of Leang said, “I wish quietly to receive your
instructions.” Mencius replied, “Is there any difference
between killing a man with a stick and with a sword?” The
king said, “There is no difference.” “Is there any difference
in doing it with a sword and with the style of government?”
“There is no difference,” was the reply. Mencius then said,
“In your kitchen there is fat meat; in your stables there are
fat horses. But your people have the look of hunger, and on
the wilds there are those who have died of famine. This is
leading on beasts to devour men. 7
The oppositions between the “look of hunger” and “fat horses,” between “those who
have died of famine” and “fat meat” is a stark distinction, one not to be overlooked. Evil
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here has the face of destitution or deprivation; good has the face of prosperity or
flourishing. As properties of actions, good is any action that furthers general flourishing;
evil is any action that promotes destitution. King Hwuy of Leang is evil because he’s
been led by his desires instead of by his obligation, and in doing so, he fails to live up to
the friendly harmony and thus fails to contribute to the civil evolution.
What is important in my interpretation of Confucianism is intimately related to the
conception of the small man and the gentleman. To understand how these men function
in the world, how their minds think respectively, is to understand how one sets about
living a virtuous life. The prescriptions in the Analects are primarily for the particular
moral agent, whereas the prescriptions in the Works of Mencius are primarily political in
nature. What is important to my analysis of the concept of evil, then, is this movement
from an individual obligation to uphold the moral law to an understanding of shame and
virtue, and the political obligation to the same. Though the small man corrupts himself,
the King, as just noted, destroys his kingdom. It is this insight that will guide us through
the remainder of the analysis into the concept of evil.
The antithesis between good and evil is represented in the distinction between
flourishing and decay. The king that embraces humanity and seeks to better the lives of
his people creates the condition for flourishing, which inevitably leads to happiness and
the good. The king that seeks his own ends, like the small man, will eventually destroy
his kingdom. There is, then, a necessary relationship between the notion of goodness that
yields flourishing and evil that leads to decay.

11

As noted in the beginning of this chapter, an understanding of the good facilitates an
understanding of that which is evil. In the Works of Mencius, this relation between good
and evil are defined within the context of one’s relation to the state. Mencius writes,
Never has he who would by his excellence subdue men
been able to subdue them. Let a prince seek by his
excellence to nourish men, and he will be able to subdue
the whole empire. It is impossible that one should become
ruler of the empire to whom it has not yielded the
subjection of the heart. 8
In the Work of Mencius there is a stark contrast between the leader of the state (the
prince) and his subjects. For Mencius, the people are only subjugated to the prince,
insofar as he has won their heart, which is to say, he has gained the affection of the
people. Mencius garners power through an appreciation of personal autonomy, which the
state seeks to acknowledge. Mencius describes the good statesman as concerned with the
wellbeing of his subjects.
Returning, then, to the doctrine of the rectification of names, (zhèng míng), it should
be apparent now why King Hwuy failed as a leader. He failed to serve the needs of his
people and chose instead to satisfy his own desires. His use of power can oppress or
liberate his people. Where his power is used for oppression, his kingdom will fail. Where
his power is used for the betterment of his people, his kingdom will succeed. Maintaining
a keen sense of friendly harmony provides the king as well as any citizen with the
necessary cognitive tools required to live harmoniously with others and with one’s
environment.

8

Legge, 1900, (Book IV, XVI)

12

1.3.

Daoist Conceptions of Evil
Like Confucianism, Daoism involves a moral philosophy, but the emphasis is placed

on the way one lives. For Laozi, the Dao is represented in the natural flow of life, in the
increasing complexity of life and one’s progression from birth to death. This flow is a
harmonious principle. It is a way of existence, i.e., a way in which the moral agent can
live within the world. Thus, the ideas of good and evil relate to this mode of being in the
world. Those actions that conform to the Dao are good. Those actions that do not
conform to the Dao are evil.
The good is aligned with creation and the life-oriented flow and complexity of nature.
One’s relation to another human being is of the same importance as one’s relation to the
natural world because the Dao manifests in both. A sense, then, of our interconnection to
other human beings and our connection as human beings to the world, allow for a holistic
conception of codependence on others and the world. To live ethically, then, the moral
agent must remain within the harmony of the natural order.
Conversely, however, evil is that which does not accord with the Dao. It is the refusal
to recognize the inherent interconnection of all life forces. Where the Dao is a way of
living harmoniously, evil disrupts the harmony of the natural flow. It runs counter to the
Dao and as such introduces chaos to the order of the universe. These primal forces of
order and entropy manifest in the opposition between good and evil. For Laozi, then, the
good is harmonious, it accords with the Dao and it is ordered, whereas evil is disruptive,
it fails to accord with the Dao and it is marked by chaos.
Laozi characterizes good and evil in the Dao De Jing. In v 31, he writes,
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Recognize beauty and ugliness is born.
Recognize good and evil is born. 9
…
Weapons are ill-omened tools,
Not proper instruments.
When their use can’t be avoided,
Calm restraint is best.
Don’t think they are beautiful.
Those who think they are beautiful
Rejoice in killing people.
Those who rejoice in killing people
Cannot achieve their purpose in this world. 10
Laozi recognizes the disparity between good and evil. He sees that good and evil are both
brought about by human action. Goodness is defined as actions that accord with the Dao
and evil is recognized as the contrary. 11 Sung-peng Hsu writes,
“Good” and “evil” are defined with reference to actions,
because, in Laozi’s philosophy, they are not some
substantial entities, eternal forms, or God’s
commandments. They are qualities of action (emphasis
added) 12
Tools are instruments of this creative action. The tools we create reflect the will of the
creator, as the kinetic process of creation manifests in that, which is created; hence, an
“ill-omened tool” is a reflection of the ill-will of its creator. Evil is similar to goodness in
that it is a product of this creative act. If the creative act accords with the Dao, the action
is good. If the creative act is in discord with the Dao, the action is evil.
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At the same time, Laozi recognizes the disparity of good and evil. The good is
defined as actions in accord with the Dao. The Dao can roughly be defined as the form of
nature’s flow. This flow aims at life. Good actions are in harmony with the life-oriented
flow; Evil actions are in opposition to this. In that sense, the good is aligned with creation
and evil is aligned with destruction.
In an attempt to approximate an understanding of the nature of evil, one can contrast
the good in opposition to the nature of evil. In the Dao Te Ching, for example, Laozi
offers many descriptions of the good life, which can then be contrasted against the nature
of evil. He writes,
Giving birth and nourishing,
having without possessing
acting with no expectations,
leading and not trying to control:
this is the supreme virtue, (emphasis added). 13
In asserting that the supreme virtue entails, “having without possessing” Laozi
acknowledges a conception of holding, without possessing, of sharing without
begrudging. If I am not bound by the law of possession, as a moral agent, I am
unconstrained in my movements. The fluidity of my existence is such that I can exist
without possessing. I can lead without controlling. As we have seen in a previous section,
the prince controls the people through their affection for him, not through the exercise of
his might.
Unlike the good, evil arises from destruction, which works against the flow of nature.
That which is evil is necessarily against the Dao. It remains in perpetual conflict with the
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Dao. The destruction of life and the disruption of the flow of nature are hallmarks of evil
and one’s progression toward evil is always marked by inhumanity.
The duality of good and evil is represented in the duality of humanity and
inhumanity. The good is always a benefit to humanity. It strengthens humanity by
imbuing it with meaning, with lives lived for virtue. Evil is always a regressive force,
which suppresses humanity and the flourishing thereof by motivating selfishness and
inconsideration. These factors will invariably lead to desensitization. Unable to
empathize with the plight of others, war and mass exterminations are sure to follow. Our
attachment to things and our selfishness interferes with our ability to recognize the
suffering of others.
Through our connections to material objects, then, we lose a sense of our autonomy,
our connection to ourselves, which is to say our identity becomes conflated with the
things we own or possess. For example, you may here someone say, “I am my car” or “I
am this apartment.” In truth, however, the individual is not and cannot be these things.
The person has conflated his sense of personal identity with that which he possesses,
which serves as the groundwork from the manifestation of evil. Laozi continues:
Whoever relies on the Dao in governing men
doesn’t try to force issues
or defeat enemies by force of arms.
For every force there is a counterforce.
Violence, even well intentioned,
always rebounds upon itself.
The Master does his job
and then stops.
He understands that the universe
is forever out of control,
and that trying to dominate events
16

goes against the current of the Dao.
Because he believes in himself,
he doesn’t try to convince others.
Because he is content with himself,
he doesn’t need other’s approval.
Because he accepts himself,
the whole world accepts him, (emphasis added) 14
In following the Way, the Daoist rejects the imposition of forceful argumentation, which
brings about confrontation and violence. Rather, he is patient and mindful of the issues,
without an insistence of proving points or winning retorts. He understands that there is a
balance, a counterforce that governs the laws of nature and moreover realizes that he too
is subject to these laws.
The Dao’s flow evolves from chaos to order, from uniformity to diversity, from the
void to complexity. The Sage acknowledges the role of serendipity and waits patiently.
As the Sage is a representation of the good, so too is the fool a representation of that
which is evil. As Kant has mentioned, “a universal relation obtains that integrates all
worlds into a single framework,” which corresponds to Laozi’s profound insight that,
Every being in the universe
is an expression of the Dao.
It springs into existence,
Unconscious, perfect, free,
takes on a physical body,
lets circumstances complete it.
That is why every being
spontaneously honors the Dao,
(emphasis added). 15
This nexus of interconnectivity serves as the ultimate condition for all creation. It is the
manifestation of creation, as an infinite act of increasing diversity, all hinged upon the
14
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possibility of utter systemic collapse. My understanding of this Oneness, in a strictly
Parmenidian sense, evolves as Parmenides states in Plato’s Parmenides,
if there is a one, of course the one will not be many.
Consequently it cannot have any parts or be a whole…And,
if it has no parts, it cannot have a beginning or an end or a
middle, for such things would be parts of it. Further, the
beginning and end of a thing are its limits. Therefore, if one
has neither beginning nor end it is without limits. 16
Though there is, to use the Kantian phrase, a “single framework” it is the manifestation
of a plurality, it is the representation of one through many. It is an understanding, as we
have seen that the One is continually held in opposition to the chaos that seeks to
consume it. It is the primordial battle between entropy and order. Martin Schönfeld
expresses this tension nicely, writing,
nature’s stellar order is the logical reflection of its initial
chaotic opposite in time. This opposite is some kind of
energetic mist or smoke. Its dirty chaos of flow-vectors and
explosive collisions is structurally a flip-flop of oscillating
continuities and limits…Nature sometimes seems chaotic,
sometimes ordered, but instead of reducing the one to the
other…Kant accepts both: free chaos and lawful order hang
together. 17
This balance between the utterly destructive capabilities inherent within a system that
supports life and the proliferation of life itself, in actuality are two sides to the same coin.
More appropriately stated Parmenides’ conception of the one is manifested as a
representation of plurality; it is the appearance of contradiction without contradiction. In
fact, were this contradiction to manifest, there would be no life at all. Thus, the existence
16
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of life necessitates a balance of these dualities. These primordial dualities of chaos and
order, then, manifest in our conception of evil and goodness. Evil is a force of the
destructive capacity of the universe, which is only of moral concern because of human
sentience. Otherwise, it just is. Conversely, good is the creative capacity of the universe,
whose end only approaches but never reaches, viz., the infinite multiplication of all life.
Balance is construed as the golden mean, which allows life and nature the opportunity
to flourish. Where balance is absent, evil manifests as an excess or deficiency, which is
antithetical to life. Where balance facilitates flourishing, evil resists stabilization. It
always manifests as an extreme. Thus, evil is a totalizing force that is contrary to the
balance necessary to bring about flourishing.
This sense of balance was further discussed by the greatest of all Chinese mystics,
Chuang Chou (Zhuangzi), a Daoist, Chinese mystic of the 4th century BCE. His writings
are of such philosophical complexity and beauty that his works have mystified scholars
throughout the ages. In Burton Watson’s introduction to the Complete Works of Zhuangzi
he writes,
The central theme of the Zhuangzi [as a body of work] may
be summed up in a single word: freedom. Essentially, all
the philosophers of ancient China addressed themselves to
the same problem: how is man to live in a world dominated
by chaos, suffering, and absurdity? Nearly all of them
answered with some concrete plan of action designed to
reform the individual, to reform society, and eventually to
free the world from its ills…Zhuangzi’s…answer…is
grounded upon a wholly different, type of thinking. It is the
answer of a mystic…[his] answer to the question is: free
yourself from the world (emphasis added). 18
18
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The world, rooted in evil and chaos, binds us by appealing to our vanity, our hubris, our
self- aggrandizement, or desire for fame and knowledge. It is this self referential mode of
being that deludes our ability to conform to the moral law. It is, in effect, to believe that
one is, “above the law,” i.e., vanity furnishes the moral agent with the false belief that he
transcends the moral law, which is a refusal to disentangle our propensities for evil from
the act of our socialization into goodness.
To recognize our place within the world is understand our need to detach from its
many offerings and its appeal to our pride. Zhuangzi offers an interesting metaphor. He
says, “the swamp pheasant has to walk ten paces for one peck and one hundred paces for
one drink, but it doesn’t want to be kept in a cage. Though you treat it like a king, its
spirit won’t be content.” 19 We, unlike the swamp pheasant, want to be pampered. We
want to be taken care of. We want to be provided for, but most importantly, we want to
be king, because to be king suggests that others will have to walk those many paces to
satisfy our needs, while we remain idle. The question, then, is who is freer, the king, or
the servants, the caged bird, or the free ranged bird? This is where evil takes root, in the
desire to be king, the desire to be famous. With such desires, however, Zhuangzi warns,
“If you do good, stay away from fame. If you do evil, stay away from punishments.” 20
According to Zhuangzi, “Virtue is destroyed by fame.” 21 Thus, it is impossible for
one to act virtuously if his actions are governed by a desire for fame. The king is the
embodiment of fame, and as such is “caged” or immobilized by his status. He is
19
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imprisoned by his fame. His spirit cannot run free, as does the spirit of even the swamp
pheasant. “Fame is something to beat people down with, and wisdom is a device for
wrangling. Both are evil weapons—not the sort of thing to bring you success” (emphasis
added). 22 We can see that evil, for Zhuangzi, is partly based in this desire for fame.
Better stop short than fill to the brim
Oversharpen the blade, and the edge will soon blunt
Amass a store of gold and jade, and no one can protect it
Claim wealth and titles, and disaster will follow
Retire when the work is done
This is the way of heaven. 23
A sentiment that certainly holds true in an era of Youtube and our chance for instant
stardom, reality TV and the prospects of immediate international celebrity. To subvert
evil, then, we must relinquish this desire for fame and for wisdom.
For Zhuangzi, wisdom must not be used for the destruction of others. The true sage
does not profess to be so, does not relish in his own brilliance, and does not use his
knowledge for destructive ends. The true sage is concerned with truth rather than
knowledge, as the ordinary man should be. “If he [the ordinary man] is willing to regard
the ruler as superior to himself and to die for him, then how much more should he be
willing to do for the Truth!” 24
1.4.

Presocratic Conceptions of Evil: 535-430 BCE
From the dawn of civilization, great thinkers have been intrigued by the concept of

evil, what is it? Why does it occur? How, if at all, are we to prevent its proliferation? It
was through countless attempts to answer these questions, that formal thought became
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ordered and logical; the formation of a discipline emerged as a result of our infatuation
with evil. Good versus evil, God versus Satan, man versus woman, and the individual
versus the state, are but a few such polemics wherein the analysis of evil has thrived.
The Presocratics did not have a clear definition of evil. So to speak of their
philosophies strictly in terms of the polemics between good and evil may be
anachronistic. In fact, Empedocles discussed the notion of Love or philia and Strife or
neichos rather than discussing good and evil. It can be argued that Empedocles’
articulation of Love and Strife would later inform accounts of good and evil, but to
strictly align Empedocles account of Love and Strife with notions of good and evil is too
great a generalization.
For Empedocles, Love and Strife serve an essential role in the formation of the
universe. They are the primordial forces, whose interplay generates the evolving universe
or kosmos. The act of Love is a pulling-together; it is needed to counterbalance the act of
Strife. The act of Strife is a pushing-apart; it complements the act of Love. The attraction
of Love or philia and the repulsion of Strife or neichos work together to mingle the
elements and to combine them to more complex structures, thus organizing the cosmos.
If either of Love or Strife outweighed the other, destruction would ensue—Strife
unbridled causes the world to fly apart into disorganized akosmia; Love unbridled causes
the world to collapse into an undifferentiated sphairos. Thus, creation is represented in
the balance of Love and Strife, where equilibrium is maintained, and destruction is
represented in a failure to preserve this balance.
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The notion of Love and Strife are co-emergent with life and since life is an increasing
progression toward complexity, Love and Strife are also co-emergent with complexity.
Since complexity is a mixture of the elements, a coming together, which Love facilitates
as the attractive force, unbridled Love leads to a singularity and an undifferentiated unity.
It leads to the Sphairos – the big crunch of the cosmos into a singular, uniform, even
sphere, in which all is equal and there are no qualities.
To balance this extreme, then, Strife arises as an opposing force insofar as it pushes
things apart, i.e., it pushes the mixture of elements apart. The purpose of Strife is to reign
in Love. It prevents the tendency toward undifferentiated unity. It preserves the mixture
of elements by destabilizing the attractive forces of Love. Unchecked, however, Strife
leads to Akosmia – the big rip of the cosmos into elemental tatters, disjointed and
unconnected. This process of stability and instability, balance and unbalance is a
continual process, which is represented in the forces of Love and Strife. Thus, in either
extreme, total Love, or total Strife, lies death and destruction, and as seen from the optics
of life, evil. In fragment B112 of On Nature, Empedocles explains,
O friends who dwell in the great city on the yellow
Acragas, on the high citadel, caring about good deeds,
honorable harbors for strangers, unacquainted with evil,
greetings! (emphasis added). 25
Empedocles suggests that the Acragantines are unacquainted with evil, which is contrary
to historical findings, as the Acragantines waged war against Syracuse in c. 445 BCE.
Empedocles is suggesting that the Acragantines lack the moral sensibility necessary for
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differentiating good and evil. Clearly, evil needed to be defined, and Empedocles
implores his brethren of Acragas to remain morally accountable for their action. In her
analysis of fragment B112, Catherine Osborne writes,
It is in the light of what Empedocles proceeds to revel that
we perceive the ambiguities of the value judgments implied
in B112…The Acragantines turn out to be, in a very real
sense…inexperienced or ignorant of evil…They have not
learnt what evil is, that the very acts which the place in
such high regard are the worst evils, and that their
prosperity, their non-acquaintance with misfortune and evil,
is illusory. 26
The tensions among the Acragantines are reflected within Love and Strife, in an infinite
battle between the two forces of nature. Empedocles characterizes Love as a force of
unity and symbolizes it as a circle. He characterizes Strife as a force of disunity and
symbolizes it as a whirl. The distinctions between Love and Strife are more that mere
degree, Love seeks to unify the four roots and Strife seeks their destruction. The
destructive capacities of man aren’t inherently evil, but left unchecked can lead to the
eradication of all. Love too, if left unchecked will overpopulate the world and slip into
destruction.
Aristotle interprets Empedocles conceptions of Love and Strife as meaning both
Good and Evil. He writes,
Since it is apparent that nature also contains the opposite of
what is good, i.e., not only order and beauty but disorder
and ugliness, and that there are more bad and common
things than there are good and beautiful, another thinker
introduced Love and Strife as the representative causes of
these things. For if one follows and gives heed to the
26
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statements of Empedocles with a view to his meaning, and
not to his lisping expression in words, it will be found that
Love is the cause of Good, and Strife of Evil. Thus, it would
perhaps be correct that Empedocles in a sense spoke of Evil
and Good as first principles, and was the first to do so,
(emphasis added). 27
Empedocles’s metaphor of the circle and the whirl is best characterized in terms of a
pool of water. If the pool is still, it is ideal for drinking, breeding, bathing etc. Without
motion, without a disruptive current, the pool becomes stagnant. If the current is too
strong, however, and the pool whirls too forcefully, it becomes destructive. Animals that
would seek reprieve from the sun in the waters depths would be pulled by the current and
eventually drowned. Thus, a balance must be met. The pool must be still enough to
accommodate the possibility of its many functions, but its current must be strong enough
to remove the waste and excess buildup that, if left unchecked, would contaminate its
waters.
Empedocles writes,
for the uniting of all things brings one generation into being
and destroys it, and the other is reared and scattered as they
are again being divided. And these things never cease their
continuous exchange of position, at one time all coming
together into one through Love, at another again being
borne away from each other by Strife's repulsion. 28
Empedocles recognizes that the dialectic nature of Love and Strife. Love and Strife are a
function of an infinite attempt to maintain balance between these forces. The
Acragantines could not recognize that a balance must be attained between Love and
Strife, between creation and destruction, and were, therefore, incapable of recognizing
27
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their own evils. Strife, then, is a necessary component of existence, but it is to be kept in
balance by our recognition of its destructive nature.
Empedocles’ predecessor, Heraclitus, suggested the more forceful claim that, “Good
and Evil are one,” 29 which is not to suggest that they carry the same meaning or share the
same account of change, rather, for Heraclitus, good and evil are ascribed meaning
through their oppositional relation, i.e., one cannot understand goodness without evil or
evil without goodness; good and evil are specifically human phenomenon because of this
requirement for understanding. These conception, then, are defined in terms of their
binary opposition. Heraclitus’ monistic view predates Empedocles’ pluralism. For
Heraclitus, the totality of reality could be explained in terms of its derivation from fire, as
the primordial substance, whereas, Empedocles argues for the ‘four root’ as a pluralistic
account of the same.
Heraclitus was arguably the first Presocratic philosopher to offer a complete account
of change in his cosmogony. A conception of change is necessary in any monistic
account because the world is composed of more that just one substance. Heraclitus’
account that everything is derived from fire does not fall prey to Anaximander’s critique
of Thales, who suggested that everything is composed of water. Anaximander challenged
his teacher (Thales) one the notion that everything could be derived from water, on the
basis that at least one thing could not, viz., fire, since fire is in opposition to water.
Heraclitus’ account differs insofar as fire has the capacity to account for the plurality of
substances. If there is fire and paper (2 substances) and the paper is placed into the fire,
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the product is ash, which is neither paper nor fire. The destructive capacity of fire is
capable of creating new substances. Thus, Heraclitus’ cosmogony can account for change
and the multiplicity of substances.
William Chase Greene writes,
Heraclitus includes both Good and Evil, as correlatives,
within a natural system which presents an analogy with
primitive moral law; human good and evil, however, are
related to a specifically human attitude and activity, as with
the Atomists and Stoics. 30
This binary opposition facilitates in identifying each half, that which is good is defined
by its oppositional relation to evil, and that which is evil is defined by it oppositional
relation to good.
Thus, the Presocratics sought to articulate the conception of evil in terms of its
relation to that which is good. Through an understanding of the good, one is better
equipped to understand evil and the nature of this relationship. A cosmogony and the
descriptive account of how things came to be must incorporate these conceptions of good
and evil as fundamentally and inextricability bound to the origins of the universe. As
noted in the previous section, the association of order and entropy, the balance of life
always teetering on total systemic collapse is a facticity of not only the formation of the
universe, but also our lives. The duality of these forces is in effect two sides to the same
coin. To reject one is to reject the other and to affirm one is to affirm the other. The
forces of good and evil, like fire and water, are the primordial forces of the universe.
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1.5. Socratic Conceptions of Evil: 424 BCE- 210 CE
Like the Eastern philosophers that predated them, Ancient Greek’s also had
conceptions of virtue and morality, which prescribed proper moral action. Plato, for
example, suggests that our actions should reflect moderation, sôphrosynê. 31 In the
Charmides, he and Critias discuss the nature of man’s search for happiness, which is
inextricably bound to moderation and the knowledge of good and evil.
Socrates. Yet I should like to know one thing more. Which
of the different kinds of knowledge makes [man] happy?
…
Critias. The knowledge with which he discerns good and
evil.
Socrates. You villain! I said. You have been carrying me
round in a circle, and all this time hiding from me the fact
that it is not the life according to knowledge which makes
men act rightly and be happy, not even if it be knowledge
of all the sciences, but one science only, that of good and
evil (emphasis added). 32
For Plato, the form of happiness is intertwined with our acts of moderation and the
knowledge of good and evil. The form of our happiness resides outside this world –it is
transcendent– yet moderation functions as a vehicle, within this world, leading us toward
that transcendence.
Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle championed the idea that function and form were
one in the same, that material objects attained formal cause not in their matter (thisness)
or in the work needed to bring about the object (the efficient cause) but in the form itself.
Form inheres within matter, thus, substance equals form and matter. For Aristotle, good
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and evil were kept in balance by arête (virtue). Like the pre-Socratics, Aristotle sought to
resolve the polemics of good and evil. He writes,
And also for the sake of mere life (in which there is
possibly some noble element so long as the evils of
existence do not greatly overbalance the good) mankind
meet together and maintain the political community. And
we all see that men cling to life even at the cost of enduring
great misfortune, seeming to find in life a natural sweetness
and happiness. 33
For Aristotle, moderation is the path to arête, between excess and deprivation, which
he investigates at length in the Ethics. In discussing the nature of evil, Aristotle notes,
“excess can be manifested in all [including love]…yet all are not found in the same
person. Indeed, they could not; for evil destroys even itself, and if it is complete becomes
unbearable.” 34 He suggests that evil eventually destroys itself. It undermines its own end,
which correlates to Laozi’s claim that, “Those who think [weapons] are beautiful, rejoice
in killing people. Those who rejoice in killing people cannot achieve their purpose in this
world.” 35
The commonality between Laozi and Aristotle is shared by Plato’s account of evil in
the Gorgias. The following discussion between Polus and Socrates demonstrates the
point.
Socrates. Which do you consider the worse, Polus, to do or
to suffer wrong?
Polus. I? To suffer wrong.
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Socrates. Well, and is it more shameful to do or to suffer
wrong?
Polus. To do wrong…
Socrates. Then to inflict wrong is worse than to suffer it
through an excess of evil. 36
Plato offers an interesting account in the Gorgias by trying to reconcile the difference
between inflicting evil, on the one hand, and being made to suffer evil, on the other. It is
important to see that for Plato, one’s attempt to inflict pain, to exacerbate another
person’s suffering, is more heinous an act than having to endure suffering. Thus, Plato
describes two properties of evil. On the one hand, he discusses suffering as a property of
evil, but on the other hand, he also acknowledges the troubles of deliberately inflicting
harm. In our continued discussion of the causes of evil, then, one must acknowledge that
deliberately inflicting harm is a fundamental cause of evil.
In attempting to forego evil, Plato demarcates its types, there is the evil of intent and
the evil one suffers. In demarcating its types, one is better equipped to analyze the
concept of evil, so as not to confuse one form of evil with another. The type of evil
associated with the intent of causing one to suffer, is worse than the type of evil wherein
one is made to suffer. Recognizing this distinction between types allows one to moderate
or ultimately forgo engaging in acts of evil. In our attempts to understand the many
causes of evil, as moral agents, we must recognize the role of suffering and the deliberate
attempt to inflict harm as essential sources for the proliferation of evil. In the next
chapter, I will incorporate these conceptions of harm and suffering into an overall
discussion of genocide theory and the act of genocide as the greatest manifestation of
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evil. Genocide, as enacted within the external world, however, is itself buttressed on
notions of deliberate harm and the perpetration of suffering.
The stoic philosophy of Seneca ushered in the dawn of the Common Era with an
insightful investigation into the nature of providence and evil, wherein he addresses the
difficulties faced by the deterministic aspects of providence, and the obvious presence of
evil. If our lives are fated and deviations from that fate are impossible, yet we experience
evil in our daily lives, what sense can be made from the relation of its existence and
providence? One may argue that such an outlook of pessimism ultimately dooms, i.e.,
fates, the moral agent to suffer the ills of evil without the possibility of reprieve. Seneca
suggests that evil makes us stronger. It makes us more resilient.
Why do many misfortunes fall to the lot of good men? It is
not possible that any evil can befall a good man…He
maintains he poise and assimilates all that falls to his lot to
his own complexion, for he is more potent than the world
without. I do not maintain that he is insensible to externals,
but that he overcomes them…All adversity he regards as
exercise. 37
Though Seneca offers neither a metaphysical account of evil nor a description of how it
manifest within our lives, he does offer insight into coping with its existence. For Seneca,
evil builds character. It allows a man to overcome adversity, to define himself as resilient,
capable of enduring great sufferings. He suggests that, “No one is more unhappy…than a
man who has never met with adversity. He has never had the privilege of testing himself”
(emphasis added). 38
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With regard to that privilege, Seneca is suggesting that through suffering, we grow
callous to suffering, which serves as a testament to the resilience of human beings. We
identify ourselves through our abilities to overcome suffering. He writes, “By suffering
misfortunes, the mind grows able to belittle suffering.” 39 Our endurance, then, our ability
to persevere despite great adversity, is the hallmark of a good man.
Though Seneca speaks to the resilience and character that is cultivated through one’s
sufferings, if it is believed that a divinity is the ultimate creator of the universe, and that
good men exist alongside evil, “Why does God allow evil to happen to good men?” 40
This question speaks more to the problem of evil and the causes of evil. For Seneca, evil
is an instrument of perseverance. The more one perseveres, the more one experiences
evil. The more one experiences evil, the better equipped one is for facing the brutal
realities of life. Thus, the more one perseveres, the better equipped one is for facing the
brutal realities of life. Perseverance allows us to overcome a lifetime of struggle. Seneca
suggests that our suffering is, “to teach others to endure [suffering]” 41 The ultimate end
of suffering is a greater ability to endure more suffering as evident in the claim, “Scorn
pain: either it will go away or you will” 42 Death becomes trivial and unlike many other
that characterize death as the ultimate evil, for Seneca, death is a release, an escape from
a lifetime of suffering.
One would certainly be justified in labeling Seneca’s stoicism as pessimistic. The
more dubious claim that human beings are controlled by providence rather than freedom,
39
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all the while enduring the greatest evils, disturbed a new generation of philosophical
skeptics. Thus, in attempting to understand the concept of evil one cannot truly
conceptualize the grandeur of its destructive capacities without also acknowledging its
ability to exacerbate suffering and ultimately destroy human life. The willful attempt to
proliferate the suffering of other and the wholesale destruction of human life is the
greatest manifestation of evil. Through its manifestation, however, those that survive the
onslaught of evil will retain a greater resilience to survive. Through their survival, former
victims of evil serves as the greatest source and hope for understanding the nature of evil,
and as Seneca has suggested, their struggle emboldens future generations of sufferers to
persevere through the ills of evil.
1.6. Hindu Mysticism and the Concept of Evil
In articulating this balance, there were variations in how the concept of evil is
formalized. Patañjali was a Hindu mystic believed to have lived between the 2nd-3rd
century C.E. and author of the widely influential Yoga-Sūtras. His Yoga-Sūtras is based
on the Samkhya school of Hindu philosophy, which teaches that all matter is derived
from prakrti (primal Nature) and its three constituent gunas, viz., sattva (being, existence,
light), rajas (change, energy), and tamas (resistance, darkness). The three gunas are the
foundation for all existing things. There unification results in the creation of the external
world, which are but manifestations of their essences. Patañjali explains,
The nature of each different Guna is influenced by the
nature of the other two Gunas. Gunas are perceived in
objects which are manifestations of their mutations. In each
manifestation, the three Gunas are combined. When
analyzed, it shows Sattva on one side, Tamas on the other,
and Rajas in the middle. When we speak of Sattva, Rajas
33

and Tamas are bound to be there…[Thus] Gunas combine
to produce all objects and they act by mutual cooperation. 43
It is our attachments to others, to wealth, and even to our own minds, which serves as the
true source of evil. In the highest stage of self-liberation, Patañjali writes, “the highest
form of detachment is achieved in the mind ceasing to act, the Seer is said to be in a state
of Kaivalya or liberation.” 44 Patañjali’s account of the Yoga-Sūtras and the conception of
self-liberation spread to foreign countries and were quickly translated by others.
Some of the first known translations of Patañjali’s work were by the Persian
philosopher and natural scientist, Abū ar-Rayhān Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Bīrūnī, also
known as al-Bīrūnī (973-c.1050), who translated the original Sanskrit text into Arabic.
There is some debate, however, over the accuracy of Al-Bīrūnī’s translation of Patañjali’s
Yoga-sūtras, 45 but there is consensus on the influence and purpose of Patañjali’s
philosophy. In a further elaboration of this process of self-liberation, Al-Bīrūnī translates
Patañjali, writing,
Q6. How can the quelling of the soul and the compression
of its faculties away from external things be
accomplished?...
Ans. This may be accomplished…[by] intellectual, namely
mental asceticism, which consist of contemplating the
consequences with the eye of the heart, and considering the
evil of the existents, which come into being and pass away.
For nothing is worse than decaying and passing away, these
two being inherent in (the existents)…For they are the
43
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causes of attachment to things existing in the world, and
add to the evils of bondage, and prevent him from
addressing himself single-mindedly to his liberation. 46
Death is part of life. To relinquish our attachments, then, is to transcend death, as death is
but a loss of one’s attachment to another. Thus, in self-liberation and the ultimate act of
Kaivalya (liberation of the mind), one transcends death and all attachments including
one’s attachment to one’s self. According to Patañjali, this is truly the triumph of good
over evil.
This mystic conception of self-liberation differs from the conception of original sin
insofar as the power to overcome evil resides within the individual. We are not burdened
by the guilt of original sin and the process of overcoming evil is clearly defined. This
process is undertaken by recognition of one’s need to attain Kaivalya and total selfliberation. Evil can have no hold of the Yogi since he is without attachments, and the fear
of loss will not motivate an evil action to preserve that which is inherently mortal or
prone to decay. Thus, Patañjali’s Yoga-Sūtras serves as an alternative, non-Western, nonChristian, account of our relationship to evil, which exists and arises from a fear of loss.
Remember it was Mencius’s discussion of fear and anxiety that led to the corruption of
the small man and the king, and the act of attempting to circumvent the process of our
socialization that led to the greatest injustice, which is the appearance of justice without
an obligation to the moral law. Later in the discussion, I will return to Patañjali’s mystic
conception of self-liberation in a contemporary account of political evil.
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1.7. Medieval Conceptions of the Problem Evil: 160-1274 CE
The discussion of evil reached its peak during the middle ages. As a point of
clarification, I will discuss evil, in this section of the analysis, in terms of the theological
problem that pertains to the traditional argument for the existence of evil in light of God’s
characteristics, viz., his omnipotence, omniscience and his benevolence. Towards the
end of this section, I shall return to a discussion of the concept of evil and draw my
conclusions.
St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo Regius, rejected the notion that God has abandoned
us in a cosmos where everything is evil and proposed an alternate account: man, not God,
is the source of evil. This goes against Seneca’s stoic conception of fate and providence,
and is an embrace of man’s freedom of will. For centuries, theologians have grappled
with the existence of evil, attempting to reconcile its presence with the existence of an
omnipotent and benevolent God. 47
On this account of Augustine, Paul Vincent Space writes:
There is a paradox about evil in the world, at least there is a
paradox if you believe in any kind of traditional God. If
God (a) knows about evil by his omniscience, (b) has
the power to prevent it by his omnipotence, and (c) is
benevolent and just and so will arrange things to avoid evil
wherever he can (which in virtue of (a) and (b), means that
he will avoid it everywhere), then it looks as though there
can be no evil in the world. It has been successfully
prevented by a power strong enough to do so. And yet God
47
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is supposed to have all these properties, even though there
is evil in the world. 48
If in attempting to account for the problem of evil, one denies God’s love, one raises
the issue of absentee deism. Absentee deism is the belief that God created the universe
but that after the creation of the universe he abandoned his creation, leaving us to fend for
ourselves. Thus, it accounts for the existence of evil by denying God’s benevolence.
St. Augustine explicitly denies this suggestion. His contribution to analyzing the
problem of evil arose from his refusal to deny God’s characteristics or the existence of
evil, i.e., he embraced both the belief in the existence of evil and all three of God’s
characteristics. In order, then, to integrate both, St. Augustine had to find an account for
the existence of evil, one that did not compromise God’s characteristics. St. Augustine
found this alternative in man’s free will. Within the will, man had the ability to exercise
his freedom, and God, being the benevolent being He is, could not limit man’s freedom.
Evil, so St. Augustine, enters the cosmos through the corruption of man’s will.
The fundamental account for this initial corruption arises from man’s original sin.
The original sin occurred when, according to biblical text, Adam and Eve transgressed
and disobeyed God’s commandment not to eat of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and
Evil. In their transgression, their eyes were opened to the evils of this world and they
realized that they could act as they pleased. In breaking God’s law they were punished,
ejected from the Garden of Eden and forced to fend for themselves.
Augustine discusses the nature of man’s will in relation to God’s power and the
ramification of original sin, writing:
48
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the first evil act of will, preceding as it did, all evil works in
man, was rather a falling away from the work of God to the
will’s own works than any one work; and those works were
evil because they followed the will’s own pattern and not
God’s. Thus, the will itself, or man himself in so far as he
was possessed of an evil will, was the evil tree, as it were,
that bore the evil fruit that those works represented. 49
Augustine argues that it is man’s weakness of will and his inherent freedom to exercise
that will, which has lead to the proliferation of evil. Since Augustine is not denying the
existence of evil, and he acknowledges that God is the creator of the cosmos, and evil
exists within the cosmos, then his account of man’s freedom of the will, offers an
explanation as to how evil exists and how its existence cannot be attributed to God.
Through exercising his freedom, man is able to follow his own will instead of the will
of God. After eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, man became aware to
corruption and disobedience. His awareness is a direct result of his disobedience. Thus, in
disobeying God’s will, man placed primacy on his own will. The will of a man, however,
is often incapable of properly distinguishing between instances of good and evil and
therefore prone to the proliferation of evil throughout the world. Augustine writes,
“The eyes of both” we are told, “were opened,” yet not that
they might see, since they could see already, but that they
might distinguish between the good that they had lost and
the evil into which they had fallen. This also explains why
the tree itself, which was to enable them to make such a
distinction if they laid hands on it to eat its fruit in spite of
the prohibition, what named for that fact and called the tree
of the knowledge of good and evil.50
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The true nature of man, however, is to obey the will of God. The fall was a contingent
event wherein we chose to disobey. In disobeying the will of God, those that now attempt
to walk in the faith, as it were, face additional evils that are not faced by nonbelievers. 51
Thus, the righteous will be made to bear not only the suffering of “evils common to good
and bad” but also a species of evil of their own. Augustine writes,
[Evil] would never have existed anywhere if our nature had
still remained upright as it was created. Hence also this
conflict of ours, on which depends our salvation, and from
which we desire to be freed in final victory, is one of the
evils of this life. And so by the evidence of these evils, so
many and so great, we prove that this life is one of
condemnation. 52
This life is condemned. It has been defiled by man’s freedom of the will, which has
placed his desires above the will of God. Nonetheless, there is reprieve in heaven.
Augustine’s dualism shuns this world for the afterlife, shuns desire for abstinence, and
attributes the problem of evil to man’s corrupted will and his ability to exercise his
freedom. 53
Ernesto Bonaiuti and Giorgio La Piana discuss Augustine’s interpretation of evil in
terms of his account of original sin and his strict tenets of predestination. Though it is not
often noted, Augustine argued in De libero Arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will), that the
original substance of Adam and Eve and the Garden of Eden was one of an “ethereal
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substance.” 54 Bonaiuti and La Piana then argue that, under biblical interpretations, Adam
and Eve’s bodies were made physical, i.e., the punishment of sin is death. Death is the
decomposition of physical substance. An ethereal substance would lack divisibility and
therefore lack the ability to die. What is of interest in my analysis of the concept of evil is
not the view which argues for death as the greatest evil, rather I am interested in St.
Augustine’s conception that our punishment for disobeying God’s laws was embodiment.
An ontological question arises with Augustine’s conception of ethereal substances,
one which, until now, has yet to have been addressed, i.e., does the ontology of evil
require embodiment? The answer, for Augustine, is simple enough, as he affirms that it
does. Quite obviously, contemporary metaphysicians may classify themselves as idealists
or materialist. Those supporting the existence of evil can certainly be found in both
camps. Thus, the question arises, in an Augustinian sense, as to the nature of evil and
embodiment. The idealist may argue for the existence of evil but deny the requirement
for embodiment and the materialist may also argue for the existence of evil and affirm the
requirement for the same. It would be very interesting to see how this argument would
develop within the discourse of evil. I would anticipate that as the difficulties of
defending these two stances would unfold, one would further gain insight into the
ontological nature of evil and its specific relation to embodiment.
St. Augustine also faced the further historical pressure of differentiating Roman
Catholicism from both Manichean and Pelagian interpretations of the gospel. Gillian
Evans captures this tension nicely writing,
54
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The Pelagian regarded the lust of the flesh as a natural
good; the Manichees think that it has been an evil thing
from all eternity; the Catholic date the evil in it from the
fall of Adam. The Pelagian says that even a wicked man
can do good by his own free will; the Manichees deny that
it is from a man’s free will that evil takes its beginning; the
Catholics maintain that each man is the source of his own
evil and that no one can do good of himself. 55
It is interesting to note that the main conceptual difference between each of the three
systems of belief pertains to the role of evil within a devotee’s life. Though Augustine’s
account is theological in its nature, he is more accurately, here, concerned with
articulating various concepts of evil, rather than couching the discourse in terms of the
problem.
As noted in Evans’s account, the concept of evil and the effect it has on a
parishioner’s life, unfolds in vastly different ways. For Pelagians, sexual pleasure is a
natural good, whereas for the Manicheans it a natural evil. Catholics locate the existence
of evil within the moral agent’s exercise of the will, whereas the Manicheans deny this
claim. It is not so much that these arguments regress into relativism, which is of any
concern here. Rather, that the discourse on evil was structured in terms of its
manifestation and proliferation instead of attempting to consolidate its existence with that
of God’s characteristics, at least demonstrates that the concept of evil, though tenuous,
was of interest even within theological discourse. Separating the two, however, i.e.,
totally separating a discourse of evil from theological analysis would have been sacrilege.
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As has been noted, various philosophers at the beginning of the Common Era tackled
the problem of evil by relating its existence to our freedoms, some suggesting that we are
free to determine the course of our lives, others arguing the contrary. Nevertheless, God’s
relation to mankind as the creative force behind our existence was contrasted by the
conception that human beings are inherently free. On the one hand, the existence of evil
and God’s divine providence for mankind, as noted by Seneca, is divorced from a
conception of a caring God, insofar as God’s providence includes evil, on the other hand,
the existence of evil is necessitated by our freedom of will. Thus, either God is uncaring
or, as Augustine noted, it is man that exercises his will and as such serves as the source
for the proliferation of evil.
Sextus Empiricus of the Pyrrhonian School offered one of the first arguments for the
problem of evil, which directly challenged the conception of a monotheistic God. He
argues that evil becomes a problem for the theists because there is an inability to
reconcile the obvious existence of evil with the existence of God. He argues that God is
attributed with three characteristics that are incompatible with evil. God is said to be
omnipotent, omniscient and omni-benevolent.
If God were omnipotent, he would have the power to prevent the occurrence of evil.
However, evil exists, which challenges the notion that God is omnipotence. If God were
omniscient, he would know that evil exists and would use this knowledge to prevent its
occurrence. Since evil exists, we are led to believe that God is not omniscient. Finally, if
God were omni-benevolent his love for us would motivate him to prevent the occurrence
of evil, but evil exists, which leads us to believe that God does not love us.
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The implications of Sextus’ argument challenge the core beliefs of Christianity. In
defending the existence of God, some have denied the existence of evil and thereby
preserved the characteristics of God. I will discuss such attempts in chapter 3. Others
have suggested that God is not omnipotent as his has created the laws of nature to which
even he is bound. But few deny the omniscience and omni-benevolence of God.
For centuries after he first presented his argument, philosophers and theologians alike
have attempted to resolve the fundamental conflict between the existence of evil and the
three characteristics of God. The attempt to resolve this tension cannot arise within the
context of a theological account for the problem of evil. One must shift the analysis from
the problem of evil to a discussion of the concept of evil, a discussion that can be fully
articulated within secular terms. In his description of the problem of evil, Sextus writes,
Anyone who asserts that God exists either says that God
takes care of the things in the cosmos or that he does not,
and, if he does take care, that it is either all of things or
some. Now if he takes care of everything, there would be
no particular evil thing and no evil in general in the
cosmos; but the Dogmatists say that everything is full of
evil; therefore God shall not be said to take care of
everything. On the other hand if he takes care of only some
things, why does he take care of these and not those? For
either he wishes but is not able, or he is able but does not
wish, or he neither wishes nor is able. (emphasis added) 56
The discussion of evil shifted significantly from the more modest claim to live a life of
balance and moderation, espoused by so many before the Common Era, to an indictment
of God’s inability to shield humanity from the evils of the world. Effectively, then, the
discussion shifted from an analysis of the concept of evil to an analysis of the problem of
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evil, the former accounts for the conceptual nature of evil’s manifestation within the
world and the latter accounts for how that manifestation affects the nature of God’s
divine existence. The concept of evil can be articulated purely in secular terms, whereas
the problem of evil is primarily a theological discussion.
A dramatic shift, then, has occurred in the discussion of evil: rather than bemoaning
the harsh nature of suffering that we must bear, rather than labeling death as the greatest
evil inflicted upon humanity, Sextus implicates God as bastardizing His creation. We
have been left to fend for ourselves, irrespective of fate or divine providence; God has
abandoned us in a cosmos where, “everything is full of evil”. Despite Sextus’ skepticism
and his indictment of God as absentee deity, he does offer an account of good and evil:
If, then, there exists anything good by nature or anything
evil by nature, this thing ought to be common for all men
and good or evil for all. For just as fire which is warmthgiving by nature warms all men, and does not warm some
but chill others…what is good by nature ought to be good
for all…but there is nothing good or evil common to
all…therefore there does not exist anything good or evil by
nature. 57
Surprisingly, Sextus’ account of good and evil is to refute the possibility of their nature.
Unlike the capriciousness of God’s care, or even more forcefully said, his responsibility
to his creation, which follows no conceivable logic, Sextus applies the most rigorous
skeptical doubt in conceptualizing the nature of good and evil. Since being good or evil
by nature would entail an ability to universalize, under every circumstance, either
conception, and interpretations of these facts are (arguably) subjective matters, Sextus’
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suggest that it is impossible to generalize the nature of good and evil. Thus, he concludes,
there is nothing that is inherently good or evil.
Though this conclusion may seem to follow from the premises, there are a number of
problems in Sextus’ argument. First, that the nature of good and evil, if the existence of
such things are called into question, is contingent on subjective interpretations, in no
sense serves to refute the possibility of their existence. It only demonstrates a difficulty in
distilling their nature from an event, a feat that presents no logical contradiction.
Determinations of good and evil are complex assessments that require not only moral
determinations, but political determinations as well, which is essentially an empirical
process. Determinations of good and evil can be made in this regard, which is not to
discredit Sextus’ claim, by appealing to political rather than moral determinations.
Furthermore, all human beings have bodies and those bodies are either healthy or sick.
Sickness or disease yields suffering and misery whereas health points to wellbeing and an
ability to flourish. On the level of embodiment, then, good and evil are physically or biomedically universal. Our embodiment is a necessary feature of our humanity and as such,
our identification with these conceptions directly pertains to how an understanding of
these concepts affects our bodies. As we have seen in the previous section, in account for
evil one must also acknowledge the role of suffering, which is itself contingent on the
idea of an embodied being. Thus, embodiment as the nature of our existence serves as the
requisite framework with which we truly come to understand notions of good and evil.
Secondly, his use of the word ‘nature’ is vague. One can argue that the attempt to
define the ‘nature’ of evil, as an essential component to understanding how we identify
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events as evil is a meaningless prospect, since determinations of evil depend on the
nature of the event rather than the nature of evil. In fact, one could grant Sextus the claim
that evil has no nature and still demonstrate conditions wherein its manifestation yields
the judgment that an event is evil. I will present such a case in chapter two. The very
thought that one can either prove or disprove the existence of evil based on defining its
nature, presupposes its existence—inevitably begging the question. The question is not
whether there is a nature to evil, but whether we can identify conditions that lead to the
determination that an event is evil. Evil, then, does not exist as a concept whose nature
can be articulated based on some set of universals. Rather, evil exists as an empirical
phenomenon of our shared reality, which can be logically assessed from the nature of the
event in question—not the nature of evil itself.
Sextus’ critique of God in light of the problem of evil challenges the conception of
God’s characteristics. Omnipotence, omniscience and omni-Benevolence are three
characteristics that are attributed to God. For most, the existence of evil is readily
apparent and, therefore, undeniable. However, God’s attributes, viz., his omnipotence,
omniscience and omni-benevolence, are incongruous with the existence of evil. If (1)
God is omnipotent, (2), God is omniscient, and (3) God is benevolent, and one
acknowledges the existence of evil, then the following truth table represents the problems
with adhering to all four claims.
It is argued that God cannot retain all three attributes simultaneously. If God is
omniscient and benevolent, and one acknowledges the existence of evil, then God cannot
be omnipotent because if He were, His love and His knowledge of evil’s existence would
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compel Him to act on our behalf. Thus, though He may be said to be omniscient and
benevolent it cannot be true that He is omnipotent in the face of such evil, (2&3) are true
but (1) is false. If it is argued that God is omnipotent and benevolent, and one
acknowledges the existence of evil, then God cannot be omniscient because if He were,
his love and his unlimited power would allow Him to prevent the occurrence of evil, were
He to know of its existence. Thus, though He may be said to be omnipotent and
benevolent, it cannot be true that He is omniscient, (1&3) are true but (2) is false. Finally
then, if it is argued that God is omnipotent and omniscient, and one acknowledges the
existence of evil, then God cannot be benevolent because if He were, his power and His
knowledge of evil would compel Him to prevent evil from ever occurring. Thus, though
he may be said to be omnipotent and omniscient it cannot be true that he is benevolent,
and this presents the ultimate critique against God’s existence. If he knows that evil exists
and He has the power to prevent its existence, but He does not because He does not love
us, there can be no God, or at best, He would be an absentee deity that has bastardized all
of His creation, (1&2) are true but (3) is false.
These references to the characteristics of God and the difficulties that arise over evil,
is properly termed the problem of evil. Essentially, then, the problem of evil is a
theological puzzle, rooted in monotheistic religion and only incidentally related to
philosophical analysis.
More specifically, however, a discussion of the problem of evil requires the historical
context with which emphasis was placed on the individual moral agent’s use of free will,
as the problem of evil is inextricably bound to the agent’s exercise of freedom and God’s
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knowledge that such freedom would invariably result in the existence of evil. Thus, on
moral grounds, since freedom is being assumed, responsibility and knowledge for proper
actions, in accordance with a governing moral code, must also be assumed.
There were those philosophers who combined the discussion of free will with an
analysis of political life, more so than simply discussing freedom in terms of particular
moral agency. Within Islamic culture, al-Fārābī (Alfarabi), whose full name was Abū
Nasr Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Tarkhān Ibn Awzalagh al-Fārābī, was such a
thinker. He is regarded as the founding father of Islamic political thought. He
commented extensively on both Plato and Aristotle. His theories of political life were
heavily influenced by the Republic.
For Alfarabi, accounting for evil was simple. Evil resulted from the misery of our
voluntary actions. In expressing our freedom, human beings have the ability to choose
how they will govern themselves and in so doing it is inevitable that some will
deliberately seek to inflict suffering on others. For Alfarabi, this capacity to act is an
existing fact for all human beings.
There are, however, alternatives to this capacity. Alfarabi discusses the virtues of the
soul, such as self restraint. These abilities serve to counter our inclinations toward evil. In
seeking to cause other people to suffer or to increase their misery, Alfarabi suggests that
we think in terms of how that desire may undermine the stability of the state.
If every citizen within the state were to seek to inflict suffering on others, quickly the
state would slip into chaos and cease to exist. To prevent this disaster, Alfarabi suggests
that we learn to control our impulses and think in terms of our interconnectedness rather
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than our difference. In appealing to our similarities rather than our differences, Alfarabi’s
account of evil and its relation to the political speaks to the shared obligation of humanity
to preserve life.
For Alfarabi, our voluntary actions define who we are as human beings. The person
who chooses self restraint and moderation will invariably lead a virtuous life. Living a
virtuous life strengthens the state, whereas seeking to harm other and increasing their
misery leads to evil and the ultimate destruction of the state.
Within Alfarabi’s political philosophy, he discusses the nature of evil (sharr) and
characterizes its two types, a characterization that preceded St. Anselm’s discourse of the
same. 58 In The Political Writings, Alfarabi suggests the following:
Evil does not exist at all, not in anything of these worlds
and, in general, in that whose existence is not at all due to
human volition…That is because evil is of two types. One
is the misery opposite to happiness. And the second is
everything such that misery is obtained by means of it.
Misery is evil in that it is the goal one comes to without
there being beyond that a greater evil to which one comes
by means of misery. The second is the voluntary actions
such as to lead to misery. 59
Alfarabi clearly defines the existence of two forms of evil, both of which are described in
terms of misery, as the ultimate goal of evil. In analyzing evil, a difference in typology
does not reflect a difference in teleology, since misery is the goal for both types.
Distinctions in type, however, do reflect distinctions in the nature of their existence. For
Alfarabi, one form of evil results from “the misery opposite to happiness” and the other
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from “the voluntary actions [that] lead to misery.” 60 With respect to the relationship
between evil and free will, then, it is important to note that free will, i.e., one’s “voluntary
actions,” only account for the second type of evil. With respect to defining man’s
predisposition toward evil, Alfarabi continues,
It is not likely to find a human being endowed so perfectly
from the onset that no disparity is found in him at all and
that the rest of his actions, his way of life, and his moral
habits flow according to justice and equity without
inclining to any of the extremes or to the tyranny of some
contraries over others. 61
For Alfarabi, it is evil if our voluntary actions are such that their occurrence leads to
misery. Granted, our imperfections as human beings will always lead to faulty reasoning,
which in turn leads to misery, but the intent of our actions must be governed by virtue.
The virtuous person will shun evil and embrace goodness, and will be an asset to the city,
whereas, the person without virtue will embrace evil and must be cast from the city.
Alfarabi writes,
Evils are made to cease in cities either by virtues that are
established in the souls of the people or by their becoming
self-restrained. Any human being whose evil cannot be
made to cease by a virtue being established in his soul or by
self-restrain is to be put outside the cities. 62
For Alfarabi, then, evil threatens the stability of the city and thus the state. If we are to
safeguard the state, we must seek to instill virtue into the lives of every citizen;
otherwise, it will spread, destroying the population and inevitably destabilizing the state.
Thus, for Alfarabi, evil is defined in terms of the misery that results from voluntary
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action. Since laws are passed by governmental officials to protect the lives and wellbeing
of its citizenry, the existence of malignant forces within the population, seeking to
proliferate misery, undermines the ability of the state to protect its people, which justifies
Alfarabi’s claim that, “Any human being whose evil cannot be made to cease…is to be
put outside the cities.”
As noted earlier, in our discussion of Mencius’s critique of the king and his greed, the
security of the state rests within the hands of its government. For Alfarabi, evil arises
from two sources and either of these sources may also corrupt those charged with
safeguarding the lives of its citizenry. His conception is well defined and articulated.
Despite the variations in typology, however, the teleology is the same, the end being
exclusion. If the goal of a given ruler is to exclude those that would otherwise benefit
from inclusion, be it inclusive rights or accessibility to services, then the government
directly participates in exacerbating the misery of those within the excluded group. On an
Islamic conception of evil, the actions of the government would equally warrant
reproach. Thus, under Islamic code, both the moral agent and those charged with
governing the population are bound to proper moral action. Any intention, whether
vocalized or not, whether written or thought, to enact or prolong the misery of another
human being is deemed evil.
Anselm of Canterbury continues the discussion writing,
Let us turn now to a consideration of the will and recall the
conclusion to which we have come: namely, that the will
for happiness, whatever it wills, is not evil but a good
before receiving justice. From which it follows that, when
it abandons the justice received, if it is the same essence as
it was before, it is something good insofar as it exists, but
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insofar as justice is not in the thing that it was in, it is
called evil and unjust (emphasis added). 63
Anselm returns to a Platonic conception of justice (dikē) and further elaborates on the
interrelation between that which is just and that which is good. The conception of justice,
in a political sense is not novel to Anselm; it is a conception as old as Western
philosophy. What Anselm was able to contribute, however, was the union of justice and
injustice with the conceptions of good and evil. A further investigation of Anselm’s quote
revels that the deliberate attempt to remove justice from moral considerations is both
“evil and unjust.” If, in determining the morality of a given action, the moral agent
willfully removes or overlooks conception of justice and equality, fairness and inclusion,
for the intended purpose of excluding members of the community that would otherwise
be included in moral consideration, then the moral agent’s action ought to be considered,
according to Anselm, as evil and unjust. What is important to understand from Anselm’s
articulation of evil is the emphasis he places on the agent’s will and the exercise of his
freedom in determining which action to take. If, in determining the appropriate course of
action, I intentionally disregard the moral considerations of an agent, how, then, am I to
hold claim to proper moral conduct. To remain consistent with proper moral conduct, I
ought to respect and recognize the freedom of other moral agents, all of whom hold the
same claim to exercising their freedom as I do. Thus, essential to a discussion of evil,
especially if the discussion focuses on conception of justice and morality, is the

63

Anselm, Brian Davies, and G. R. Evans. 1998. “On the Fall of the Devil.” In The major works.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. § 19, p. 221.

52

recognition of other wills, and other, possibly competing, modes of interpretation.
Otherwise, the moral agent cannot hold claim to inclusivity.
The argumentative difference between Anselm and Augustine’s conception of the
nature of the will, differ in the slightest regard, but it is an essential distinction. For
Augustine, we are free to determine our actions and evil is an absence of goodness, which
also holds true for Anselm. The difference being, however, that for Anselm,
the nature in which injustice is found is something evil,
because it is something real and differs from injustice
which is evil and is nothing. Therefore, what is real is made
by God and comes from him; what is nothing, that is evil, is
caused by the guilty and comes from him (emphasis
added). 64
Anselm’s argument here is a bit complex and arguably confusing, but it is important to
understand what is being said. The circumstances wherein we identify an act or event as
unjust, is itself an instance of evil, i.e., the particular, real world event, wherein an
atrocity occurs is an identifiable instance of evil. This identification of an evil event,
however, differs from the lack of goodness, which is also evil but posits no identifiable
existence. It is evil insofar as it is not good but it posits no positive (in the sense of actual)
evil. He later writes,
When the we hear the word ‘evil’ we do not fear the evil
that is nothing, but that which is something real and
follows the lack of the good. Many sufferings follow on
injustice and blindness and those in fact are nothing, but
these sufferings are evil and are something real and it is
these we fear when we hear the word ‘evil’. 65
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Anselm has two radically different conceptions of evil; there is, what I will call, the
conception of ‘evil as nothing’ and ‘evil as something’. I will argue two points. First the
conception of ‘evil as nothing’ is synonymous with, that which is not-good, and second,
that we equivocate in the use of the term ‘evil’ if we are interchangeably using ‘evil’ as
that which is not-good, (evil as nothing) on the one hand, and evil as a positive act of
exclusion and destruction, on the other. The two are not interchangeable. In the following
chapter, I will disregard the concept of ‘evil as nothing’ or the lack of goodness for a
positive (being actual) account of evil, which will require me to define and qualify what
is meant by the term.
Anselm’s account of the distinction between ‘evil as nothing’ and ‘evil as something’
and Alfarabi’s discussion of the two forms of evil are important contributions to a
philosophical investigation of evil. We are frequently equivocating in the use of the term
evil, which Anselm recognized and all too many have overlooked. We are not using the
term ‘evil’ in the same sense if we are defining an event that was not good from one’s
voluntary actions that led to evil, which has semantic rather than ontological importance.
For example, there is a difference in saying “Though he could swim, Bob did not save
Mary from drowning,” and saying, “Bob drowned Mary”. Many would suggest that both
are instances of evil, and they may be correct, but the use of the term ‘evil’ in formulating
an argument, cannot have two senses, i.e., we cannot use the term ‘evil’ to mean both that
which is not-good and that which results from one’s voluntary actions to do evil. Thus,
we are certainly justified in asking, “In what sense is the term ‘evil’ being used.” In
formulating an argument, we can use the former or the latter but not both.
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In this analysis, in referring to the term evil, I will always be referring to the
conception of evil as positing something positive. I will never use the term evil to
describe an instance of not being good. Though it is also correct to discuss evil in terms
of not being good, I will refrain from using this sense of the term. In the following
chapter, I will define the positive attributes that I have ascribed to evil and further define
what I mean by the term. Furthermore, it is not being suggested that these are the only
two senses of the term, to add more would only strengthen my point. My argument is
based on Anselm’s explanation of this difference, and as such, I will limit my use of the
term ‘evil’ to a positive account of evil as something.
Both Alfarabi and St. Anselm discuss evil in terms of the concept of evil, one form of
evil arising in opposition to that which is good, and the causes of evil as arising from
one’s voluntary actions. If voluntary action is based on one’s freedom of will, and the
will is the source of evil’s existence, then one’s voluntary action is the source of evil’s
existence. Might there, however, be some third omni-malevolent cause of evil? This
question is posed and answered by Saint Thomas Aquinas.
Saint Thomas Aquinas offered a comprehensive analysis of evil within his magnum
opus, Summa Theologica. Rather than surveying Aquinas’ discussion of evil, however, I
have selected two key points of interest for investigation. First, does Aquinas believe in
the existence of a supreme evil, as the cause of all lesser evils, which would function as
alternative cause of evil? And second, what is the signification of evil?
Regarding the first question, St. Aquinas ultimately disagrees with the conception that
a supreme evil could exist, but he poses the following argument.

55

Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But the
supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every
good…Therefore, also, there is a supreme evil opposed to it
as the cause of every evil. Further, as we find good and
better things, so we find evil and worse. But good and
better are so considered in relation to what is best.
Therefore, evil and worse are so considered in relation to
some supreme evil. 66
In formulating his reductio ad absurdum, Aquinas suggests that one could argue for the
existence of a supreme evil based on the conception of the greatest good, summum
bonum. Since nature is comprised of contrary existences, 67 and the summum bonum
exists within nature, it seems logical to conclude that the summum malum, or the greatest
evil, also exists. If the summum malum existed, it would be the cause of every evil in
existence. 68 Thus, Aquinas considers the possibility of its existence, but refutes the
infinite regress of causes and effects, which would result from a lack of a summum
malum. He writes,
Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the
cause, because the deficient effect comes from the deficient
cause…But we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter.
Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of
every evil. 69
Assuming the logical necessity of a summum malum, which prevents a regression of
causes and effects ad infinitum, Aquinas argues against the possibility of its existence by
appealing to the conception that evil is the lack of that which is good. In chapter three of
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this analysis I will argue against the suggestion that evil is merely a privation of
goodness, as this line of reasoning is prone to error. Nevertheless, Aquinas writes,
But there cannot be a supreme evil, because…although evil
always lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it; and
thus, since good always remains, nothing can be wholly
perfectly bad. 70
Aquinas even makes the stronger claim, which was discussed in my analysis of Aristotle
and Laozi, that evil invariably destroys itself. Aristotle writes,
[Anger] can be manifested in all the points that have been
named (for one can be angry with the wrong person, at the
wrong things, more than is right, too quickly, or too long);
yet all are not found in the same person. Indeed they could
not; for evil destroys even itself, and if it is complete
becomes unbearable (emphasis added). 71
Aquinas concludes that the summum malum cannot exist because it would destroy itself.
Furthermore, Aquinas must reject this conception of the summum malum because the
existence of an all powerful force of evil would further exacerbate the problem of evil
and particularly undermine God’s love. As the creator of the universe it would be
impossible to account for the existence of absolute evil, which would be the cause of all
minor instances of its instantiation. Theologically, then, Aquinas cannot support the
notion of a summum malum because he would then be left with the terrible task of
accounting for its existence in light of God’s characteristics. On these grounds, then, and
based on his religious beliefs, Aquinas must deny the existence of the summum malum.
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Evil, then, is said to approach supreme evil but it is incapable of utterly destroying
that which is good, since it is defined as that lack of goodness. 72 If the existence of evil is
inextricably bound to goodness, and is more properly defined as a lack of goodness, then
the complete lack of goodness would serve as a sufficient condition for the destruction of
evil.
I turn now to the question of signification. Concerning the signification of evil, and I
quote here at length, Aquinas writes,
One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is
known through light. Hence, what evil is must be known
from the notion of good. Now we have said above that
good is everything desirable; and thus, since every nature
desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said
also that the being and the perfection of any nature has the
character of goodness. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies
being, or any form of nature. Therefore it must be that by
the name evil is signified a certain absence of good. And
this is what is meant by saying that “Evil is neither a being
nor a good.” For since being, as such, is good, the taking
away of the one implies the taking away of the other
(emphasis added). 73
Aquinas suggests that being has the “character of goodness,” which is to assert that, that
which exists (being) is signified by goodness, i.e., all of reality is signified by goodness.
Thus, goodness is a signifier, and it signifies being. What is interesting about Aquinas’
claim, though he doesn’t make it at all clear, is that evil is not, and cannot be, a signifier,
i.e., evil does not signify being. In fact, if one defines evil as a lack of goodness, and a
lack constitutes privation, if the signifier is deprived, that which it signifies must also be
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deprived, which is reflected in his claim that “the taking away of the one implies the
taking away of the other.” The taking away of goodness (the signifier) is the taking away
of being (that which is signified by goodness). Thus, if one accepts the premise that evil
is defined as a lack of goodness, and that goodness signifies being, then one must
recognize that it is incorrect to conclude that evil, too, signifies being. The signification
of being cannot be ascribed on these grounds, by a privation of goodness, since the
privation, the lack, has no signification. As we have seen the summum malum or supreme
evil destroys itself because if the existence of evil is inextricably bound to goodness, and
is defined in terms of privation, then the complete privation of goodness serves as the
sufficient condition for the destruction of evil.
Being is signified by goodness, without which it would cease to exist. Since evil
cannot signify being, we are made aware of evil’s existence because of a privation in
goodness. Without goodness, then, being would cease to be, i.e., it would cease to exist,
since it is signified by goodness. Thus, to argue for the possibility of the summum malum,
necessitates the absence of goodness, and goodness is the only source of signification
from being. Thus, the summum malum eliminates the signification of being (goodness)
and thereby being itself. On this ground, the summum malum is impossible since it results
in the total annihilation of being.
As we have seen in the discussion, Aquinas introduces the notion of the summum
malum only, in the end, to argue for the ontological impossibility of its existence. The
question, however, one must ask is, “Why does Aquinas deny the ontology of the
summum malum?” In denying the ontological existence of the summum malum Aquinas
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preserves the monotheistic sentiments of an omni-benevolent God. Aquinas’ theology has
informed his philosophy and as such he cannot allow for the existence of the summum
malum as such an acknowledgment would undermine his theological beliefs.
Though he ultimately denies the ontological possibility of the summum malum, as
noted earlier, Aquinas does consider its existence. It is of the utmost importance that one
recognizes that Aquinas’ refutation of the ontological existence of the summum malum
assumes a theistic cosmogony, wherein the origin of the universe is ultimately traceable
to God. If one denies the existence of God and assumes as secularist or naturalist
cosmogony, then one is certainly justified in reexamining the plausibility of the
ontological existence of the summum malum. Again, for Aquinas, the summum malum is
refuted on theological grounds as the theist cannot accept the ontological existence of the
summum malum. Nontheistic accounts are not obligated by such limitations.
If one attempts to conceptualize the ontological existence of the summum malum,
given a secular humanists stance, then two key assertions arise. First, in articulating the
ontology of the summum malum one can argue that its reality is not a result of continuum
wherein absolute evil dominates all of existence. Rather, one can certainly argue that the
ontology of the summum malum arises as a fleeting occurrence that rushes to the surface,
destroys all within its path, and then collapses under its own heinousness. It is a pulse or
a spike. It is pronounced and totalizing. Within the history of the world, the summum
malum manifests as total devastation. Secondly, then, the ontological basis of the
summum malum can to be affirmed in the context of the unyielding attempt to destroy
human life. Unlike the problem Aquinas faced in describing a transcendent evil, i.e., a

60

supernatural evil, the secular humanist can certainly account for the ontology of evil
without also appealing to the transcendence of evil. Thus, the summum malum is
ontologically sound if its manifestation is relegated to this world. Whereas the theist may
represent the manifestation of the summum malum as the ultimate conquest of the devil
over the force of good, the secular humanist can offer a more pragmatic account of its
manifestation in genocide and extermination of massive portions of the human
population. Thus, the ontological impossibility of the summum malum only results from
accepting a theistic cosmogony. If one accepts a naturalistic cosmogony of the universe
the ontological possibility of the summum malum can be explained in terms of a totalizing
attempt to destroy human life.
Medieval philosophers desperately fought with an attempt to understand the problem
of evil and how one, especially one of faith, is to reconcile the existence of God with the
existence of evil, their solutions to the problem of evil, however, manifested in a broad
spectrum of alternative accounts. Whether God was implicated as an absentee deity or
man was implicated as the source of evil in the exercise of his freedom, throughout the
Middle Ages the discussion of evil was always articulated within the context of the
problem of evil, i.e., it was articulated in theological terms. The problem of evil,
however, is only a problem for the theist, which left many secularist and atheists to view
an investigation into the nature of evil as essentially fruitless. This wholesale rejection of
the existence of evil will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three of this analysis,
but the notion that the contemplation of evil is essentially a theological enterprise is a
direct result of the proficiency with which medieval philosophers engaged the topic.
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1.8. Early Modern Conceptions of Evil: 16th – 17th Century
In conceptualizing the formation of society, Thomas Hobbes addresses the concept
rather than the problem of evil. It is, then, the natural attempt to return to a nontheological discussion of the concept rather than the problem of evil, which motivated
Hobbes’ inquiry. Thomas Hobbes was adamant to offer an account of evil in political
rather than theological terms. Like Alfarabi, Hobbes describes evil in terms of its
manifestation within and affect on the state. For Hobbes, evil arises in the state of nature,
which is both a pre-moral and pre-social state.
Within the state of nature there are no restrictions in how individual power is wielded
and those with limited power will fall prey to those with more power. Individuals will use
force to attain the limited resources available. However, all individuals within this state
of nature share an equality of needs. Since there is a limited capacity for altruism, each
person within this pre-social state will use force to acquire the resources he needs to
survive at the expense of the lives of every other person within the state of nature.
The resulting situation is state of constant war, in which each person is feverishly
fending for his own wellbeing. The formation of the political results in the recognized
need to allocate and resources fairly and efficiently. The problem, however, with such a
state of affairs is that one quickly realized that if one is to preserve one’s life it will
require an impartial third party. However, all are motivated by self interest, which only
complicates any attempt to protect the lives of others. Thus, a sovereign must be elected
and the power to take one’s life is transferred to the sovereign, who is now obligated to
protect the lives of his subjects.
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The constant war that defined the state of nature is offset by the protection guaranteed
by the sovereign. Thus, for Hobbes, evil proliferates within a state of nature, where our
unregulated desires result in constant chaos. With the formation of society, however,
human beings establish codependence and as such the necessary norms to govern our
actions. Evil, then, is the natural and logical outcome of the given nature of our pre-social
setting. A limitation on resources in a setting where each must fend for his own can only
be described in terms of evil. It is proliferated by unobstructed greed and self
centeredness. Only through our socialization, then, are we able to overcome evil.
There is an explicit account of evil in Hobbes’ conceptualization of the social. For
Hobbes, evil is,
…the object of his Hate, and Aversion [which results
in]…three kinds…Evil in promise…Evil in effect…and
Evil in the means…Molestation or Displeasure [is] the
appearance or sense of evil… (italics in original). 74
Though Hobbes offers an account of these three kinds of evil, he does not articulate there
function, which suggests that he recognized there existence, but felt no need to define
each kind or relate each to its sociological corollary.
If, on the other hand, one argues that no account of Hobbes’ social contract theory
can be reduced to psychological egoism, including the mechanics of behavior, then it is
imperative to demonstrate the necessary conditions for the existence of evil in terms of
pure mechanics (i.e., in terms that do not include human motivation), which is
substantially more difficult. In his analysis of Hobbes, Gert concludes,
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In showing that psychological egoism cannot be validly
deduced from Hobbes’ mechanism, in either version, it was
not necessary to investigate the concept of self-interest,
only that of motive. By showing that a motive entails
having a belief and that neither version of Hobbes’
mechanism entails having any beliefs, it was possible to
conclude that Hobbes’ mechanism could not
entail…psychological egoism. 75
While this account of Hobbesian mechanics severs the association between psychological
egoism, by disassociating motivation and belief from Hobbes’ mechanism, it may
seemingly sever a mechanistic account of Hobbes’ social contract theory from a
discourse on evil.
For those accounts that do not have their basis in freedom, evil manifests as a
consequence of providence or God’s divine will, i.e., our will is determined. The
existence of human motives results in an ability to exercise our freedom, which often
leads to evil. The alternative account is to suggest that our actions are mechanical (their
function is independent to our beliefs), resulting in pure determination, either by God or
nature, which also has the tendency of leading to evil. Thus, evil has two sources and
these sources are mutually exclusive.
1. Motivation
2. Mechanical

–
–

Freedom
Determination

–
–

Evil
Evil

What if, wonders the defender of Hobbes’ mechanism, there was a third account of evil,
which could be articulated such that one combined a mechanical account of behavior
with the freedom of will, which still resulted in the existence of evil?
3. Mechanical

–

Freedom
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Evil
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Such an account would allow for a confluence of mechanistic behavior, on the one hand
and freedom on the other, which is the only logical conclusion since Hobbes believed that
we were free. It is suggested that human behavior exists independent to motivation,
which, for Gert holds true,
Whether we say that one’s action is caused by some more
elaborate physical, chemical, biological, or psychological
terms, nothing follows about motives…not even…that one
did or did not have a motive in doing [an] action. 76
Such an account would suggest that evil exists as a consequence of human behavior,
which is mechanical insofar as there is no identifiable association between action and
motivation. Thus, our behavior is shaped by forces beyond our control, which is not to
say that our behavior is determined. Granted, it would require an extensive investigation
to successfully “prove” the possibility of mechanical-freedoms resulting in evil, an
investigation I would certainly love to read, but it is difficult to see how one would go
about formulating such an argument.
In discussing a Hobbesian account of the social, whether one holds psychological
egoism as applicable to his account or not, one has the challenge of incorporating his
conception of evil in either case. For those who deny a psycho-egoistic read of Hobbes,
explaining evil is all the more difficult (though not impossible) as one would have to
account for the concept of mechanical-freedoms resulting in evil, which could
conceivably exist but would certainly be difficult to demonstrate.
The most consistent account of good and evil, then, according to Hobbes’ discussion
of the emergence of the social order and transference of power to the sovereign locates
76

Ibid 348.

65

the concepts of good and evil within his sociopolitical framework. For Hobbes, then,
goodness is located within social order and gives rise to a well governed society, whereas
evil results from the four factors mentioned earlier that inform the state of nature—
limited altruism, equality of needs, equality of powers, and scarcity of resources. This
juxtaposition between war and peace, good and evil is best exemplified in the following:
For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of
what is good, and evil…Good, and evil, are names that
signify our appetites and aversions…And therefore so long
as a man is in the condition of mere nature, which is a
condition of war, as private appetite is the measure of good,
and evil: and consequently all men agree on this, that peace
is good, and therefore also the way, or means of peace,
which, as I have shown before, are justice, gratitude,
modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature,
are good; that is to say, moral virtues; and their contrary
vices, evil (emphasis in original). 77
Hobbes describes the condition of “mere nature” as a state of war, that is, an existence in
a pre-social setting must be dominated by continuous war and anarchy. Evil prevails
within this setting as there are no political systems yet in place to enforce peace.
Consequently, after transitioning from the state of nature into the social order, not only
does one transition from a continuous state of war, one also realizes, for the first time, an
opportunity to actualize peace, which is inconceivable in the state of mere nature. Thus,
for Hobbes, good points to peace and civility and evil manifests in war and the state of
nature. The veracity of Hobbes’ account rests in his ability to articulate the existence of
both good and evil within the understanding and discretion of the sovereign’s judgment.
Emphasis is placed in the power of his judgment, which of course is not infallible, but for
77
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Hobbes, judgment is an essential element in identifying and describing what one means
by evil, thereby removing any mystery from its discussion. In the transition from the state
of nature to a socialized setting, the transference of judicatory power shifts from the mob
and their continual warmongering to the sovereign and his efforts to preserve peace and
civility. Hobbes describes the ease with which we can discuss and understand
conceptions of good and evil.
Here is confirmed the right that sovereigns have, both to the
militia and to all judicature; in which is contained as
absolute power as one man can possibly transfer to another.
Again, the prayer of King Solomon to God was this: (I
Kings, 3. 9) Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy
people, and to discern between good and evil. It belonged
therefore to the sovereign to be judge, and to prescribe the
rules of discerning good and evil: which rules are laws; and
therefore in him is the legislative power…To these places
may be added also that of Genesis, (3,5)Ye shall be as gods,
knowing good and evil. And (verse 11) Who told thee that
thou wast naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I
commanded thee thou shouldest not eat?" For the
cognizance or judicature of good and evil, being forbidden
by the name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge (emphasis
in original). 78
For Hobbes, then, in the transference of power from the state of nature to the sovereign
also results in transference of the power to judge and exercise capital punishment, as such
powers are necessarily reserved for the state. The state of nature is plagued by evil and
war precisely because everyone has the ability to serve as judge and executioner, whereas
in the social settings these powers are reserved for the sovereign, which is exactly how
society is spawned. Thus, peace and goodness are predicated on proper judgments,
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whereas war and evil arise from a diffusion of judgment and the ability to exercise capital
punishment throughout the population, a condition that can only give rise to anarchy and
violence.
In his Ethics, Baruch Spinoza formulates an altogether different account of good and
evil in terms of pleasure and pain. He writes,
Knowledge of good and evil is nothing other than the
emotion of pleasure or pain in so far as we are conscious of
it…so far as we perceive some thing to affect us with
pleasure or pain…we call it good or bad; and so knowledge
of good and evil is nothing other than the idea of pleasure
or pain… 79
Spinoza’s account of good and evil, in terms of pleasure and pain, covers a wide range of
topics from the emotions 80 to desires, 81 human nature, 82 to knowledge 83 and fear. 84 Of
the many issues discussed by Spinoza, I am interested in the relationship between fear
and evil. Concerning fear, Spinoza writes,
He who is guided by fear, and does good so as to avoid
evil, is not guided by reason…This corollary can be
illustrated by the example of the sick man and the healthy
man. The sick man eats what he dislikes through fear of
death. The healthy man takes pleasure in his food and thus
enjoys a better life than if he were to fear death and directly
seek to avoid it. 85
To continue with Spinoza’s metaphor I will briefly discuss two approaches to medical
treatment. Within the health sciences, one may approach the discussion of medical
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treatment in one of two fashions. Either one may discuss medical treatment in terms of
preventative medicine or one may discuss treatment in terms of reactionary medicine. A
preventative approach to medical treatment is informed by precautionary and proactive
measures taken to maintain a healthy standard of life. A reactionary approach to medical
treatment, however, begins as a response to a decline in the patient’s quality of living, by
the onset of disease formation, sudden illness etc. The motivation of a patient seeking
treatment for a preexisting illness is one of fear, viz., fear of death. The patient’s fear,
however, could have been minimized or completely eliminated by informing the patient
of the necessary steps that could have been taken to prevent disease formation in the first
place, which is evident in the claim, “The sick man eats what he dislikes through fear of
death.” 86 He eats what he dislikes because he believes that in so doing, he will live
longer. Thus, eating what he dislikes is motivated by fear, since he would otherwise shun
the thought of eating it. Similarly, Spinoza is arguing, that our actions must be guided by
reason rather than fear. The most rational people will make a hasty decision if fear is
motivating the decision. It is better to act in light of all the facts, make a decision based
on the information presented, which requires time, and an understanding of these facts,
than to make a hasty decision based on fear.
Fear, then, is a powerful tool in hastening faulty decisions and the prized tool of
terrorists the world over. If a state of terror manifests, there is no opportunity for
preventative measures to combat its existence. The immediate state of terror requires a
visceral reactionary response. This response is typically in the best interest of the
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population at large, but it is most certainly based on fear rather than reason. Was the state
of terror not to exist, the decision to act out of desperation would assuredly differ given
adequate preparation, time and information. The man eats what he dislikes because he
has to in order to survive. To refuse to do so expedites his death. But the man could have
lived a different, a more self reflected life. Similarly, the state that engages in a
reactionary war as a means of combating terrorism, only demonstrates the lack of
preparation and intelligence gathering, which may have prevented such a state of terror
from arising in the first place.
In his discussion of good and evil, Spinoza addresses these conceptions by means of
their relations to pleasure and pain, but more importantly, however, he discusses the
nature of rational thought and the capacity for decision making in the face of one’s own
mortality. The threat of death, the recognition of our fragility yields a fear so powerful, a
terror so great that it impedes the capacity for rational thought. The mechanization of this
terror, this fear, hampers the state’s ability to sufficiently protect members of it
population, by forcing hasty decisions. Thus, to prevent such terror from undermining the
sovereignty of the state, and protecting its populations, the state must learn to prevent a
state of terror from forming rather than reacting to a state of emergency.
More so than merely describing fear as a cause of evil, Spinoza discusses the concept
of evil as it pertains to an investigation of nature and our knowledge of good and evil. In
an insightful passage he writes,
Every man for the laws of his own nature, necessarily seeks
or avoids what he judges to be good or evil. Knowledge of
good and evil is the emotion of pleasure or pain insofar as
we are conscious of it, and therefore every man necessarily
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seeks what he judges to be good and avoids what he judges
to be evil (emphasis in original). 87
To judge Spinoza’s account of the distinction between good and evil as hedonic is a
mischaracterization. It is more than the simple affinity for pleasure and the judgments
that moral agents make, with respect to their specific desires and proclivities, which
influence their nature. Again, Spinoza writes. “Every man for the laws of his own
nature…” though it may certainly sound as if Spinoza is defending a relativistic account
of good and evil, insofar as the laws of good and evil seem to conform to the nature of
each individual, such an account would be incorrect. In a later passage Spinoza notes,
pleasure consists in the transition to a state of greater
perfection, blessedness must surely consist in this, that the
mind is endowed with perfection itself. 88
This account harkens to the Platonist account of the forms, wherein the semblance or the
imitation of the true form of perfection, i.e., the good, is represented in a lesser
instantiation, namely the mind of the perceiver. The suggestion is that if we have a
conception of perfection within our minds and we are obviously not perfect beings, then
there must exist this perfect thing, namely, God or goodness that allows or justifies our
ability to conceptualize perfection. Goodness, then, for Spinoza is undeniably attached
and associated with perfection and God, thereby accounting for his pantheism. The
inverse relationship also holds true. Spinoza writes,
So perfection and imperfection are in reality only modes of
thinking, notions which we are wont to invent from
comparing individuals of the same species or kind; and it is
87
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for this reason that I previously said that by reality and
perfection I mean the same thing…So in what follows I
shall mean by ‘good’ that which we certainly know to be
the means for approaching nearer to the model of human
nature that we set before ourselves, and by ‘bad’ that
which we certainly know prevents us from reproducing the
said model (emphasis added). 89
Based on what Spinoza has himself stated, it would be incorrect to attribute more
importance to the conception of goodness and evil beyond modes of thinking.
Remember, Spinoza has argued that, “Knowledge of good and evil is the emotion of
pleasure or pain,” and he says that, “pleasure consists in the transition to a state of greater
perfection,” thus, goodness is a state of greater perfection and evil, then, a state of
imperfection. Insofar as our conceptions of good and evil reflect modes of thought, our
conceptions of these notions are not bound to the exactness and specificities of the
natural world, as our thought is limitless, universal. Thus, in conceptualizing good and
evil each moral agent faces the infinitude of their limitless intellectual capacities.
Spinoza’s practical account of evil as simply a state of imperfection, results in an
interpretative advantage insofar as one can now describe the existence of evil in relation
to an inherent imperfection within the system, that system being either the nature of our
social interactions, namely, our socialization, or the nature of the universe itself. The
problem, however, with such an interpretation of evil is that it trivializes the grandeur and
the willful method with which human life is destroyed. It is not merely that Hitler’s
conception of morality was imperfect, or in some sense flawed, but that he categorically
rejected morality. For him, everything including the norms that govern human interaction
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was subject to the will of the state. And as the leader of the state, Hitler positioned
himself as God and as the ultimate source for moral justification. Thus, despite Spinoza’s
insight, there is grave danger in conceptualizing evil merely in terms of imperfection.
Leibniz situates his account of the problem of evil within a traditional account of
mitigating the tension between the existence of evil and the characteristics of God. It
should be noted, however, that for Leibniz, “God” is not to be understood in the
traditional conception of God. Rather, God is understood in terms of nature or a cosmic
force. As such, Leibniz was able to offer new interpretations in attempting to resolve this
tension.
Like St. Augustine, Leibniz acknowledged the role of freedom. He argued that this
world, with its misery and suffering, with the evil that plagues humanity, is still is the
best of all possible worlds. For Leibniz, at each level of emergence, things are as
complex as they possibly can be. So at each stage, the world is the best possible world.
Thus, God, as defined as nature or cosmic force is himself bound to the laws of nature.
Man’s freedoms, then, cannot be limited.
In allowing for the existence of evil, however, unlike former articulation of the
problem, for Leibniz, is it precisely because God loves us why evil exists. God, in His
infinite wisdom realizes that He must allow for the existence of lesser evils if He is to
prevent the existence of the greatest evil, an evil so powerful that it would destroy all of
existence.
Leibniz is able both to account for the problem of evil and God’s characteristics
without denying either. In fact, he is able to define three forms of evil, namely,
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metaphysical, physical and moral evil, none of which undermine God’s characteristics.
For Leibniz, then, evil is a necessary consequence of our existence which he expressly
defines in terms of imperfection. Imperfection results from our flawed reasoning, which
necessitates the existence of evil. Thus, as long as human reason is prone to error, evil
will always exist.
Leibniz’s Theodicy takes an unexpected stance within the historical narrative and
discourse on the problem of evil, by claiming that our agency and will are undetermined,
i.e., our will is free, without denying the omniscience or benevolence of God and
acknowledging the existence of evil. Until now, the combinations of these characteristics
were thought to be incompatible, but Leibniz is able to overcome the apparent disparity
by arguing for the best of all possible worlds (BPW). Concerning the BPW, he writes:
Thus I shall say that God, by virtue of his supreme
goodness, has in the beginning a serious inclination to
produce…good and every laudable action, and to
prevent…all evil and every bad action. But he is
determined by this same goodness, united to an infinite
wisdom…to produce the best possible design of things.
This is his final and decretory will. And this design of the
best being of such a nature that the good must be
entrenched therein…God could not have excluded this evil,
nor introduce certain goods that were excluded from this
plan, without wronging his supreme perfection. So for that
reason one must say that he permitted the sins of others,
because otherwise he would have himself performed an
action worse than all the sin of creatures. 90
The importance of Leibniz’s BPW argument is that it lays bare the claim that this world,
with its many imperfections and the obvious existence of evil, is the best of all possible
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worlds. The key difference between Leibniz’s theodicy and traditional theodicies is that
Leibniz does not recognize a disparity between God’s love and the existence of evil.
For Leibniz, God’s love is governed by his omniscience, and his “Supreme reason,” 91
which allows God to instantaneously conceptualize all possible worlds, this particular
world being the best of all possible. God, then, had to allow for the existence of lesser
evils, so as not to introduce even greater evils into the world. Note, that it was God’s
reason that determines this course of action. For Leibniz, reason dictates that if one is to
ascribe to the belief of the inherent freedom of our will, and one acknowledges the
existence of evil, while holding steadfast to a belief in God, then the only means of
coherence within such a theological system is to necessitate that God is ultimately
rational. His reason could not prevent the existence of evil as it was necessitated by our
freedom. Thus, “Supreme reason constrains him to permit the [existence of] evil.” 92
In discussing the problem of evil, Leibniz had finally bridged the gap between the
characteristics of God, on the one hand, and accounting for the existence of evil, on the
other. He neither denied the characteristics of God, nor denied the existence of evil, but
suggested, rather, that both conceptions are compatible given an understanding of the best
of all possible worlds. The BPW, then, afforded Leibniz an ability to rationally explain
the problem of evil without offending theists or denying its obvious existence.
The only possible offense to a theist is the appeal to evolution in Leibniz’s theodicy.
In contradistinction to the literal exegetic conception of the Creation, the world according
to Leibniz suffers discrete stages in its development—a contention that also comes out in
91
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his work on the early history of the Earth, Protogaea. As the world develops, it unfolds
its implicit dynamic potential along ever greater stages of actuality. At each level of
emergence, the beings in the created world are as complex as they possibly can be. Thus,
already in this ontogenetic sense, the world is at each successive stage of its development
the best of all possible worlds. Evil is simply a symptom of evolution, a sign that the
world, in its self-realization along stages of possibility, is not yet done. God, the driving
creative force, may well be omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent, but as the expression
of the force is bound by the very structure it expresses, God, defined as cosmic force, is
Himself bound to the self-created laws of nature.
Leibniz differentiates among types of evil. He notes,
Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically and morally.
Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection, physical
evil in suffering, and moral evil in sin. Now although
physical evil and moral evil be not necessary, it is enough
that by virtue of the eternal verities that they be possible.
And as this vast Region of Verities contains all possibilities
it is necessary that there be an infinitude of possible worlds,
that evil enter into divers of them, and that even the best of
all contain a measure thereof. Thus has God been induced
to permit evil. 93
In attempting to account for the existence of evil, which must then be reconciled against
the existence of God’s grace and love, Leibniz offers three instantiations of evil, namely,
metaphysical evil, physical evil and moral evil. Though he acknowledges the existence of
both physical and moral evil, he suggests that their existence, “be not necessary.” Thus,
of the three forms of evil that he describes, only metaphysical evil exists with necessity.
Moreover, Leibniz defines metaphysical evil as, “mere imperfection,” which as has been
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demonstrated by Spinoza’s account of good and evil, is the same, i.e., metaphysical evil
is defined in terms of an inherent imperfection within the system.
Since that system of existence is the universe in its entirety, and though there are laws
of nature and regularities within the system, the system is necessarily balanced by the
forces of entropy and chaos, black holes and lacunas in thought. An infinite
multiplication of diversity would inevitably overpopulate existence. Thus, multiplicity
and diversification must be, that is, they are necessarily balanced by, destruction and
chaos.
Metaphysical evil exists with necessity because the nature of the universe is the
continual refinement and evolution of life itself. The continuous evolution of species,
knowledge and the universe itself, necessitates an acknowledged understanding that the
universe cannot be a perfect creation. Were it to be a perfect creation evolution would
cease to fulfill its function and a state of perfect would have been reached. Metaphysical
evil, as described by Spinoza and Leibniz in terms of imperfection, follows as a
necessary consequence of existence—as such. Where there is existence, and assuming a
state of perfection has not been attained, then there must also exist imperfections inherent
within the system, which is continually mitigated by the gradual process of evolution.
Thus, the very notion of evolution is itself buttressed by the conception of metaphysical
evil.
The imperfection within the system is also an imperfection within all human beings,
i.e., moral imperfection. This imperfection, however, is itself contingent on the existence
of human beings, as moral evil is solely a problem for humanity, barring the existence of
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other sentient life forms. Moral evil is an imperfection of moral, which is mitigated by
virtue, a notion that Leibniz shares with the ancients. But in the description of evil and its
necessary existence within the world, for Leibniz, one can only articulate its existence in
terms of metaphysical evil and the notion of inherent imperfection.
Early modern philosophers found themselves competing with the old paradigm of
evil, viz., the problem of evil and the theological underpinnings that inform that analysis,
and the new paradigm of evil, which is rooted in an increasingly secularist account of the
same. The shift from the problem of evil to the concept of evil, during this philosophical
age, swung like a pendulum, wherein philosophers attempted to divorce their theories
from theology, at one end of the pendulum’s swing, but were essentially unable to
divorce the concept of evil from digressing into discussions of the problem of evil.
Thomas Hobbes’, however, was able to finally realize that the means of discussing evil
without also enacting a theological discussion of the problem of evil was to articulate evil
in terms of its sociopolitical manifestation. The manifestation of evil purely in terms of
its sociopolitical dynamics, as mentioned earlier in my analysis of Mencius, is a return to
the ancient concepts of government and the regulation of the masses by the prince.
Though Hobbes merely points to this ability to articulate evil in terms of its sociopolitical
instantiation as rooted in the moral agent’s psychological egoism, I will continue, and
more thoroughly describe the concept of evil and its greatest manifestation within
sociopolitical terms in the act of genocide. Thus, without a proper understanding of the
historical analysis of evil one cannot anticipate how the discussion will progress and as
such the concept of evil will lose its relevance to contemporary thought. It is my
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intention, then, to rekindle the investigation of evil in terms of its historical situatedness.
To do this, however, requires that one understand the preconditions for a globalized
society, and the need for international jurisprudence. To this end, Immanuel Kant
articulated the conditions that would lead to the formation of the United Nations and he
conceptualized the process and problems of globalization in the 18th century, which is
why the analysis will culminate with a Kantian account of radical evil.
1.9. A Kantian Account of Radical Evil
Kant suggested that evil is best understood in terms of maxims rather than the
consequences of actions. The maxim is the driving intention of an action. It is one of the
conditions for the possibility to act. The maxim precedes the action. It informs the act. To
describe evil strictly in terms of an action’s performance or consequences is to
misidentify the root of evil.
The power of a maxim rests in the fact it can be universalized. The moral agent can
universalize the maxim and in the example of an evil person, Kant argues that those
maxims that fail to be universalized are evil. The potential for evil presents a greater
threat in ascribing to a failed maxim than in committing an evil act. If, in attempting to
universalize a maxim, the moral agent realizes that it is impossible, i.e., the benefit is lost
after universalization, but does so anyway, such an attempt is evil. Later, I will describe
Kant’s specific example of cheating to demonstrate this point. Thus, the good is
universalizable and sustainable, whereas evil is self-reducing and unsustainable. The
attempt, then, to act on a failed maxim is precisely what Kant defines as evil.
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Thus, Kant’s account is a hybrid between those account that suggest that evil is
imposed on moral agents through misery (Alfarabi) and those that suggest that evil
results from free will (St. Augustine). Kant, then, bridges the gap between strictly
external and internal accounts of evil. For him, evil manifests as a union of both accounts.
The internal notion of evil, as resulting from one’s freewill is instead articulated in terms
of maxims, which prescribe action. These actions affect the world as a consequence of
the maxim. For Kant, then, it is impossible to discuss evil in terms of action without also
discussing the maxim.
The benefit of Kant’s account in a contemporary analysis of universal secular evil is
his articulation of how evil is universalized. It is not, as Aquinas may have argued,
universalized in the summum malum. Rather, Kant describes the attempt to universalize
evil in terms of ascribing to a failed maxim. In the next chapter I will argue that this
maxim or an ideology of exclusion is the unnatural attempt to universalize a failed
maxim.
The greater point for Kant, in discussing the attempt to universalize evil is that such
an attempt is inherently unsustainable, i.e., like the ancient Chinese philosophers, Kant
contends that universal evil destroys itself. Evil is a function of collapse entailed by
unsustainable actions. If, for example, one discusses murder and attempts to universalize
it as a categorical imperative, one progress from murder to mass murder, from mass
murder to genocide and from genocide to the total destruction of life, which is
contradictory to the intended imperative. One cannot universalize murder because it is
unsustainable, i.e., perpetual murder is impossible. Thus, on Kantian grounds, genocide is
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evil because it is a representation of the specific attempts to universalize this failed
maxim. Such attempts seek to universalize murder for some but quite obviously not for
themselves.
Kant defines evil in the following terms:
Well-being or ill-being always signifies only a reference to
our state of agreeableness or disagreeableness, of
gratification or pain, and if we desire or avoid an object on
this account we do so only insofar as it is referred to our
sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure it
causes. But good or evil always signifies a reference to
the will insofar as it is determined by the law of reason to
make something its object; for, it is never determined
directly by the object and the representation of it, but is
instead a faculty of making a rule of reason the motive of
an action (by which an object can become real). Thus good
or evil is, strictly speaking, referred to actions, not to the
person’s state of feeling, and if anything is to be good or
evil absolutely (and in every respect and without any
further condition), or is to be held to be such, it would be
only the way of acting, the maxim of the will, and
consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil
human being, that could be so called, but not a thing. 94
Thus, for Kant, the maxim determines the morality of the act. Whatever is moral is a
priori. Anything of moral relevance, and thereby anything that can be called ‘good’ or
‘evil’ is formal, i.e., its morality is contingent on the agreement between the action and
the maxim. An action is evil, then, insofar as the attempt to universalize the maxim has
failed yet the action is still performed. An action is good or moral insofar as the attempt
to universalize has succeeded and the action performed conforms to the maxim.
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What is material, or concerns the empirical, however, amounts to being contingent
and a posteriori. Hypothetical imperatives do not count, so, as moral notions, ‘good’ and
‘evil’ cannot be defined in empirical terms. That is to say, for Kant, determinations of
morality are based on the maxim not the action, since actions are empirical. So benefits
and harms, being empirical, are improper assessments for determining morality.
Essentially, good and evil concern the formal structure of action.
Crucial, of course, in the Kantian account, is the Categorical Imperative as the unified
principle of morality. According to the first version of the Categorical Imperative, good
turns out to be what is universalizable, which is to say, an action is good if anybody can
replicate it and, in doing so, continue to replicate it indefinitely. According to the second
version, good is a property of actions that accord humanity its appropriate respect, which
is to say that good involves the treatment of autonomous beings as autonomous beings.
According to the third version, good is whatever helps the evolution of complexity along,
or whatever empowers heteronomous beings to develop into autonomous beings.
Thus, good actions are sustainable, appropriate, fitting, realistic, progressive,
liberating, and empowering. Evil is the opposite. Evil is what fails to be universalized (by
the first version of the categorical imperative), what treats ends as means (by the second
version), and what enslaves (by the third). Put differently, for Kant, evil actions are selfreducing by the first version; they are inappropriate, misfits, and irreal, by the second
version; and they are regressive, enslaving, and disenfranchising, by the third
version. Thus, evil results from a failed attempt to universalize a maxim, where the action
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was performed despite this failure. Goodness, on the other hand, rides on successful
attempts to universalize maxims.
Our historical investigation into the nature of evil culminates with an analysis of
Immanuel Kant’s conception of radical evil, specifically, and the nature of evil in
general. Evil has plagued humanity from the origins of time, as we have forgone paradise
to suffer the brutality of an increasingly evil world. Rather than bemoaning the fact, Kant
addresses this demise in his discussion on religion. He suggests that, “nature itself would
be promoting the cultivation in us of this ethical predisposition toward goodness.” 95 His
account of ‘nature’ as a force, driving mankind toward the cultivation of goodness, is
contrasted from an underlying failed maxim, which if enacted defines the act as evil. The
locus of power in any discussion of evil, then, is situated in the moral agent’s maxim,
rather than the agent’s actions. It is the maxim that motivates action, and as such, the
maxim that is inherently evil. According to Kant’s account, it is wholly incorrect to label
the individual as evil if such an assessment is solely based on the act. Rather, it is the
maxim that motivated the moral agent to act, which serves as the true source of evil. The
specific act, however, is limited by the perpetrator’s power. The more power the
perpetrator has, the more pervasive the affects of evil. Kant, nevertheless, identifies the
true source of evil within the maxim rather than the action. The maxim is universalizable.
It contributes to our judgments about the nature of human morality, but is all-the-while
inferred from “consciously evil action(s).” 96 The moral agent cannot be deemed evil by
95
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the actions he performs, without also regarding his maxims as evil. Since, one’s maxims
inform one’s actions, the person is properly labeled as “an evil person” not because of the
action he has performed but by the maxims that drove him to perform such actions in the
first place. Kant describes this relationship between the action and the maxim in the
following quote:
…we cannot observe maxims, we cannot do so
unproblematically even within ourselves; hence the
judgment that an agent is an evil human being cannot
reliably be based on experience. In order, then, to call a
human being evil, it must be possible to infer a priori from
a number of conscious evil actions, or even from a single
one, and underlying failed maxim. 97
Kant’s conception that evil is rooted in the attempt to universalize a failed maxim, rather
than simply identifying evil in particular actions, is the keystone of my research. The
attempt to locate evil in one’s maxims, rather than one’s actions, suggest that Kant is
emphasizing our specific obligations to uphold the moral law—for its own sake, i.e., the
moral law is good in-and-of-itself, and for the sake of itself. Prima facie, then, a failed
maxim is universalizable and therefore presents a greater metaphysical threat than any
particular acts of evil, which is why Kant suggests that the determination of an evil
person is based on his maxims rather than his actions. Moreover, the universalizability of
a failed maxim, according to Kant, speaks to the general universal conception of evil that
is at the heart of this discussion. At the heart of the discussion is the assertion that evil
cannot and should not be limited to mere harms and torts, for specific instance of moral
infractions. To do so is to relativize the scope and grandeur of evil to petty and trite moral
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infractions, when in effect, evil is the deliberate and contemplative attempt to
universalize a maxim that would endanger, harm, maim or kill a substantive portion of
the population for personal gain. This attempt at universalization, however, ignores the
fundamental principle of fairness and the value of human life—held with such esteem—
in Kant’s first and second formulations of the categorical imperative, wherein he asserts,
Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you
can at the same time will that it become a universal
law…So act that you use humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, always at the same
time as an end, never merely as a means. 98
Contrary to Kant’s imperatives, the moral agent seeking to universalize a failed maxim is
inherently seeking reprieve from the very maxim universalized. That is, the attempt to
universalize a maxim for personal gain is nullified during the process of universalization,
wherein the sole benefits of the maxim is lost as it is a contradictory stance to attempt to
universalize personal gain. More clearly states, then, personal gain is nullified if everyone
benefits. Under a strict Kantian approach to both formulations of the categorical
imperative, such indiscretions are not supported in the process of universalization. In the
attempt to universalize evil, however, the moral agent is obliged to him or herself, i.e.,
the duty is to one’s self, rather than to the moral law. This strict obligation to one’s self,
this adamant refusal to acknowledge the plight and sufferings of the other, this
contradictory and unnatural attempt to universalize a maxim solely for personal gain, not
only violates both of Kant’s formulations—especially the second—it deifies the moral
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agent and grants him or her reprieve from the very maxim in question. Such biased selfcenteredness universalized as the sole maxim of the moral agent is the very definition of
evil. It is unnatural. It is unfair. It runs contrary to the moral law and whenever it is
universalized, it necessitates evil.
The attempt, then, to universalize a failed maxim is unnatural. Evil runs counter to
nature, which requires Kant to qualify just how he is defining the term nature. As we
have seen, Kant has suggested that nature is a force promoting goodness. The unnatural
attempt to universalize a failed maxim eschews the moral law and both of Kant’s
formulations of the categorical imperative for the exacerbation of suffering and death. So
as not to confuse his use of the term ‘nature,’ Kant writes,
…by “the nature of a human being” we only understand
here the subjective ground—wherever it may lie—of the
exercise of the human being’s freedom…but this subjective
ground must itself always be a deed of freedom. 99
Kant’s emphasis in the subjective grounding of our nature within deeds rather than the
ability to choose reflects his understanding that the preservation of freedom and the
justification for punishment requires personal accountability. Concisely, then, for Kant,
our nature is inherently governed by freedom. We are free to choose, and thus
accountable for the choices we make. According to Kant, one’s choices cannot be
determined. Thus, “the ground of evil cannot lie in any object determining the power of
choice through inclination, not in any natural impulses, but only in a rule that the power
of choice produces for the exercise of its freedom, i.e., in a maxim.” 100 Evil, then,
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according to Kant, arises from our choice to universalize a failed maxim. Evil does not
determine our choice, since our nature is inherently free. Evil follows from our choices,
specifically our choices to universalize failed maxims. In short, evil results from human
freedom. It is not merely that evil results from human freedom, but that evil manifests as
a condition of one’s maxims. Kant notes,
…the will is in all its actions a law to itself, indicates only
the principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can
also have as object itself as a universal law. This, however,
is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is
the principle of morality; hence a free will and a will under
moral law are one in the same. If, therefore, freedom of the
will is presupposed, morality together with its principle
follows from it by mere analysis of its concept (emphasis
added). 101
The moral agent has at every instant the opportunity to conform to the moral law as is his
obligation; his duty under the a priori conditions of his judgment should always be in
accordance with the moral law, for the sake of the law itself. Remember, Kant’s
cautionary tale of the shopkeeper. It is only when the shopkeeper acts in accordance with
the law, for the sake of the law itself, rather than out of fear of discovery, that his action
is considered moral. The exercise of freedom, then, cannot be determined by “nature” nor
can it be objectified in experience, since it serves as the very condition for morality and
human agency. Nevertheless, the exercise of freedom directly informs the maxim the
moral agent chooses to universalize. Properly speaking, then, one is held accountable by
one’s choice of maxim rather than the result of one’s actions, which is contrary to a
purely consequentialist interpretation of morality. This is not, however, to suggest that
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Kant deemphasizes the role of one’s actions, as it is to stress both the capacity of the
moral agent’s freedom of will, which is universal, and the resulting moral assessment of
one’s actions, which necessarily conforms to the given maxim. Thus, the exercise of
one’s freedom informs both the maxim and the action. If one freely chooses to
universalize a maxim that is grounded in self-centeredness, without consideration for
others, for one’s own personal gain, the resulting action, must, and can only be, labeled as
evil and cannot arise as a natural propensity among human beings.
For Kant, the adoption of a failed maxim cannot arise from a natural propensity
within humans, because, as he notes, the “human being is alone its author,” “its” referring
to the maxim. 102 The preservation of freedom and our ability to choose to universalize a
good or failed maxim is prior to any and all experiences we perceive within the given
world. Thus, experience cannot dictate future actions, i.e., Kant is denying the possibility
of social determinism. For Kant, the ability to choose and the preservation of freedom are
independent to our experience. Our actions do not determine our maxims; rather, it is the
choice to universalize a particular maxim that determines our actions. Thus, an act is
classified as evil not merely because it is an infraction of the moral law, for such errors in
reasoning are redundant or tautological. Instead, the act is evil because the maxim
necessitated an evil act. The maxim, then, serves to determine the nature of the action.
There are some, however, that focus on the nature of human beings, suggesting that,
“The human being is (by nature) either morally good or morally evil.” 103 Kant argues that
this disjunction isn’t entirely accurate because it might also be true that human beings are
102
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neither morally good nor evil. The condition of being good or evil, then, according to
Kant, functions independent to the moral agent’s “natural” propensities. He writes,
…freedom of power of choice has the characteristic,
entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action
through any incentive except so far as the human being has
incorporated it into his maxim (has made it into a universal
rule for himself, according to which he wills to conduct
himself); only in this way can an incentive, whatever it may
be, coexist with the absolute spontaneity of the power of
choice (of freedom). 104
The moral agent’s actions are governed by his maxim, and the maxim is a
consequence of his freedom. Thus, the agent’s actions are a consequence of his freedom.
The maxim, then, separates the agent’s actions from his freedom. Since his actions are a
reflection of his maxim, a change in maxim is a change in action. The ease with which
we fluctuate between good and evil is reflexive of our change in maxims. This fluctuation
is characterized by the manner wherein we describe some actions a “good” and others as
“evil”. Such a description pertains to the action and, as Kant has describes, does not
speak to the “nature” of human beings, since to do so would eliminate human freedom.
This, however, is not to suggest that a moral agent can be partly good and evil with
reference to a particular act, if, to deem one’s actions good or evil means that it has
followed from one’s choice in maxim, because one cannot universalize contradictory
maxims. Take for example, the second formulation of the categorical imperative. One
cannot simultaneously treat others as ends in themselves and also seek to exploit others
for personal gain. Evil, then, is the deliberate selection of a maxim with disregard for the
universal law, wherein the resulting actions are solely meant to benefit the moral agent’s
104
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self-interests. To be a good person means that the individual has properly selected the
moral law as his maxim and has universalized accordingly, whereas to be an evil person
means that he has not. This classification, however, in no sense speaks to the moral
agent’s “natural” disposition. Kant allows for a flexible transition between classifying a
moral agent as good and evil because such classification does not rely on a “natural”
propensity, i.e., no one is inherently good or evil. The moral agent’s character is based on
the choices he has made, especially which maxim he has chosen to universalize.
In discussing an agent’s actions, then, one should recognize that good and evil
emerge as properties of action, the existence of which continuously challenge the very
notion of morality and the agent’s maxims. Unlike Plato’s notion of transcendent
goodness, which is otherworldly, Kant has localized good and evil within the inferred
presence of either good or failed maxims. Thus, with respect to the relationship between
good and evil as properties of action, it is not the action itself that serves as the emergent
property for the existence of good and evil, but the maxim that informed the agent’s
action. Kant is very clear in his account of this relationship between action and morality.
He writes,
We call a man evil, however, not because he performs
actions that are evil (contrary to law) but because these
actions are of such a nature that we may infer from them
the presence in him of failed maxims…but a man’s maxims,
sometimes even his own, are not thus observable;
consequently the judgment that the agent is an evil man
cannot be made with certainty if grounded in experience. In
order, the, to call a man evil, it would have to be possible a
priori to infer…the presence in the agent of an underlying
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common ground, itself a maxim, of all particular morallyfailed maxims (emphasis added). 105
It is, then, correct to assert that good and evil are emergent properties of actions because
the underlying maxims informing those actions are themselves the true source for the
existence of both good and evil. As suggested by Kant, we can observe the existence of
good and evil from an agent’s actions, that is, through the process of direct observation,
but such a process cannot speak to the emergence of good and evil as properties of action.
It is the action, then, that serves to manifest the existence of either good or evil. But as
Kant has rightfully noted, the action is itself informed by the maxim. Thus in discussing
the emergence of good and evil as a property of action, one must recognize that we
cannot properly speak of action without fully acknowledging its relation to the maxim.
The association of both the maxim and the action as one conceptual unit [maxim-action]
is the very fabric with which all discussions of good and evil, and furthermore, all
discussions of morality are based. To discuss the maxim in itself is incomplete because
assessing judgments of morality would be impossible without the conformity or
disconformities of action. Likewise, to also discuss an action by itself is also incomplete
because there would be no standard or law with which assessments of morality could be
referenced against. Thus, to truly understand the meaning of good and evil, one must first
recognize that the existence of these concepts are themselves supported by the unit of
maxims and actions.
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In a contemporary discussion of evil, Kant’s articulation plays an integral role in
bridging the gap between the substantive claims that evil is relative or has little bearing in
political discourse and our emotive often visceral abhorrence to catastrophic abuses of
political power, viz., genocidal and holocaustic level events. There is a cognitive
discontinuity between the claims that, “evil does not exist” and the sight of innumerable
decaying bodies, plied in towering heaps of amputated and mutilated piles. There is a
“gut level” feeling of injustice, inhumanity, and repugnance, often coupled with
numbness, paralysis and terror at even the mere thought of such wantonness destruction.
Kant’s discussion of evil bridges this chasm because, as he writes,
…we are only talking of a propensity to genuine evil, i.e.,
moral evil, which, since it is only possible as the
determination of a free power of choice and this power for
its part can be judged good or evil only on the basis of its
maxims, must reside in the subjective ground of the
possibility of the deviation of the maxims from the moral
law (emphasis added). 106
This ability to deviate from the moral law is the necessary consequence of our freedom; it
is the price we pay for freedom. Insofar as a moral agent is free, he or she is free to
deviate from the moral law. If one holds freedom as an essential aspect of human agency
and accountability but denies the existence of evil, then such a person bears the burden of
proof in demonstrating, how on the one hand we preserve our freedom, i.e., our actions
are not socially or biologically determined, and simultaneously, on the other hand, refute
the existence of evil. In chapter three of this investigation I will discuss the many
historical attempts to deny the existence of evil, using the same line of reasoning and
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disprove the reliability of all such attempts. It is, therefore, imperative that one recognize
Kant’s mediation between freedom and our personal duty to universalize the moral law.
Maxims by their very nature require universalization, and universalization cannot be
implemented without the conscious choice of the moral agent. Moreover, the choice of
the agent cannot refer to the agent’s “nature” because to do so undermines the agent’s
freedom, thereby necessitating his action. Thus, labeling one “evil,” if by “evil” one
means “morally evil” or “genuinely evil,” is a misrepresentation of the metaphysical
conception of evil, if one is referring to the agent’s actions rather than the agent’s
maxims. Remember Kant’s is not a consequentialist account and Kant would undeniably
disapprove with the general conception that all human beings have an inherent propensity
to evil. He himself writes,
…the statement, “The human being is evil,” cannot mean
anything else than he is conscious of the moral law and yet
had incorporated into his maxim the (occasional) deviation
from it. “He is evil by nature” simply means that being evil
applies to him considered in his species; not that this
quality may be inferred from the concept of his species. 107
The structure of Kant’s argument in the preceding quote follows a similar line of
reasoning as presented in Plato’s Euthyphro, wherein Socrates asks, “Is the pious being
loved by the Gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the
Gods?” 108 With respect to Kant’s claim, being evil is a “natural” characteristic of a
particular human being only if by “natural” we mean something like, “this human being
is more inclined to evil, than others within his species.” What Kant is not saying, which is
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clear from the above citation, is that “being evil is a (natural) characteristic of humanity,”
i.e., of humans in general. In his discussion Kant even emphasizes the “occasional”
deviation from the moral law, which strongly suggests that there is no natural propensity
for evil. Humans, according to Kant, irrespective of their past moral infractions can never
be labeled as inherently evil, as to do so would rob them of their freedom. For Kant, there
is always the possibility for change, for the opportunity to conform to the moral law, for
the sake of the law. The suggestion that a man is “genuinely evil” is a dangerous claim,
as it, in effect, absolves him both of his actions, but more importantly, his choice of
maxims, insofar as, on such grounds, he could argue that he was a victim of his “natural
inclination.” To then punish such a man, if one agrees with this conception of his “natural
inclinations toward evil,” would be sadistic. Clearly, Kant refutes any such claim. We are
accountable for our moral infractions because we could have done otherwise. We could
have done otherwise, because we could have chosen to universalize our maxims in
accordance with the moral law. Deviations from our duty to follow the moral law are a
necessary consequence of our freedom, which in turn furnishes each and every moral
agent with the opportunity to participate in evil. This, however, does not mean, nor does
it follow that every human being has a “natural” propensity for evil, since such an
assertion would eliminate the possibility of deviating from the moral law in the first
place. Thus, the moral law is the very condition for which we arrive at a choice, the
choice either to follow the law or not to. In either case, there is no “natural,” i.e.,
determined, propensity for evil. Evil, then, is a result of this choice and as such, everyone
choosing to participate in evil, i.e., enact a failed maxim, can be held accountable. The
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apparent gap, then, between freedom and nature is substantiated by the conceptual gulf
between our ideas of freedom and our embodiment. The two are often and mistakenly set
in opposition. Kant, however, attempts to ramify this conceptual oversight, writing,
Hence, freedom is only an idea of reason, the objective
reality of which is in itself doubtful, whereas nature is a
concept of the understanding that proves, and must
necessarily prove, its reality in examples from experience.
From this arises a dialectic of reason since, with respect to
the will, the freedom ascribed to it seems to be in
contradiction with natural necessity…Philosophy must
therefore assume that no contradiction will be found
between freedom and natural necessity in the very same
human actions, for it cannot give up the concept of nature
any more than that of freedom. 109
This dialectic of reason is the attempt to resolve this apparent gap between nature and
freedom, which is further complicated by attempts to account for the origins, existence
and definition of evil. If evil is natural, then we are absolved from any wrongdoings. If
evil arises from freedom, then, why should we cling to the concept of freedom, knowing
that it necessitates the existence of evil?
Kant resolves this apparent disparity by denying the possibility of “natural evil,”
which, in turn, gives his account the flexibility needed to describe situations wherein a
moral agent, “naturally inclined to evil,” can suddenly forego his previous habits to act in
accordance with the moral law, or conversely, wherein a moral agent’s track record of
conforming with the moral law can suddenly deviate from the moral law. As human
beings, beings capable of freedom, which as Kant has suggested must be presupposed, it
is important that we have the ability to deviate from the moral law, not that we deviate
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from the moral law. In layman’s terms, “I could do wrong, but I won’t.” The recognition
that one could deviate from the moral law is in itself sufficient for freedom. One need not
actually deviate from the law to exercise one’s freedom.
It is specifically how moral agents choose to exercise their freedom that determines
the morality of their action. Those choices that conform to the law are moral and those
that do not are immoral. There is however, a greater level of understanding with respect
to freedom and the existence of evil. As noted earlier, evil cannot strictly be assessed
through an observation of action. It must be assessed in terms of the unity of the maxim
and the action. Those actions that acknowledge human beings as ends in themselves are
good because the act of recognizing one’s autonomy [particular] is justified by the law,
namely, the second formulation of the categorical imperative [universal], which
demonstrates that one can simultaneously speak of both particulars and universals
without contradiction. The particular actions are justified by universal law, which govern
the actions. Again, the two are inseparable. Kant understood that in making assessments
of evil, we would be tempted to merely base our judgments on the action, which is only
partially correct. If his account were to stop at this point, it would be weakened by
objections of relativism. Kant is able to overcome these objections, however, because of
the biconditional relation between actions and maxims. One cannot effectively describe
morality or account for the existence of good and evil without simultaneously discussing
both conceptions. Thus, our understanding of good and evil, and Kant would agree that
we have the cognitive abilities to understand good and evil, is itself contingent on how
the action relates to the moral law.
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It follows, then, that good is a property of action that is future oriented, that
anticipates the conformity of the action with the moral law. In fact, the moral agent
should always be able to asses the morality of the action at any time, since the
determination of morality is itself time independent. The moral agent is recognized as an
autonomous agent capable of understanding the moral law and acting accordingly. All
that is required for the process of proper moral action is for the moral agent to have the
cognitive awareness of the moral law, which raises an interesting point. Those humans
that lack the ability to fully comprehend their moral obligation and duties to the moral
law, cannot and should not be held accountable for their actions. This may include
infants, patients afflicted with dementia or those in comas. Human development is a
process of transforming individuals from mere means into ends.
The relationship between freedom, one’s maxims, and the moral agent’s action,
serves as a source for determining morality and accountability. Strict determinists
encounter the problem of accountability if they ascribe to the social or biological
determinism of human beings, since such an ascription denies the possibility of
punishment, and thereby undermines the grandeur of evil. Therefore, an understanding of
evil requires the recognition of both freedom and the universalization of maxims.
Maxims universalized in accordance with the moral law result in good actions. Whereas,
maxims universalized from deviations from the moral law result in evil actions. For those
actions deemed evil, it is the maxim, specifically the choice in universalizing a particular
maxim, which is deemed evil, if the maxim deviates from the moral law. The hallmark of
evil is a disregard for benefits that would otherwise be lost in universalization and an
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adamant stubbornness to retain such benefits despite the contradiction in universalization.
For example, my attempt to reap the benefits of getting better grades than my peers or
better grades than I am otherwise capable, by cheating on my midterm exam and stealing
the teacher’s answer key, is lost if I attempt to universalize the maxim that everyone
should be able to steal the teacher’s answer key. If we all cheat, there is no value in
cheating. Thus, the act of cheating loses its benefit if universalized. Hence, the hallmark
of evil is the stubborn attempt to universalize a maxim that is grounded in selfcenteredness, without consideration for others, wherein the resulting maxim takes the
form of a personal gain under all such circumstances, and the benefit is not universally
transferred. It is, in effect, the bizarre and contradictory attempt to universalize personal
benefits that is the telltale sign of evil. All actions resulting from such maxims are
necessarily evil and all moral agents freely choosing to universalize such maxims are
recognized as evil. The stigma of being evil, however, is transient, as the individual
always has the opportunity to realign with the moral law.
Immanuel Kant, then, was able to describe the concept of evil in terms of a perversion
of our maxims. Cognition offers each moral agent the accessibility to that, which is
universal, that which informs our actions. Norms or morality need not descend from
religious texts, as humanity is fully capable of cognizing proper moral action based on
the universalization of one’s maxims. These maxims, however, are inextricably linked
with the actions they inform. Thus, as Kant’s account of space-time and momentumenergy would later revolutionize physical sciences and astronomy, so too has his account
of maxims and action revolutionized morality. The articulation of evil in wholly secular
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terms is feasible insofar as one proceed in such a manner as to recognize the
subordination of action to maxim. The attempt to disentangle our propensities toward evil
is only feasible within the socialization of each human being, and the process of
socialization is itself regulated and subordinate to the power of the political realm. Thus,
a contemporary account of evil, must one the one hand, account from the role of our
socialization in making good moral agents and, on the other hand, describe how that
process is polluted, while also discussing the role of the political and the conflicts each
moral agent faces in mitigating social and political obligation with the moral law, i.e.,
maxims. A contemporary analysis into the concept of evil, then, must be guided by
sociopolitical investigations.
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Chapter 2: Genocide and Evil

2.1.

Conceptualizing Genocide and Evil
The concept of genocide evolved in 1933 when Raphael Lemkin coined the term.

Fifteen years later on December 9, 1948 the United Nations General Assembly, in light of
the events of World War II, adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, popularly known as the United Nations Genocide Convention
(UNGC) Article II of the UNGC States:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its destruction in
whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intending to prevent births
within a group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group. 110
Since the UNGC’s adoption, scholars who study genocide have criticized the
convention and offered suggestions for its amendment. The foundation of genocide
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studies, irrespective of the many definitional disagreements on the UNGC, is firmly
rooted in Lemkin’s thoughts on genocide. Lemkin had defined genocide as
By “genocide” we mean the destruction of a nation or of an
ethnic group…Generally speaking, genocide does not
necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation,
except when accomplished by mass killings of all members
of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated
plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of
essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the
aim of annihilating the groups themselves. 111
Thus, for Lemkin, sterilization and the destruction of a group’s culture, language,
religious symbols, i.e., the basis of a group’s identity, without the extermination of the
group’s members, constituted genocide.
Nearly sixty one years after the adoption of the UNGC, genocide research has grown
exponentially. In his 1975 article entitled, “Ethnic Genocide,” Rene Lemarchand
discussed the 1972 genocide against the Hutu by Tutsi militia in Burundi, in Central
Africa. Lemarchand’s analysis of the genocide in Burundi furthered genocide scholarship
because it dealt with the concept of ‘selective genocide’.
The selective genocide that Lemarchand discusses pertains to the selective targeting
of the educated members of Hutu society. Any Hutu would be killed but members of the
educated class were specifically targeted for extermination. The act of selective genocide,
then, demonstrates the calculated capacity and forethought in exterminating a potential
threat. The selective approach to killing in Burundi highlights Lemkin’s idea that a
perpetrator of genocide could aim at the destruction of an essential pillar of a group’s
111
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strength. By targeting educated Hutus, the Tutsi perpetrators of genocide in Burundi
destroyed the basis of Hutu power and identity.
In an analysis of the ideological motives perpetrators use to justify acts of genocide,
Edward Kissi describes the specific processes wherein ethnic groups become enemies of
the state. 112 Kissi’s analysis is significant. It converges with my specific
conceptualization of genocide and evil, because it shows how the state converts members
of its population into enemies, through the implementation of ideologies for the sole
purpose of extermination.
Kissi addresses this issue from the very beginning of his book, in his discussion of the
Dergue (the Ethiopian military government, which replaced Haile Selassie I) and further
expands on the notion of selectivity. He writes:
given the domestic political climate under which the
Dergue operated, it attempted to consider all the Tigrinyaspeaking people of Tigray and neighboring Eritrea as
potential supporters of the rebel Tigrayan Peoples
Liberation Front (TPLF), which sought to overthrow the
Dergue, and the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF)
which fought for the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia.
Here, it was the revolutionary regime’s ideology of
absolute national unity that tempted the Dergue to convert
particular ethnic groups into political enemies to be
destroyed (emphasis added). 113
Thus, despite the multi-ethnic composition of the Mengistu regime, Tigrinyaspeaking people were selected for extermination because their secessionist nationalism
presented a unique political threat to the regime’s ideology of absolute national unity.
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Important to this analysis, however, and our ongoing investigation into the philosophy of
evil and its relation to genocide scholarship, is the need to further inquire into how
political dissidents are converted into enemies of the state, a process I will describe later
in the analysis.
Kissi describes the process wherein Mengistu and the Dergue wooed the former
Soviet Union into providing military support for an attack against the TPLF and others,
the Dergue constructed as enemies of the state. Thus, in embracing tenets of
communism, without actually pursuing a communistic ideology, the Dergue obtained
Soviets weaponry to launch a repressive campaign against Tigray and neighboring Eritrea
verging on genocide. As Kissi has argued, “Here, a determination to crush domestic
political opponents took precedence over any desire to become the first communist state
in Africa” (emphasis added). 114
In this description of the Dergue and its political relations with Moscow, Kissi
demonstrates how the pan-Ethiopian ideology, professed by Mengistu and the Dergue,
was used to garner arms by espousing communist slogans in an opportunistic way. More
precisely, however, with respect to my analysis into the nature of evil, Kissi’s
investigation addresses the problem of domestic jurisdiction, as addressed by Hannah
Arendt, and the extent to which the state will go to gain arms for its campaign of
genocidal killing. Thus, any opposition to state ideology serves to locate dissenters. As
Kissi has already mentioned, after dissenters have been identified, and the necessary arms
acquired, the Ethiopian revolutionary state began the process of converting members of
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the Ethiopian population into political enemies of the state, i.e., once they have been
newly defined as enemies of the state, they will be slated for extermination. Though Kissi
is not arguing that the events in Ethiopia constituted genocide, the process is the same.
My investigation into the nature of genocide and evil, then, begins where Kissi’s
analysis ends, with an explicit formulation of the necessary conditions for converting a
civilian into an enemy of the state, i.e., explaining how political power and a state
endorsed ideology of exclusion are used to justify genocidal motivations. My
investigation, then, draws from an interdisciplinary discourse on genocide, combining
key conceptions of selectivity and jurisdiction with philosophical notions of power and
ethical prescriptions on fairness. As I will argue, this ability to convert members of the
population into enemies of the state initiates the process of extermination and, moreover,
serves as the foundation for the possibility of discussing evil.
In part, I will be addressing the preconditions for genocide and Evil, but most
importantly, I will systematically define what I mean by ‘Evil’. The purpose of this
analysis is to engage the entire spectrum of interdisciplinary research in a discussion of
Evil, of which genocide is its most insidious manifestation. Thus, it will be argued that
the preconditions for the manifestation of Evil, as manifested through genocide, exists
where a state’s sovereignty excludes particular members of the population, residing
within the limits of the state’s domestic jurisdiction, from state-protection, when the
following premises are true:
1. there exists reluctance to accept state endorsed
ideology;
2. such ideology excludes a portion of the population
within the limits of the state’s domestic jurisdiction;
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3. a refusal to accept state endorsed ideology is
punishable;
4. the manner of punishment is contingent on both
mutable and immutable identifiers. A mutable identifier
is a particular demographic identifier that can be
changed, viz., political affiliation. An immutable
identifier is a particular demographic identifier that
cannot be changes, viz., race.
5. mutable identifiers that are changed to conform to state
ideology are not punished;
6. mutable identifiers that are not changed to conform to
state ideology are punished;
7. all immutable identifiers are inherently incapable of
conforming to state ideology;
Therefore, all immutable identifiers are necessarily
subject to punishment.
The term identifier simply refers to demographic identifiers, which are used to
identify groups within a nation’s census, like a group’s race or its ethnicity. The
conclusion, “all immutable identifiers are necessarily subject to punishment” is the
absolute conceptual foundation for the greatest conceivable evil—genocide based on
immutable identifiers. Since these demographic identifiers cannot be changed, genocide
is necessitated by their presence, i.e., if a state has assumed an exclusionary ideology and
the target of its exclusionary practice is based on an immutable identifier like race, then
since one’s race cannot be changed, the process of state endorsed exclusion is
necessitated by the presence of an excluded race. If, unfortunately, my race has been
excluded from state protection, then every member of my race is a potential target for
extermination.
Genocide based on immutable identifiers, however, is to be contrasted with genocide
based on mutable identifiers. Mutable identifiers can be changed. Thus, one’s political
affiliation, for example, is classified as a mutable identifier because it is a flexible state,
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i.e., it is subject to change, whereas one’s ethnicity or race is an immutable identifier
because it is a fixed state, i.e., not subject to change.
Thus, punishment is a necessary result of genocide based on immutable identifiers
but only a contingent result of genocide based on mutable identifiers because once the
state assumes an exclusionary ideology, those possessing immutable identifiers cannot
(by definition) conform to state ideology because immutable identifiers like race and
ethnicity are fixed states. Thus, it is certain that they will be targeted for extermination.
Political affiliation, however, is a mutable identifier, i.e., political affiliation can easily be
changed. Punishment based on mutable identifiers is contingent because if the person
changes his political affiliation to conform to state ideology he will no longer be deemed
an enemy of the state. Those who refuse will be slated for extermination. Thus,
punishment will not result from genocide based on mutable identifiers when there is
compliance with state ideology. The concept of Evil, then, arises because of the ‘forced’
punishment of those whose identity is a function of nature. It is as if these demographic
identifiers were solely selected for their immutability so as to expedite the “purge” of
those bearing such demographic identifiers from state protection and ultimately from
existence. Thus, punishment is inherent in state ideology where members of the
population are excluded based on immutable identifiers.
Evil, then, arises as a consequence of an ‘exclusionary ideology,’ since exclusionaryideologies necessitate genocide based on immutable identifiers. Exclusionary ideology is
defined as state ideology that excludes members of particular groups. Simply put, evil,
within the discourse of state sovereignty, is defined as the intentional reduction of
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domestic diversity within state demography by the formulation and pursuit of an
exclusionary ideology for the purpose of enforcing a homogeneous society.
As mentioned in the previous chapter in the discussion of Empedocles, the polemics
between good and evil are balanced by their coexistence. Unbridled, both Love and Strife
lead to destruction. Thus, homogeneity presents a specific problem to how we must
assess and interpret our social relations.
Again, I have defined evil, within the context of state sovereignty, as the intentional
reduction of domestic diversity within state demography by the formulation and pursuit of
an exclusionary ideology for the purpose of enforcing a homogeneous society. I will
qualify this definition by analyzing its two component parts, which are (1) the reduction
of domestic diversity, and (2) the formulation and pursuit of an exclusionary ideology.
After I have fully qualified the definition of evil, I will offer a defense against objections.
In his account of state sovereignty and the role of the sovereign, R.B.J. Walker
argues,
Entry into the modern system of states enables any
particular sovereign to decide on an exception to the norms
of human conduct within a particular territory. Sovereigns
make the final decision…The modern states system is
always susceptible to war, to the necessity of sovereigns
declaring a state of emergency and an exception to all
norms. (emphasis added). 115
Within a state’s domestic jurisdiction, the sovereign is fully capable of enacting
exceptions to the norm, by attempting to control the demography within the state’s
jurisdiction. The demography within a state’s jurisdiction is its domestic diversity. For
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states whose demography is very homogeneous, e.g., Somalia, any means of
differentiating Somali, legitimate or ad hoc, can always be used to endorse an ideology of
state exclusion. Thus, even where a state’s demography is homogeneous, the state can
still form an exclusionary ideology. By ‘domestic diversity,’ I am specifically referring to
(1) every member of the population within a state’s domestic jurisdiction, men, women,
children, foreigners, residents and so on that are subject to the state’s authority, which
does not include diplomatic personnel or representatives of foreign governments because
they are not subject to such authority. Specifically, regarding the use of the term
‘diversity,’ (2) it should only be applied to those subordinate members of the population,
living within the domestic jurisdiction and subject to the state’s authority. The application
of the term ‘diversity’ (3) refers to any quantifiable and statistically verifiable
demographic identifier, i.e., any and all identifiers, which are quantifiable, or may be
assessed to characterize and define a particular person within the state’s domestic
jurisdiction. These identifiers (4) must be incorporated into the concept of diversity. For
example, religious affiliation, language spoken, ethnicity, and variations in culture are all
quantifiable and statistically verifiable demographic identifiers and are to be included in
what is meant by ‘diversity’. Since these demographic identifiers are necessarily
associated with particular individuals, i.e., they describe members of the population, then
any attempt to purge or reduce those identifiers (decrease the level of diversity) from the
collective state demography, requires (5) either extermination or the forced mass
expulsion of all portions of the population bearing those identifiers. Essentially, however,
there is little resistance that can be effectively wielded against a state determined to
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“cleanse” or purge its population of those individuals bearing undesirable identifiers.
Martin Shaw writes, “Victims have no choice but to orient their actions to the
overwhelming power of the enemy that attacks them.” (emphasis in original). 116 Though
resistance is a necessary feature of genocide prevention, there is little that can be done
from within the community of targeted groups to thwart their extermination. Thus, third
party intervention is necessary to aid in resisting extermination.
As discussed in the previous chapter, however, Seneca’s thoughts on evil would
undermine this notion of resistance. Succumbing to evil in the hopes of building character
is antithetical to genocide prevention and discourse. Unless some of the intended victims
resist genocide, all will perish and there will be none to bear actual witness to their
suffering. Thus, on this account Seneca’s discussion of resilience could not be
implemented because the intent of genocide is the total annihilation of targeted groups.
Unless, of course, mutable identifiers defined some members within the targeted groups
and they were willing to change their affiliation to prevent extermination.
Political, ideological, and religious affiliations are but a few examples of mutable
identifiers. Ethnic, racial, and physical disabilities are but a few examples of the
immutable identifiers. Particular demographic identifiers that are subject to change are
classified as mutable identifiers. Particular demographic identifiers that are not subject to
change are classified as immutable identifiers. Robert Melson captures the concept
perfectly. He writes,
Especially vulnerable are ethnic groups and/or social
classes that have traditionally been difficult to integrate into
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the larger society, or have been refused
assimilation…Whether such conditions in fact lead to
genocide depends on the ideology of the perpetrators, the
identity and situation of the victims…(emphasis added). 117
Thus, within any collective demography there exist both mutable and immutable
identifiers. As Melson has explained, ethnic minorities are especially vulnerable since
their ethnicity is immutable. Thus, if their ethnic group is selected by the state for
exclusion, it cannot be changed, thereby necessitating the extermination of all members
from that ethnic group. These identifiers can be arbitrary and completely ad hoc, but they
serve the same end—identifying those members of the population that are to be purged
from within the state’s domestic jurisdiction. In his analysis of the Khmer Rouge, Kissi
writes,
The Khmer Rouge leadership gave each Eastern Zone cadre
evacuated to the northwestern province of Pursat a blue
scarf, not as a token of honor or of loyalty to the state, but
as a “sign” to distinguish them from the other Khmer. The
object of this unusual identification was to make cadres of
the Eastern Zone more visible as the dissident and impure
Khmer to be exterminated. 118
The “sign” that Kissi is referring to is a means of identifying a distinction, which
carries with it the difference from those in power, so as to exclude “them” from “us”
despite the fact, however, that Khmer were targeting fellow Khmer. Thus, the basis for
their extermination was one of ideological differences, which means that their
extermination was one based on mutable identifiers, since they could have conceivably
changed their ideological stance.
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The necessity of wearing a blue scarf is of even greater importance because those
targeted for extermination were Khmer. As evident in Kissi’s example, the process of
identification may be entirely ad hoc, but its function will always be to identify those to
be “cleansed” from the population. The use of genocide in this example is a contingent
condition based on the ideological refusal of some Khmer to assimilate to the Khmer
Rouge’s state endorsed ideology. Thus, this ideological refusal led to their eventual
extermination. In this example, Kissi is describing the targeting of those Khmer, by
fellow Khmer, for extermination based on their refusal to conform to state ideology.
Therefore, the subsequent act of genocide was itself based on mutable identifiers that
were not changed to conform to state ideology, which was carried out by fellow Khmer.
As we have seen, genocide based on immutable identifiers is the most heinous
manner of reducing the diversity within a state’s demography, because these identifiers
cannot be changed by members of the population. There is, however, as demonstrated in
Kissi’s example of Khmer targeting fellow Khmer, the ability to base genocide on
mutable identifiers, if one defines political affiliation as such. This in no sense suggests
that there are better or worse forms of genocide. What it does demonstrate, however, is
that unlike genocide based on mutable identifiers, where members of the population are
given a choice to conform to state ideology and their lives, possibly spared, members of
the population bearing immutable identifiers have no choice and face either mass exile or
extermination. In my articulation of domestic diversity, then, I am specifically discussing
the attempt to remove any number of demographic identifiers from the population by
means of persuasion, exile or extermination. This decrease in both ethnic and ideological
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diversity is accomplished by an abuse of state authority within its domestic jurisdiction.
Thus, the process of converting a former civilian into an enemy of the state is as easy as
identifying or aligning all members of the population bearing those demographic
identifiers as enemies of the state. The final solution, then, is to purge the state or
exterminate all members of the population bearing these identifiers, in the case of
immutable identifiers, or enforcing conformity for all members of the population bearing
mutable identifiers. In either case, through the process of a reduction in domestic
diversity, the state eliminates those demographic identifiers from its demography and its
domestic jurisdiction.
In defining evil, by “the formation of exclusionary ideology” I am referring to (1) a
state endorsed ideology that makes specific references to demographic identifiers
represented within its population. The state (2) further associates these attributes (i.e., the
particular demographic identifiers) as potentially corrupting the remaining members of
the population within a state’s domestic jurisdiction. The association, then, of these
demographic identifiers with a “contaminated” portion of the population is included in
what I will label as the “selective phase” of exclusionary ideology.
It is important to recognize that perpetrators of genocide view both ethnic and
ideological diversity as essentially corrupting and contaminating the state. As already
discussed in Kissi analysis of the Khmer Rouge, targeting fellow Khmer facilitated
Khmer Rouge attempts to “purify” the state. This act of genocide best exemplifies one
that is based on mutable identifiers, as their ideological assumptions could have been
changed to conform to state ideology. What Kissi’s example demonstrates is the extent to
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which a state can enact an ideology of exclusion, even within a substantially homogenous
demography. The attempt, then, to purify or force conformity within the state is
inherently antithetical to its natural occurrences. Thus, forced conformity is an unnatural
attempt to modify state demography. The unnatural attempt to modify state demography
through mass exile or genocide is the clearest manifestation of evil, as it is contrary to the
natural dispersion of these characteristics within the state. Thus, any attempt to modify a
state’s demography through the use of coercion or force assumes a godlike stance similar
to the manipulation of naturally occurring characteristics.
After the state has selected those demographic identifiers that pose the greatest risk to
state sovereignty, it must (3) then associate members of the population bearing those
identifiers with risks to state sovereignty or the good functioning of society. This process
concludes what I will label as the “transformative phase” of exclusionary ideology. I have
briefly discussed the process of converting a civilian into an enemy of the state, a process
that I will examine in greater detail shortly. Through the transformative phase,
nonetheless, civilians are disenfranchised from the protection of the state. Measures that
would have otherwise safeguarded them from exploitation and extermination are now
nonexistent.
Once enemies of the state have been identified, the state must begin the process of
cleansing or purging itself of those members of the population. I have identified this final
phase as the “purgative phase” of exclusionary ideology. This is not specifically the act
of genocide, though genocide is certainly to be included within the purgative phase. In
order to understand how civilians are turned into enemies of the state, one should identify
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each of the three phases of exclusion: (1) selective phase, (2) transformative phase and
(3) purgative phase. It should be noted, however, that I am not suggesting these three
phases are in any sense exhaustive. It is likely that there is a wide spectrum of
explanatory approaches that would account for such a process. Nevertheless, I have
selected these three phases as tools in analyzing state endorsed exclusionary ideology.
2.2.

Phase 1: The Selective Phase
Peter Uvin, in his discussion of the social relations between the Hutu and Tutsi of

Rwanda in Central Africa, comments on existing prejudicial ideologies in the country,
In Rwanda, basic psychocultural images of the Tutsi and
the Hutu have been—and still are—the basic building
blocks of society. These profoundly ingrained, widely
shared images treat Hutu and Tutsi as radically and
unchangeably different…These images can be observed
in—and from childhood are transmitted by—a multitude of
proverbs, stories and myths…This prejudicial ideology can
properly be called racist, for it is widely perceived as
referring to races. 119
As Uvin explains, this ideology has been profoundly ingrained into every psychocultural
facet of Hutu life and, according to Uvin, their perceptions of the Tutsi have been shaped
by their psychocultural development. The continual references to proverbs, myths, and
the press, of the differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi contributed to the growing
tensions among members of the Rwandan population. Though the Tutsi were selected as
potential enemies of the state, under Hutu control the dissemination of information
required extensive governmental support. Uvin continues,
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More generally, at political rallies, in speeches, and in
extremist local language newspapers and radio stations,
Tutsi were constantly the subject of hateful
propaganda…Much of the freedom of press that was
suddenly (and only partly) allowed was invaded by
newspapers with an incendiary and racist position. The
most (in)famous case were Kangura, a radical newspaper
created in early 1990 and Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille
Collines…These genocidal and extremist voices were not
only tolerated, but also morally and financially supported
by people at the highest levels of the establishment,
including the government. 120
Like Kissi’s example of the Khmer Rouge’s extermination of fellow Khmer, which
represented an ethnically homogeneous state, in Rwanda the same can be said, as the
Hutu and Tutsi speak Kinyarwanda. Even apart from the colonial history of Rwanda, the
alleged ethnic differences between the Hutu and Tutsi groups may well have been
socially constructed and fabricated by the Hutu dominated state, as a means of preserving
power and subordinating Tutsi. The difference, however, is that unlike the genocide
perpetrated by the Khmer, which was based on mutable demographic identifiers,
Rwanda’s genocide was based on immutable identifiers, namely, ethnicity. What the
comparison between Rwanda and Cambodia illustrates, however, is the extent to which
an exclusionary state ideology can arbitrarily assign both mutable and immutable
demographic identifiers to a portion of the population to justify their extermination.
Kissi’s account of the Cambodian genocide and Uvin’s of the Rwandan genocide both
share the arbitrariness with which the state transforms formers citizens in poor standing
with the state into enemies of the state.

120

Ibid., p. 64.

115

As is evident in Uvin’s discussion, the government selected those members of the
population, namely, Tutsi and moderate Hutu who challenged its power and slated them
for extermination. Propagandist newspapers and television networks that are supported or
subsidized by the government have great influence among members of the population
because the source of information is viewed as credible. Moreover, the pervasiveness of
anti-Tutsi ideology throughout nearly every facet of Hutu lives, led enough Hutu to
participate in the government supported genocide.
In discussing Hutu-Tutsi relations, Joshua Wallenstein refers to the “enemy within,”
writing, “The duty of the Hutu, then, was to erase the enemy within, i.e., to fight to
preserve his family, his race, and his nation,” (emphasis added). 121 Wallenstein
discusses the role of Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) in justifying the
state endorsed massacre of Rwanda’s Tutsi, in 1994, on the grounds of protecting and
defending Hutu solidarity. The portrayal of Tutsi as subhuman by the Hutu dominated
state, demonstrates the antagonistic approach used to justify their extermination. The
Tutsi were the ‘enemy within,’ which refers to the scope of the state’s domestic
jurisdiction. The Tutsi were to be exterminated and RTLM and other propaganda media
were to conduct the business of justifying the extermination to sympathetic Hutus. Thus,
in creating an enemy of the state, the state also creates its sympathizers. Those
sympathetic to state ideology will justify their discrimination as nationalism, a concept
which will be thoroughly discussed later in the analysis. Those disenfranchised by the
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state’s exclusionary ideology will be targeted for exile or extermination and those
needing motivation will be subject to state endorsed propaganda.
2.3.

Phase 2: The Transformative Phase
In analyzing the definition of evil, I am attempting to qualify what is meant by ‘the

formation of exclusionary ideology’ in the proposed definition of evil. In discussing the
formation of an exclusionary ideology, I have identified three, phases of exclusion,
namely, the selective phase, the transformative phase and the purgative phase. The
transformative phase of a state’s exclusionary ideology converts members of the
population who are subject to state sovereignty into enemies of the state.
This process is transformative insofar as a judgment of value is placed on otherwise
valueless demographic identifiers, which state officials then associate with barbarism, or
attempt to dehumanize those individuals bearing these identifiers. For example, the shape
of someone’s nose is an empirical fact that is devoid of value. The shape of someone’s
nose is of no particular consequence, but if one seeks to dehumanize this fact one must
also espouse the bizarre claim of what a proper or normal nose should look like. 122 Leslie
Fiedler describes this as “physiological normalcy.” With respect to this particular act of
excluding members of the population based on their physiology, Leslie A. Fiedler offers
an interesting account. She writes,
But other unfortunate human beings regarded—at that time
and in that society—as undesirable deviations were also
destroyed…It is a development which should make us
aware of just how dangerous enforced physiological
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normalcy is when the definition of its parameters fall into
the hands of politicians and bureaucrats. 123
Again, this conception is not exclusive to genocide, as enforced assimilation, ethnocide,
alienation, and many other forms of intolerance work toward the same end, discomforting
members of the population so they conform or exiling others that will not. If members of
the targeted population are capable of assimilating their demographic identifier, their
identifiers are mutable. If they are incapable of assimilating their demographic identifier,
their identifiers are immutable. With respect to punishment, then, immutable identifiers
necessitate punishment, whereas mutable identifiers are contingent on an individual’s
willingness to assimilate, albeit enforced assimilation.
Within the context of a state’s domestic jurisdiction, the concept of enforced
assimilation is integral to fully understanding the precise meaning of evil. In formulating
an exclusionary ideology, state officials attempt to ensure that political power remains
centralized. Political power remains centralized if members of the population are forced
to conform to state ideology and state authority is not mitigated by a judicial system of
checks and balances. Assimilation, then, is enforced as a means of centralizing state
authority. The decentralization of state authority is possible by mitigating sovereignty and
embracing cultural and ethnic pluralism.
This process of transforming particular members of the population into enemies of the
state is the attempt to homogenize demographic identifiers within the state’s domestic
jurisdiction to conform to an ideology of sameness. In discussing evil, then, the attempt
to enforce assimilation is morally reprehensible because it is a willful disregard of
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physiological properties that are natural and factual within a group. Centralizing political
power, then, will invariably destabilize select members of the population, because they
pose a threat to that centralization. The threat may not be a political threat, i.e., those
labeled enemies of the state may not have an armed force or aspirations for political
power, but they threaten political power insofar as they physically embody variation.
Their naturally occurring physiological differences are dehumanized, which lays the
groundwork for their extermination. It is evil to target others for extermination based on
biological properties beyond their control. It is evil when an ascription of value seeks to
enforce physiological homogeneity.
The desire to attain political power, “by any means necessary” cannot relate to the use
of human beings as a means to an end. In so doing, human beings become tools for
advancing a particular ideology of exclusion. Those targeted for exclusion are excluded
from the political process without measures to safeguard their lives. Insofar as these
members of the population are excluded, they are not identified as an end. To be
identified as an end is to be identified as human. Therefore, they are not identified as
human. Once this conclusion is reached, the state has successfully completed the process
of transforming particular civilians into enemies of the state. Their extermination is
justified by their socially constructed inhumanity, which is itself based on an artificial or
unnatural attempt to control physiological homogeneity. They are a pest, a plague,
roaches, vermin, lice to be purged or exterminated, effectively “cleansing” the state from
their infestation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, however, the fate of humanity
rests in our ability to maximize goodness and minimize evil.
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As has been demonstrated, the dehumanization of targeted groups requires an
exclusionary ideology, typically fueled by government sponsored propaganda. If these
members of the population are seen as subhuman, their massacre will not be inhibited by
moral considerations. Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda characterized Jews as ‘disease’,
‘bacilli’, ‘thieves’, ‘lice’, ‘subhuman’, ‘parasites’, ‘alien bodies’ and so on. 124
Dehumanization is essential in this transformative phase. The continual use of
propaganda aimed at dehumanizing members of targeted groups, as exemplified in the
example of the RTLM, facilitates the ease with which potential genocide sympathizers
can be spurred into participation, as participants essentially fail to recognize the humanity
of their intended victims. 125 Nazi-Germany viewed Jews as subhuman, as threatening the
racial purity of the Aryan race and as a direct threat to the German state. Once
perpetrators are unwilling to recognize human beings as moral entities the
dehumanization of these human beings follows without much effort. The
misrepresentation of members of a targeted group as nonhuman and thereby unworthy of
moral consideration serves to bolster an exclusionary ideology.
The process of selecting members of the population for exclusion and transforming
those individuals into enemies of the state is a process that seeks, as its ultimate end, the
consolidation of political power. A unified and consolidated state, which has already
enacted specific measures of enforcing an exclusionary ideology, has truly progressed
through a selective and transformative phase of exclusion and approaches the final
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purgative phase. It is in the attempt to consolidate power under the banner of an ideology
of exclusion, where governmental resources contribute to disenfranchising members of
its population, that we can begin a discussion of evil. This consolidation of power is not
consolidated within an individual. It is an inherent mechanism of human relations and as
such is subject to abuse and dominance. The disenfranchisement of individuals by a state
endorsed ideology of exclusion, exhibits an inclination to participate in acts of genocide
and other crimes against humanity.
2.4.

Phase 3: The Purgative Phase
The final phase of exclusion is the attempt to purge “enemies” from the state. Though

some speculate whether genocide existed during antiquity, there is no speculation about
its unfortunate prevalence in our contemporary lives. Quite possibly one of the
unforeseen effects of the scientific revolution of the Enlightenment, coupled with the
advances made in military grade weapons, is our increasing proficiency with killing. In
his book, On Killing, Lt. Col. Dave Grossman discusses terrorism and the cycle of
violence,
Another powerful process that ensures compliance in
atrocity situations is the impact of terrorism and selfpreservation. The shock and horror of seeing unprovoked
violent death meted out creates a deep atavistic fear in
human beings. Through atrocity the oppressed population
can be numbed into a learned helplessness state of
submission and compliance. 126
State endorsed terrorism is facilitated by the daunting sense of helplessness throughout
the population. The ease of extermination is facilitated by an overwhelming recognition
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of state authority and its capacity, within the confines of its domestic jurisdiction, for
mechanizing mass deaths. Terrorism, then, is inextricably bound to an ideology of
exclusion and necessary in fulfilling the purgative phase. Arendt writes,
[it] reigns over a completely subdued population…Where
the rule of terror is brought to perfection, as in
concentration camps, propaganda disappears entirely; it
was even expressly forbidden in Nazi Germany…terror, on
the contrary, is the very essence of its form of government
(emphasis added). 127
Terrorizing members of the population slated for extermination or mass exile, as
mentioned by Arendt and Grossman, serves to subdue the population into accepting the
inevitability of their banishment or deaths. There is a very serious danger, however, if an
oppressed group usurps the government to gain control of power within the state’s
domestic jurisdiction. Grossman warns,
Once oppressors begin to think of their victims as not being
the same species, then these victims can accept and use that
cultural distance to kill and oppress their colonial masters
when they finally gain the upper hand. 128
Clearly, then, matters of authority and subordination are circumstantial. If the
circumstances are such that the state has embraced an ideology of exclusion, it is certain
that terrorism is surely to follow, and moreover, that those slated for purgation will be –in
part– pacified by the use of terror. If, however, the oppressed group attains control of the
state, it will likely commit similar acts of depravation against its former oppressor within
the state’s jurisdiction.
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As noted earlier, within that jurisdiction, the state is capable of exercising absolute
control over members of its population, an act that frequently flirts with genocide as a
means of purifying the population. As mentioned earlier in the discussion, genocide is but
one instantiation of state power. The act of “cleansing” the state is more precisely viewed
in terms of the implementation of governmental power within the confines of a state’s
domestic jurisdiction. This is not to suggest that genocide scholars are less equipped to
critically analyze genocide, but the focus must involve a discussion of the
implementation of power and a thorough investigation of killing. Once the role of power
is incorporated into the discussion, we have the even stricter obligation to remain on
topic, i.e., not to fall into a discussion of the geology of power or its infinite incarnations.
Rather, we are bound to the bodies of millions of victims to fully acknowledge the state’s
power.
The goal of this analysis is to recognize and acknowledge the existence of evil, its
viability, and its importance, in attempting to interpret atrocities throughout the world.
Philosophy must have something to contribute to the discussion of evil, as so many lives
have been exterminated in the name of ideological contentions based on philosophical
suppositions. While genocide is the greatest manifestation of evil, it is but one of its
instantiations. The purgative phase of exclusion is the final eradication of those members
of the population transformed into enemies of the state. The power to transform and add
value to demographic identifiers, to enforce physiological normalcy, to dehumanize the
intended victims, are mostly done with words, with philosophical ideas. Thus, before
even one person is killed, before the purgative phase has even begun, much has been
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done to create a state of terror and ultimately evil. Philosophy can contribute to the
discussion of genocide by incorporating conceptions of power, evil, and the formation of
ideology into that discussion but it requires that philosophers embrace an
interdisciplinary discussion of evil, one that addresses both philosophical and historical
concerns.
2.5.

Politicide and the Plight of Political Groups
It would be dangerous to assume that genocide occurs as a consequence of rapid

political developments wherein the state brutalizes a portion of the population. More
often than not genocide results from the ideological refusal of a segment of the
population to conform to a particular ideology.
The systematic attempt to exterminate an entire political group that would otherwise
seek political power or undermine state sovereignty is an act of politicide. It is the
deliberate attempt to eradicate any and all political opposition. The festering acts of
subversion from political dissidents fuel governmental paranoia, which, in turn,
stigmatizes the opposing political group, as such. Evil manifests in this tension between
warring political groups in struggles for political power. The assumption is that political
power is mutually exclusive, i.e., only the victor or the dominant political group may
wield political power. A winner-takes-all interpretation of political power reproaches
egalitarianism and any conception of sharing. Evil, as manifests in political power,
assumes the characteristic of an act of exclusion.
Political dissidents are caricatured to fit the ideological mold of a threat against the
state, or a threat against the assumed purity of a nation’s people. In their act of defiance,
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dissidents offer the state, and those within the state that subscribe to a conception of
unilateral power, the ability to localize or pinpoint a competing ideology. It is not the act
of subversion that is of any consequence. Rather, it is the ideological grounds that have
motivated those acts of subversion that are targeted for exclusion.
To approximate an understanding of evil is to recognize that it is a lie to suggest that
political power must be maintained with unilateral political force. It is a lie to suggest that
political power cannot be shared between competing political groups. Finally, it is a lie to
believe that in usurping the current administration anything other than a new
administration of dominance and oppression will arise, if one’s ideological basis for
understanding political power is rooted in its mutual exclusivity. This perpetration of evil
is important in discussing genocide because it demonstrates that if one assumes an
exclusionary ideology then overthrowing another government that also assumed an
exclusionary ideology suggests that the cycle of genocide will continue. Thus, the only
way to mitigate the spread and appeal of genocide is to ensure that the state never
endorses an exclusionary ideology. Otherwise, despise ceaseless revolutions the appeal of
genocide and state purification will always be an option for those who have newly
acquired political power from their former subordinators.
Once political dissidents are able to convey the injustices that have been inflicted on
them they pose a very real threat to the establishment. The private meeting between
dissidents and sympathizers to educate the population about their oppression is
conversely enough, a public act. It requires use of public meeting halls once the
movement grows beyond secretive meetings in alleyways. This, however, is precisely
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the moment when their intentions are brought to light, when the “authorities” are made
aware of their motivations. As ideologies of political dissidents compete with the
establishment, so too will their intentions compete for political power, which poses a very
real threat to those already in power.
After governmental officials have been informed of the intentions of dissidents’
attempts to infiltrate their movements the killings will soon follow. Since, to usurp
political power requires the dynamism inherent within the public sphere, then the counter
response to such an attempt must be to first destroy the group from within. What
dissidents are attempting to make public, must be kept secretive. Thus, typically, the
initial killings will be secretive, i.e., they will be private killing.
Evil culminates in the systemization of death. It is the death squad, the assassin, the
lynch mob, the death camps and so on. The greatest proof of the existence of evil is in
how we redefine and reconstruct instruments of death, which must not be relegated to
machinery. The assassin, the lynch mob, and death squads are all examples of such
instruments. But overwhelmingly the greatest ability to systematize death, either in
drafting the structural blueprints for death camps or the economic expenditure in
amassing weapons of mass destruction, rests wholly within the scope of political power.
The sheer magnitude of accessible capital or the ability to negotiate capital for weaponry
further entrenches the problem of evil within political discourse.
In attempting to contain potential political threats from dissidents, members of the
establishment have already begun to think of the various methods of implementing death,
i.e., they have already begun the process of systematizing death. Evil begins on a very
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slippery slope and once it has gained momentum, there is little that can be done to stop it
until it has run its course. To infiltrate dissident groups for the preservation of political
power and to use force to do so, suggests that were such a use of force to fail in
successfully hampering their attempts at usurping the government, more force maybe
required. The attempt to suppress such a political group necessitates their exclusion from
governmental protection. In fact, the situation is far bleaker since the government is
actively seeking to exterminate members of this rival political party.
The problem, however, which is far more sinister than the attempt to kill those that
have aligned themselves with opposing political and or ideological groups, is that one’s
political group can be an identifying characteristic for that individual. Take for example,
the sharia, the Islamic religious law. One’s identification as a Muslim, as practicing the
sharia, is an essential means of identifying not only one’s political and religious
affiliations but, more importantly, it is a means of identifying the individual as a
practicing Muslim. Thus, when Serbian nationalists attempted to exterminate Bosnian
Muslims during the early 1990s, their attempt was not only directed against the political
threat posed by a growing Muslim community, it was an attempt to deny the validity or
even relevance of being Muslim, that is, their political affiliation was an incidental fact to
their being Muslim. Muslims challenged Serbian nationalists for political power, thus
anyone practicing or following Muslim law could be identified as Muslim and slated for
extermination. The further manifestation of evil, within the scope of political power,
results from an inability to engage in tolerance.
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From the description above, one can formulate the following syllogism: To be a
political dissident is to threaten the power of the establishment, and such threats are
punishable by death. Muslims are political dissidents insofar as they pose a very real
challenge to the conception of Serbian nationalism. Any group contending for political
power is perceived as a threat. Therefore, being Muslim is punishable by death since the
act of being Muslim runs counter to the ideology of Serbian nationalism. Faced with such
fallacious reasoning, one must make the decision whether being Muslim is worth the risk
of being branded as an enemy of the state. Thus, the example of political affiliation and
state endorsed ideology, as also demonstrated in Kissi’s example of the Cambodian
genocide, serves as a representation of genocidal events based on mutable identifiers, i.e.,
those capable of being changed. Since being characterized as such may result in one’s
death, individuals within the targeted group must conform to state ideology or face
extermination. In the example of the tensions between Serbian nationalists and Bosnian
Muslims, it would require practicing Muslim to renounce their faith, culture and system
of beliefs. Quite obviously, these demands from Serbian nationalists could not be
granted, which led to the extermination of countless Bosnian Muslims.
In the selective targeting of groups, as evident in the practices of Nazi Germany, such
threats are to be taken seriously. The threat of competing political groups is a sufficient
condition for the systematization of death. Politicide quickly evolves into genocide when
it is no longer one’s political affiliation that jeopardizes the unilateral power of the
current political party, but the representation of targeted groups as increasingly vying for
political power, which most threatens the current bid to retain power. This manifestation
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of power is classified as unilateral because there is a strict refusal to share or diversify
power among respective or selected minority groups. In the previous example, it is the
refusal by Serbian nationalists in power to share power with Bosnian Muslims. It is that
fact of being Muslim that necessitates the state’s opposition, which begins the process of
formalizing an exclusionary ideology and ultimately serves as the justification for state
endorsed genocide. Killing, then, as an instrument of political power, has been
systematized and used to specifically target members of a competing political group for
the sole purpose of maintaining a unilateral hold of political power.
There is no greater display of might than the public execution of human life and there
is no greater display of evil than its public mass extermination. Corporal punishment is
the ultimate instantiation of political power, which has informed the political theories of
every philosopher since Aristotle. Fundamentally, social order is only maintained,
according to Hobbes and many others, if the power to kill, to take life is transferred to the
state and ultimately the sovereign. When the state abuses this transference of power to
publicly exterminate millions of lives, it is the greatest conceivable misuse of political
power and necessarily voids the social contract between the citizenry and the sovereign.
Members of opposing political groups knowingly risk their lives for their respective
ideologies, which they hope to bring to the forefront as a better alternative to the one they
oppose. The difference, however, between political groups vying for political power and
the Establishment, is a key difference. The social contract is hypothetically formalized
between the citizens and the state and as such the corresponding obligation to preserve
the nature of this agreement is solely the state’s responsibility. One must be cautious,
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then, in how an ideological war is waged against the government, for such a war may
result in the extermination of human lives as it undermines the power of the state.
The attempt to increase the efficiency with which human lives are destroyed or to
maximize casualties requires a deliberative process wherein assessments are made and
consequences compared to the ultimate goal or solution. The goal or the ultimate solution
for a state actively engaged in the process of disenfranchising members of its population
and specifically excluding particular political groups from state protection can only be the
mass extermination of those excluded from such protection. The state’s possession of
both money and military force means that genocide is only suppressed by the ability for
government propagandists like the RTLM to successfully convince protected portions of
the population that the extermination of political or ideological competitors is not the
same as the wholesale slaughter of human beings, which is why the act of
dehumanization serve such an essential role in state endorsed genocide. The greater the
desire for extermination, the more likely those groups will be infiltrated and labeled as
enemies of the state. The actual mass public killing of people, however, is facilitated by
the disenfranchisement of such people in the first place.
There are many who argue that the political is founded on contrasting “us” from
“them” wherein “they” are dehumanized and labeled as threats to national security issue
and economic progress. Such was the case during Nazi Germany’s rein of terror. More
heinous than the military campaigns waged throughout Europe was the ideology that
informed those campaigns. It was an ideology of blame and exclusion. Laborers inability
to afford the very product of their labor disenfranchises them from that which they helped
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to create. Similarly, if nations are built on the backs of many, the product of their labor
should be governmental protection, equality and access to opportunities and resources. If
the Establishment excludes some members of the population from enjoying these
protections for ideological reasons, then those that helped to produce the prosperity the
state enjoys, have systematically been disenfranchised from the very product of their
labor, viz. freedom.
Another feature of evil as expressly manifest in the discourse of political power and
genocide is the methodical attempt to suppress individual freedoms, where those
freedoms do not infringe on the rights of others within that society. The
micromanagement of social freedoms, i.e., the attempt to regulate, with policy, the
actions of a nation’s citizenry pertaining to private matters and personal beliefs,
especially the latter, is a precondition for the abuse of political power. Freedom must be
an expression of the will, otherwise, it is socially or politically constructed and therefore
no longer an instance of freedom. Acting in accord with political power is drastically
different from the motivations that cause one to act in such accord. As Martin Luther
King has rightfully noted, there are instances where citizens are morally obligated to
break the law in acts of civil disobedience. The attempt to justify the extermination of
human life while others within the population are able to enjoy their “freedoms” is
certainly one of the biggest paradoxes known to humanity. Our complacency with the
status quo, is an act of evil, which means that evil can and does manifest both actively
and passively. There is blame to share in engaging in an act of genocide, be it planning or
executing the act itself, but there is equally blame to share in passively stepping aside
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while an act of genocide is occurring, the differentiation between the two rather minute.
Thus, in discussing the nature of political groups and their opposition to the established
political power, one must revisit the notion of freedom and the struggle for political
power. One cannot enjoy the benefits of freedom at the expense of those who helped to
make its realization possible. To do so is hypocritical and it puts some groups beyond
state protection. Moreover, in addressing the supposition that political power is to be held
unilaterally, one denies others the opportunity of participating and sharing in that power.
It is this notion of sharing that is the kernel of political power. It is the recognition
that insofar as there are bound to be individuals within society that have been alienated,
all are entitled to the same protect under the auspices of political power. The political
must embrace diversity as the social contract binds the state and the sovereign to every
member of society. Thus, to be political is to be constantly in flux, it is to adapt to the
ever-changing needs of one’s constituents, which can only facilitate tolerance and
inclusion. The philosophical concept of evil is salient in the discussion of genocide and
the abuse of political power because it affects how we associate with other human beings.
The nature of that association is determined in part by the level of political acceptance of
the other. Where my government is intolerant, I am more likely to express similar
sentiments. Where my government is tolerant, I am more like to act accordingly.
Thus, in a Kantian sense, there is a shared obligation, a shared duty between each
individual as a moral agent and his or her government as a protector to embrace the
diversity of political and personal beliefs. Granted, there will be, on occasions, genuine
threats to national security. The state cannot politicize national security and in the same
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sense target particular groups within the population for extermination, to do so is
inherently contradictory. If the state is dedicated to national security, then it must extend
that commitment to every member of the national community. Otherwise, the state
selectively decides to exclude particular groups from state protection, thereby forfeiting
the social contract in failing to protect portions of its citizenry.
Safeguarding political groups despite their opposition to the established political party
is an act of confidence. It demonstrates to the public that competing views will be
tolerated as long as they do not infringe on the wellbeing or safety of others. In the event
that force is required to suppress a legitimate threat, the criteria of which is itself
problematic, the acts of government cannot precede the actual threat. The attempt to
preemptively strike before the threat is even actualized is often based in fear and fear is
the seed that spawns evil.
2.6.

Conflicting Paradigms: Political Ideology and Nationalism

Essential to the concept of statehood as political authority over defined geographical
boundaries, is also the importance of protecting the lives of those, both citizens and
foreigners, who reside within the borders of states. The notion of solidarity is an equally
important conception in any attempt to discuss statehood, which is often couched in terms
of nationalism or patriotism. Solidarity, then, would seemingly necessitate protection,
since nationalism would function as an essential attribute of statehood, and the state
would be bound to protect members of its population. There is, however, a dangerous
gulf between state ideology, on the one hand, and nationalism, on the other, which
surfaces in an analysis of genocide and the problem of evil.
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Though the state is undeniably the most lethal agent in the systematization of the
mass extermination of human life, the state should not be conceived as inherently
ominous. Any attempts to do so, misses the thrust of my argument. It is not simply that
the state is an instrument for the systematization of death, which is all too evident in acts
of genocide, but that the state, as discussed in the last section, has the ability to share
political power. The emergence of evil as a consequence of political power arises when
one assumes that such power is meant to be absolutely held and unilaterally exercised
rather than shared. Of course the state can exist as a sovereign entity, capable of
protecting its population, without having to resort to genocide to safeguard its own
power. The difficulty in articulating such a position, however, without sounding ethereal,
requires a firm understanding of the dual natures of nationalism.
The aim of this section is to explicate the dual nature of nationalism and demonstrate
how one conception of nationalism facilitates genocide by focusing on distinctions
between “us” and “them,” while an alternative conception of nationalism avoids these
troubles by addressing the common thread binding all members of the population, viz. the
nation. The idea of belonging to a nation or a state is integral to how we see ourselves as
human beings. A shared sense of belonging is fundamental to defining human beings. We
are after all social creatures. The problem arises, however, when nationalism and the idea
of social cohesion are conflated with an exclusionary ideology and political intolerance.
Since so much of who we are is bound to our literal geography, and since that
geographical location is governed by an authoritative body which implements codified
laws to govern our social interactions, and since those laws help to shape our sense of
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justice and injustice, then, if through the abuse of political power, the government
willfully choose to exclude or suppress a particular group of people, and codifies their
suppression in law, then “they” cannot be entitled to the same benefits under the
protection of the law as “we” are. “They” remain outside of the protection of law. This
was, in effect, what happened during American internment of Japanese-Americans.
As discussed in the previous chapter, Patañjali’s account of our attachments leading
to evil, stem from a fear of loss. Since antiquity, the philosophy of evil has been rooted in
the conception of this primordial fear. With regard to the internment of JapaneseAmericans during WWII, both the government and the average American feared losing
their freedoms to, “the Japanese”. Insofar as “they” were Japanese, “they” constituted a
danger to national security. Thus, ironically even Japanese-Americans posed a significant
threat to the safety of America’s borders.
The example of the internment of Japanese-Americans is a clear example of just how
quickly citizens in good standing with their government can be castigated and labeled as
enemies of the state. Though the United States government did not seek the mass
extermination of those held in internment camps, the ease with which their freedoms
were denied was frightening. In attempting, then, to address the association between evil
and political power, the adamant refusal to recognize basic human freedom, in the face of
a national security crisis, demonstrates the potential hostility that exist between the
government and those members of the population deemed as enemies of the state.
Evil is most effective in breaking the human spirit and reaching genocidal levels
when those in control of political power have taken specific steps to suppress the
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freedoms of some members of the national population. There is a clear recognition of
injustice when Americans are not interned, but Japanese-Americans are. The sense that
“they” aren’t really like “us,” that “they aren’t really Americans,” begs the question,
“What does it mean to be an American?” During the rein of Nazi Germany, Jews were
segregated then sent to death camps. Their segregation was part of the process of
stripping them of their freedom. It was allegedly a demonstration of political might. The
reality, however, was that such actions simply cloaked the true intention of the Nazi
regime, which was the mass extermination of Jews in Germany and Nazi occupied
Europe.
It should also be noted that the state, or those in control of it, during times of extreme
crisis, may redefine citizenship or membership of the political community over which it
exercises jurisdiction. The power to include or exclude one in the “nation” becomes an
act of the state and not one of birth. Thus, the jurisdiction in which citizenship is typically
conferred, as to the location of one’s birth, is now reinterpreted by state power. This
practice, however, problematizes the conferral of citizenship, insofar as the justification
for inclusion or exclusion becomes increasingly arbitrary. Especially in the case of the
exclusion of citizenship, those denied citizenship are more readily targeted for potential
abuse and extermination.
The concept of statehood is intimately tied to the notion of nationalism. As I have
suggested, when the idea of nationalism includes an ideology of exclusion, all efforts to
defend nationalism will only result in an exclusion of a portion of the population, which
only undermines the solidarity of the nation.
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The difficulty of analyzing the concept of evil and incorporating it into a larger
discussion of genocide, relates to complications in assessing the role of nationalism and
statehood. As previously mentioned, the concept of nationalism is essential to an
understanding of statehood. The state is a single authoritative extension of political power
and nationalism is the unifying means of constructing identity. It is, in effect, the point of
focus for any attempt to assimilate the public at large. The need to assimilate, then, is the
force that informs nationalistic ideals. Nationalistic ideologies reinforce norms, which are
substantiated by practice. The idea of democratic freedom and free market economics is a
governing norm for much of the West. One need not speak of specific instances of
nationalism because they all serve the same ideological function. Nationalism is the
driving force for socio-cultural assimilation. Thus, for the nation to diversify, for the
nation to grow, it must allow an assimilation of its ideals.
Since political ideology informs nationalism and nationalism is an essential facet of
statehood, wherein it is the driving force for socio-cultural assimilation, then any attempt
to infuse political ideology with an ideology of exclusion, compromises the process of
assimilation and therefore compromises the state itself. The strength of the state should
only be measured by the diversity of its population, for where there is a diverse
population there is a need for ideological tolerance. For the state to endorse an ideology
of exclusion undermines the natural interrelation and interaction between diverse sociocultural groups. Thus, an enforced ideology of exclusion unnaturally seeks to control the
state demography. Furthermore, this attempt to control state demography runs counter to
natural occurrences and therefore requires the use of force for its implementation. The
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manifestation of this force, as an unnatural means of controlling state demography, is
most heinously instantiated in the act of genocide. Thus, the use of genocide as a tool of
unnaturally controlling state demography is itself justified by an ideology of exclusion.
The purpose of an exclusionary ideology is to serve as a means of justifying state
endorsed genocide. Genocide is necessarily self-referential, insofar as the ideological
construct of exclusion presumes the act of genocide, and the act of genocide is itself
justified by the ideological construct of excluding members of its population from
protection. Thus, the justification for genocide is always dogmatic. The state appeals to is
exclusionary ideology, genocide manifests as a result of this appeal and is subsequently
justified by similar appeals to the same ideological basis. The only means, then, of
thwarting the occurrence of genocide is to attack and undermine any appeal to an
ideology of exclusion. If every attempt to appeal to this ideology is meant with diligent
and logical arguments to the contrary, the justification for genocide, and also the attempt
to dehumanize potential targeted groups, becomes all the more difficult. The more
difficult it is for the state to justify the extermination of targeted groups, the more likely it
is that genocide will be thwarted. Thus, the most effective means of decreasing the
occurrences of genocide results from a refusal to endorse an ideology of exclusion.
The problem lies not in the idea of nationalism but in the conception of an ideology of
exclusion, which I have demonstrated, leads to a weakening of the state. Nevertheless,
nationalism devoid of an ideology of exclusion, which is based on tolerance and a respect
for diverse populations, can only contribute to the welfare of the state. Exclusionary
nationalism is, therefore, a construct because it breeds intolerance and facilitates
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genocide. As discussed in the previous chapter, intolerance is a core cause in the
perpetration of evil. Thus, the manifestation of evil, through acts of genocide, is firmly
rooted in intolerance. To practice ideological tolerance is to strengthen nationalism,
which reinforces the conception of statehood by incorporating a diversity of political
views.
2.7.

Genocidal Intent and Causality

One of the most difficult puzzles to solve when discussing the relation between
genocide and the problem of evil is assessing the intentionality of state ideology. A
political ideology of exclusion necessitates a specific intentional act, but proving that the
intent was to commit genocide is very difficult. As has been demonstrated in the last
section, to incorporate an ideology of exclusion into the conception of nationalism is to
undermine the efficacy of the state, and statehood as such. Philosophers, however, can
demonstrate that the intentionality of the state was in fact evil, if the means of
justification was itself referenced by an ideology of exclusion, i.e., if the state’s attempt
to justify genocide is based on state ideology, then the state dogmatically justifies its
actions by appealing to itself, which was most heinously and continually done by Hitler
and members of the Nazi party.
An ideology of exclusion must first be assessed as a thought. The thought in question
must also pertain to the deliberate and systematic extermination of a portion of the
population. If this thought is realized in the act of genocide, i.e., if the incorporation of an
exclusionary ideology could possibly manifest as an act of genocide, then both the
attempt to incorporate such an ideology and the resulting genocidal act are evil.
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Demonstrating that the thought of exclusion is evil, however, requires that one assesses
the intent more so than the causal relationships between state ideology and nationalism,
on the one hand, and the mechanics of systematizing death, on the other.
Evil is most easily understood as the willful systematization of death as a result of a
state’s exclusionary ideology. If, because of an ideology of exclusion, members of a
population are willfully targeted for extermination, and the process of expediting their
deaths is systematized to result in maximizing causalities, then both the intent to act and
the act itself are evil. Such an ideology is evil because it brings death to the public, it
politicizes and systematizes death and then subsequently justifies the act of genocide by
appealing to its ideology of exclusion.
The legal difficulty in proving that a state has engaged in an act of genocide can be
eased if acts of exclusion have been codified by law. State ideology can be an amorphous
and often abstracted sociopolitical or philosophical concept that has little applicability to
legislative bodies or international tribunals. Since, however, it has been demonstrated that
an ideology of exclusion can result in an act of genocide, if one is trying to locate blame
for a proven act of genocide, one need only look for exclusionary practices codified in
law. The law, then, is a representation of state intentionality. It is the law that seeks to
regulate conduct within the domestic jurisdiction of a state’s borders. Thus, in assessing
the often elusive conception of state intentionality, one need only investigate the
execution of law. Every law that enforces acts of discrimination or exclusion or fails to
punish acts of discrimination or exclusion, sponsors an ideology of exclusion. Where
such ideology is supported by law, the state is specifically responsible for the acts of
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members of its population. As I mentioned earlier, this construction of state intentionality
is broader than simply assessing instances of state endorsed genocide. Under this
interpretation, for example, the United States government would be directly responsible
for the mass lynching of African-American men during the 19th and 20th centuries.
One should note, then, that participation is not necessary for implication. The state or
the individual can be implicated without ever having participated in the particular act. It
is the intention to act, the ability to incite hatred, the inability to prosecute acts of
discrimination, or the failure to intervene, to protect the abused and vulnerable, all of
which expose state complicity in the perpetrated acts. At this level of the investigation,
however, it would be presumptive to suggest that the state was participating in an act of
evil or, of that matter, that the state’s ideology was evil. There is agreement that it is
exclusionary, which is justified by instances of discrimination and exclusion codified
law, but it is not evil. The ideology of exclusion is only evil when, based on the principles
of exclusion, the state then begins the process of systematizing death. It is the
systematization of death and an ideology of exclusion that is evil. One may argue that a
standing militia is a representative example of the attempt to bureaucratize death, which
may be true, but one may also argue that they are a defensive force charged with
protecting the population. To understand the coupling of evil and genocide, one must
recognize the necessary causal relation between state ideology and the systematization of
death. It is only when a state ideology of exclusion commands some militia to
exterminate all members of a population bearing a specific demographic identifier that
one can truly understand the coupling of evil and genocide.
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Though much has been said of intentionality, little has been said of the causal
relationship between an ideology of exclusion and the systemization of death. Insofar as
state intentionality can be inferred from codified law, one can assess the nature of the
causal relation between the intent to commit genocide and the act of genocide itself.
More important than this causal relation between the intent to act and the act itself is the
attempt to understand, in the Aristotelian sense, the causal distinction between the
potential to commit genocide and the actualization of evil through genocidal acts.
In discussing the relationship between an acorn and an oak tree, one is justified in
classifying the acorn as having the potential to be an oak tree. Similarly, the oak tree is
the actualization of the acorn. This, however, is a cursory interpretation of causality. It is
more than simply the fact that the acorn has the potential to become an oak tree and the
oak tree is the actualization of the acorn, but that the acorn is, in fact, incomplete, i.e., it
is not an oak tree. An oak tree, however, by definition, produces acorns, such that an oak
tree is the production of its own actualization. In short, the oak tree is sustainable given
the requisite environmental factors.
In discussing the association of genocide and evil in terms of their causal association,
the potential for evil is inherent an ideology of exclusion. The ideology is the seed for
spawning evil. As I have mentioned in previous sections it is not enough to say that
genocide will necessarily follow from such an exclusionary ideology, as demonstrated in
the lynching of African-Americans during the 19th and early 20th centuries, though
genocide is certainly one manifestation of evil. More is needed to actualize evil. Though
an acorn is a necessary condition for an oak tree, it is not sufficient, as it will need
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sunlight, water and shade if it is to actualize that potential. Similarly, an ideology of
exclusion may suggest the intent to commit genocide, there maybe a potential for
genocide, but without the proper condition, viz. discrimination codified in law coupled
with the systematization of death, all the necessary conditions will not be met to define
the act as evil. Again, I am here classifying evil as the willful systematization of death as
a result of a state’s exclusionary ideology. The intent to engage in such action serves to
foster the potential for the manifestation of evil through an act of genocide, but that
potential is not enough without satisfying other conditions. The greatest actualization of
evil, then, is genocide, as a causal result of a state’s exclusionary ideology. The formation
of an exclusionary ideology is a demonstration of the state’s intent, and the
systematization of death and the act of mass public killings is the actualization of that
intention. Thus, in understanding the causal forces that determine the manifestation of
state intentionality, understanding how evil unfolds within the political structures will aid
in localizing its existence in acts of genocide.
Also implied in the discussion of an ideology of exclusion is the attempt to determine
the nature and composition of society itself, by the creation of a monolithic society. We
have often heard of the social construction of race or the social construction of gender,
but this is a political construction of society through unnatural means. Societies are
naturally constructed and determined by any number of factors and sociologists disagree
on what all those factors may be, but there is consensus that migration patterns and
accessibility to natural resources are determining factors in the formation of society.
Hobbes, notoriously spoke of the “state of nature,” but one needs not revert to such
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hostile origins to understand the formation of society. The attempt to link genocide and
evil strictly through a discourse of political power would be incomplete, because
although an ideology of exclusion seeks to remove members of society from the
population and thereby from political protection, it also implies that the state is artificially
manufacturing the social. There is the potential for a whole host of research surrounding
the political construction of the social, but my concern pertains to the artificial creation of
a monolithic society.
If one delves deeper into the idea of state intentionality, one begins to uncover the
most heinous attempts to thwart the natural migration patterns of human beings and their
accessibility to resources. Within human communities, the maximization of diversity is
inherent in biological reproduction, as a fact of human survival. This is the natural facet
of life, i.e., nature tends to maximize diversity as a defensive mechanism against genetic
disorders and diseases. Thus, any attempt by a state to thwart the natural progression to
maximize diversity, even within the domestic jurisdiction of a state’s borders, is
unnatural.
Evil, then, is unsustainable. If, as mentioned earlier, its has been suggested that evil is
defined in terms of an exclusionary state ideology that seeks to enforce homogeneity, and
the demography of the state is naturally heterogeneous, then those in control of the state
must realize that to maintain such a control of state demography requires perpetual
genocide and mass exile, a fact that is ultimately unsustainable. The attempt to enforce
homogeneity weakens society, as it requires excessive uses of force to physically
manipulate state demography. Within biological communities, a similar advantage exists
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for sexually reproducing organisms. Sexual reproduction increases diversity, whereas
asexual reproduction creates uniformity, but also weakens the viability of the group. The
viability of social groupings is dependent on the diversity of the society. Without a keen
understanding of the intricacies of social networking, one cannot assess the benefits of
diversity, which is a job for sociologists. But the unnatural attempt to enforce
homogeneity through the abuse of political power undermines the natural occurrence of a
diverse state demography.
2.8.

Genocide, Purity and Imperfection
Within this section of the analysis I will undertake a description of the notion of state

purity, which, I will argue, is a direct result of subscribing to an exclusionary ideology. If
a state’s demography is naturally heterogeneous and the state assumes an ideology of
exclusion to enforce or create a homogeneous state, then such actions are counter to the
natural occurrences within the state and thereby unnatural. Furthermore, the attempt to
purify the state presupposes that there exists an imperfection within the natural
occurrences of diversity in state demography. It assumes that the natural occurrence of a
diverse state demography is contaminated by the incorporation of groups that the state
seeks to expel. Thus, to decontaminate or purify the state, those in power must endorse an
exclusionary ideology and seek to expel targeted groups from the state demography. The
expulsion of these targeted groups from state demography is the act of purification. In
using the term purification, I am specifically referring to the act of expelling targeted
groups from the state demography once it has assumed an exclusionary ideology, either
through genocide or mass exile.
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, the anxiety caused by the presence of targeted
groups, as a perceived challenge to state authority, suggests that a state willing to
exterminate or to impose exile for members of its population behaves in a similar fashion
to the small man (shăo rén). As Mencius warned King Hwuy of Leang, the state is
obligated to it people just as a man is obligated to live a virtuous life. Thus, in the process
of attempting to purge members of the population from the state’s domestic jurisdiction,
those in control of the state fail to recognize this obligation to their people.
In the description of purification and the attempt to expel imperfect groups from state
demography, I will focus my analysis on Fascism and Totalitarianism. In my account of
these two forms of government, I will demonstrate the comparative association between
the purification of the state, on the one hand, and the endorsement of an ideology of
exclusion, both supported by Fascism and Totalitarianism, on the other. Thus, the aim of
this final section of the analysis is to demonstrate how the concept of purity is
specifically deduced from an exclusionary ideology in both Fascist and Totalitarian
states. If it is then demonstrated that the concept of purity is deducible from the initial
premise of a state endorsed ideology of exclusion, and also shown that the concept of
state purification inevitably results in genocide, then the attempt to thwart genocide is
intimately tied both to demonstrating the logical inconstancies in subscribing to an
exclusionary ideology and demonstrating how the idea of purification fails to purify the
state.
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The power of Fascist and Totalitarian state is grounded in the logic of their respective
ideologies, which according to Hannah Arendt is their ability to weaponize their
ideologies. She writes,
The device both totalitarian rulers used to transform their
respective ideologies into weapons with which each of their
subjects could force himself into…proceeded to drive
ideological implications into extremes of logical
consistency, which to the onlooker, looked preposterously
“primitive” and absurd: a “dying class” consisted of people
condemned to death; races that are “unfit to live” were to be
exterminated (emphasis added). 129
The power of the Fascist and Totalitarian state rests in the strict logical consistency with
which it governs and subordinates targeted groups within its population. For the state to
weaponize its ideology, no arguments against the state can be warranted. An exclusionary
ideology is inherently prone to weaponization because it seeks to alter, by force, the state
demography by excluding targeted groups from membership. My emphasis of Arendt’s
claim that these forms of government seek to “drive ideological implications into
extremes of logical consistency” is a means of further demonstrating the necessity for
rigorous and formulized logical coherence within state ideology. Thus, the attempt to
undermine these forms of government cannot truly be successful by waging wars as the
strength of these governments rests in their logic not their military. To undermine the
logical consistencies inherent in subscribing to an ideology of exclusion and specifically
demonstrating how a contradiction is drawn from assuming a the initial premise of an
exclusionary ideology, is all that is needed to undermine the motive, the driving force
behind these forms of governance. This will be my objective, i.e., I will attempt a
129
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reductio ad absurdum from the initial premise of an exclusionary ideology and if it is
shown that assuming such an ideology actually weakens the state, then one cannot
assume such an ideology.
With respect to the nature of an ideology Arendt writes, “the real nature of all
ideologies was reveled only in the role that the ideology plays in the apparatus of
totalitarian domination” (emphasis added). 130 This conception is of key importance in
discussing both the Fascist and Totalitarian states. The Fascist state, in its opposition to
pacifisms, seeks to subordinate the individual to the will of the state, which is ruled by a
single party, and is thereby driven by the “movement” of supporters of the political party.
Once the “movement” has attained political power, i.e., it has occupied all facets of
government with party members, the Fascist state can become totalitarian in the
omnipotence of its political power, which according to Arendt, “is what happened in Italy
under Mussolini’s Fascism, which up to 1938 was not totalitarian but just an ordinary
nationalist dictatorship developed logically from a multiparty democracy.” 131 The idea
that the party is a movement of the people is merely a muse to attain political power, it is
the framework with which the leaders of the party articulate their intentions to the
masses. The masses support the movement because the movement is allegedly a
representation of the will of the masses, which in the case of Fascism is clearly false. The
Fascist state is solely concerned with total domination. It functions to ensure that its sole
party occupies every aspect of political power and challengers to that power threaten the
existence of the Fascist state. Thus, totalitarianism is a natural consequence of a Fascist
130
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state because the drive for omnipresence is reinforced by the will to omnipotence. The
desire to represent the party in every position of political power (omnipresence) is
reinforced by the totalization of that power (omnipotence).
The problem, however, with attaining and maintaining complete political control of
power is that it requires ceaseless attention to all those forces, both malignant and benign
that may otherwise seek to usurp political power, or even seek representation within
political power. Moreover, the Fascist state, by default, since it is a single party state,
which is representative of the people’s “movement” only represents to population insofar
as those not represented within the party cannot be considered as members of the state.
The assumption that the state represents the people, is only true to the extent that single
party rule cannot, by definition, represent the entirety of a state’s demography. Thus, in
subscribing to Fascism, it follows that there will invariably be members within the state
demography that will, necessarily, be excluded from state participation. Even prior to the
formation of an ideology of exclusion, then, the Fascist state, in particular, as a means of
its existence, is itself buttressed by the conception of selective exclusion. Those not
represented by the single party will be subordinated by state bureaucracy once the
political movement to occupy every facet of political power has been accomplished by
the Fascist state.
There are two points of importance with respect to the rise of the Fascist state and its
relation to state demography. Firstly, the Fascist state is inherently exclusionary, which
seeks to govern to the advantage of a few than to satisfy the concerns of the masses.
Insofar as the Fascist state is not representative of state demography, it follows that there
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is an ideological unwillingness address the concerns for those that do not support state
power or for those that seek to diversify the state. Secondly, in strategically dominating
all forms of political power within the state, there can be no resistance by state officials
to the ideologies espoused by state leadership. In fact, those ambitious for power need
only parrot the sentiments of state ideology to virtually ensure their rise to political
power. What results from these two instantiations of Fascism is the fundamental inability
of those in power to address the concerns of the masses not represented within the state’s
sole party, and an a further reluctance, by definition, to allow the incorporation of diverse
political ideologies within the state’s governance. Thus, what results from this political
rigidity is a formulation of an ideology of exclusion, which is justified by the insistence
on a single omnipresent political party that only represents a portion of the state’s
demography.
In enacting an ideology of exclusion, wherein the state specifically targets and selects
particular groups for exclusion and inevitably expulsion from the state demography, the
state need only refer to the omnipresence of its political power. Power, in this case, has
been consolidated by all those espousing a similar political ideology. The state—argues
the Fascist—is the manifestation of the people’s will, i.e., it is the people’s movement.
Thus, any who espouse political ideologies that differ from the state’s endorsed ideology,
fundamentally undermine the power of the state, since power has been consolidated by
one party rule. Moreover, since the state is a manifestation of the people’s movement, to
endorse any political ideology other than state ideology is tantamount to subvert the will
of the people. This attempt to subvert the will of the people corrupts the very essence of
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how the state rose to power and successfully occupied every facets of political
governance, thereby challenging the state for power.
This threat need not be met by military actions against the state. The very act of
introducing an alternative state ideology essentially corrupts the purity of the state.
Knowing this beforehand, i.e., understanding that there will be those that oppose and
wish to introduce alternative forms of governance before even attain political power,
necessitates that once power is attained all those that would seek to “corrupt” the current
Fascist state, by challenging its political ideology, must be expelled from the state
demography. As mentioned in the introduction of this section, by the process of
purification, I am specifically referring to the process wherein the state seeks to expel all
those who challenge state power from the state’s demography through mass exile or
genocide.
Using the concepts that I have formulized earlier in the chapter to specifically analyze
this practice of purification within the Fascist state, it must be said that such an attempt, if
it were to result in an act of genocide would have as its foundation genocide based on
mutable identifiers. Since political ideologies are given to change, those who have an
ability to embrace the new state ideology will be spared. Those that refuse will be
exterminated. Granted there are aspects of Fascism that speak to racial superiority, which
would only strengthen my point by satisfying conditions for both genocide based on
mutable identifiers (the refusal to embrace the new political ideology) and genocide
based on immutable identifiers (the extermination of life based on the victim’s race).
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In assuming an exclusionary ideology, the state must enact the process of
purification. Otherwise, it would be contradictory to embrace such ideology while also
recognizing the diversity of state demography. Thus, to remain logically consistent, the
acceptance of an exclusionary ideology necessitates the act of purification. The act of
purification, then, is the specific act of expelling those excluded in the state ideology
from representation and state protection. However, those targeted groups are comprised
of those selected on the basis of mutable and immutable characteristics. Clearly it is
easier to exterminate those within the population that have been targeted because of their
immutable characteristics because these characteristics are readily apparent, e.g., race,
ethnicity, disability. For the sake of argument, then, assume that the state was successful
in its attempt to purify the state of all those members of target groups excluded on the
basis of their immutable demographic identifiers. There would still be, what I will argue,
the impossible task of purifying the state of all those that have been targeted on the basis
of their refusal to embrace state ideology. How conceivably could this process be
completed? If officials were to ask those selected for extermination about their political
affiliations, and those targeted for extermination understand that espousing and ideology
other than state ideology results in death, then the simple thing one can do is to falsely
acknowledge state ideology in the hopes of saving one’s own life.
The state, however, has to know that this will most naturally be the instinctive
response of potential dissenters, which leads to the conclusion that the state will have to
continually seek out kill dissenters. Note that it would be illogical to assume that the state
could ever remover all potential dissenters from state demography, because the very
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nature of their political affiliation is based on mutability. Thus, even more dangerous
than seeking out dissenters is the danger of losing those that once affirmed state ideology
to competing ideologies. Thus, subscribing to an exclusionary ideology results in at least
two contradictions, which complete the reductio ad absurdum. Firstly, purification is
impossible because the total removal of all target groups from state demography is
expressly impossible, because some of the characteristics that may be targeted are subject
to change. It is impossible, then, for the state to verify that all “contaminants” have
successfully been removed from the state demography. Secondly, and even more
importantly, if the state endorses an ideology of exclusion, then there for the state to have
power there must be those that need to be excluded. If the state were to truly purify itself,
there would no longer be a need for the state, as the very ideology of the state is based on
the process of exclusion. Thus, what is actually being stated and endorsed in subscribing
to an ideology of state exclusion, is the eternal extermination of human life. As long as
the state is in power there will always be some group that needs to be purged from its
demography. That is the truth behind subscribing to an ideology of exclusion. To support
my conclusion, I cite Arendt at length,
To the extent that the Bolshevik purge succeeds in making
its victims confess to crimes they never committed, it relies
chiefly on this basic fear and argues as follows: We are all
agreed on the premise that history is a struggle of classes
and on the role of the Party in its conduct. You know
therefore that, historically speaking, the Party is always
right…At this historical moment, that is in accordance with
the law of history, certain crimes are due to be committed
which the Party, knowing the law of history, must punish.
For these crimes, the Party needs criminals; it may be that
the Party, though knowing the crimes, does not quite know
the criminals; more important than to be sure about the
153

criminals is to punish the crimes, because without such
punishment, History will not be advanced but may even be
hindered in its course. You, therefore, either have
committed the crimes or have been called by the Party to
play the role of the criminal—in either case you have
objectively become an enemy of the Party (emphasis
added). 132
It has been my specific goal throughout this chapter, to precisely itemize exactly how
an individual “becomes an enemy to the Party.” In following Kissi’s lead and his
explanation of how the process of genocide unfolds, it was my attempt to describe how
the state manufactures enemies. This process of manufacturing enemies is essentially
arbitrary. What is not arbitrary, however, is that there will be victims if the state endorses
an ideology of exclusion. Once that endorsement is made, the entire population slips into
absurdity because it is fundamentally illogical to assume an exclusionary ideology and
not also embrace contradiction. I end, then, with a final quote from Arendt,
The ideal subject of a totalitarian rule is not the convinced
Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the
distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of
experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e.,
the standards of thought) no longer exist (emphasis
added). 133
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Chapter 3: Attempts to Deny the Existence of Evil

“There is an air of unreality about the suggestion
that ‘Evil’ is reducible to ‘not-so-Good’” 134
In a contemporary discussion of events with negative normative associations, many
social scientists, criminologists, and political theorists have abandoned the use of the term
‘evil’ for more “meaningful” terms like violence, harms or torts. These theorists have
argued that the term has lost its meaning or that it is too entrenched in theological or
metaphysical contexts to have any significant application for an analysis of violence and
mass murders. This chapter, then, is an attempt to outline the various ways in which these
theorists, both past and present, have attempted to reduce evil to conceptions such as
harm or violence. I shall demonstrate the failures of each.
3.1.

The Denial of Evil: Manichaean Dualism and Matter
From antiquity, philosophers have had difficulties in situating evil within the natural

world. Many, unable to locate evil within material substance, have argued that evil is a
privation of that which is good. Insofar as evil is conceptualized as a privation, its
existence, i.e., our ability to identify evil within the natural world, manifests as a lack of
goodness. Rula Abisaab explains,
‘Evil’…is the absence of existence or absence of a
perfection of existence or absence of perfection in an
134
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existing being. What society labels ‘evil’, in reference to
injustice and adultery, is a construction and as such has no
absolute reality. ‘Evil’, then, describes the person who is
lacking in justice, uprightness or goodness. 135
On this interpretation, evil exist, not as a thing in the world, since there is no
corresponding material substance, but as a receding gradient—a diminution of goodness.
Rather than the gradient being measured on a scale separated by goodness, on one side,
and evil, on the other, evil is measured by privation or lack of goodness, as such. Thus,
all that exists, according to this conception, is goodness. The problem, however, with
defining evil in such terms is rather obvious. Acton and Watkins explain,
From Plato on, the attitude of ‘objectivists’…have mostly
been confident about the reality of Good but rather
skeptical about Evil. They have mostly been antiManichaeists. More precisely, in place of a scale with Very
Good at one end, Very Bad at the other…they have put a
scale which just has Very Good…at one end. On this scale
one cannot approach Very Bad, but only recede from Very
Good…There is and air of unreality about the suggestion
that ‘Evil’ is reducible to ‘not-so-Good’ and that we
recognize evil situations from a prior knowledge of missing
goodness…which is palpably false (emphasis added). 136
Alexander of Lycopolis was a staunch critic of the Manichaeists and of Manichaean
dualism. For the Manichaeist, dualism arises from their refutation of God’s omnipotence,
which accounts for the problem of evil, i.e., if God is not omnipotent then one can
rationally argue for the existence of evil within the world. For the Manichaeist, there is
the recognition of evil on the one hand, but at the expense of God’s omnipotence, on the
other. Alexander recognized that Manichaean dualism jeopardized the integrity of the
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Christian faith by challenging God’s omnipotence. Thus, to preserve God’s omnipotence,
Alexander had to deny the actuality of evil. The key, however, in refuting the
Manichaean conception of God, would require Alexander to re-conceptualize the nature
of matter. For the Manichaeist, evil exists within matter, which only exacerbates their
dualism. The Manichaeists argue that if God is imperfect and his powers are limited, then
his creations will reflect his imperfections. Evil is an imperfection. Moreover, matter is a
product of God’s creation. Thus, matter is evil.
To successfully deny the existence of evil, Alexander had to demonstrate that matter
could not contain evil, as it was an aspect of God’s creation and that, unlike the dualistic
conception defended by the Manichaeists, God was omnipotent and therefore his
creations, namely matter, was devoid of evil. Jason BeDuhn addresses the nature of
Manichaean dualism within the human body,
The especially pernicious character of the human body
results, according to the Manichaeans, from an evil motive
force that inhabits it. Augustine reports that “you say that
all your members and your whole body were formed by the
evil mind which you call hylē, and that part of this
fabricator dwells in the body along with part of your
God.” 137 So “every living being has two souls, one of the
race of light, and the other of the race of darkness.” 138 The
evil mixed into the whole universe manifests itself in the
kind of behavior humans display outside the discipline of
the Manichaean faith. 139
Alexander then analyzed the nature of matter. If God is the creator of all things, and God
is all good, omnipotent, and benevolent, and matter is a product of God’s creation, then
137
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insofar as God is the Creator of matter, God did not imbue matter with evil. Thus, evil
cannot exist, as existence results from God’s creation, and all of God’s creations are
devoid of evil. According to Alexander, then, matter cannot be the source of evil.
Gedaliahu G. Stroumsa explains,
Alexander’s argument against Manichaean ontology
gravitates around the status of matter…He insists that
matter cannot be considered evil since it is generated by
God. 140 In his emphatic denial of any evil in connection
with matter, he stands rather lonely in the Platonic
tradition…For instance he objects to the definition of
matter as ataktos kinesis, 141 which had become too closely
connected to the identification of matter with evil in Middle
Platonism. 142
The Manichaeists’ conception of ataktos kinesis (disordered movement) is a reference to
the nature of matter, in which, as it has been suggested, matter results as a product of
God’s imperfect creation. The imperfection inherent within matter brings about its
disorder. Hence, the nature of ataktos kinesis as evil results from its disordered and
unperfected state. Alexander is taking issue with this conception of ataktos kinesis.
Stroumsa writes,
The Christian heresiographers seem to regard Manichaean
materialism as contradicting the very concept of God. God
cannot be situated in a place…this description implies that
God is limited…Alexander of Lycopolis…who…wrote the
first full-flegded anti-Manichaean polemic, points out that
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the Manichaean perception entails not only God’s
limitation, but also his corporeality. 143
For Alexander of Lycopolis, the existence of evil is illusory, since its actuality would
entail its manifestation from an imperfect and limited God. The Manichaean conception
of matter as ataktos kinesis would create not only a theoretical duality, but also an
embodied duality. Thus, Alexander’s refutation of evil was incidental to the fact that he
refused to accept the Manichaean conception of matter as ataktos kinesis. In refusing to
acknowledge this conception, however, and in failing to then account for what we
perceive as evil, Alexander discarded evil for the preservation and perfection of matter.
3.2.

The Denial of Evil: Refutation through Endurance
Many within the Christian tradition have attempted to tackle the problem of evil by

defending God’s characteristics at the expense of denying the existence of evil. The
denial of evil often takes the form of a suggestion that evil is a means to some greater
good, and therefore, in order to have these greater goods, we must endure some degree of
evil. In his discussion of this attempt to reduce evil to more “meaningful” conceptions, Le
Bosquet notes:
There are religious men today who assert and believe in the
reality of evil and there are those on the other hand who
deny its essential existence…The blatant optimists are ever
to be met with, they who are sure that, however things may
seem, everything is bound to come out right…[All,]
consciously deny[ing] that evil is a fact…There is harm,
calamity, anguish, but our idea that these are evil is due to
our limited and distorted vision which is unable to see
things whole (emphasis added). 144
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The attempt to reduce evil to harm is appealing because there is an ease, an ability to
remain optimistic, an ability to cope with being harmed by another person, whereas one’s
attempt to confront evil and recognize it as such is often debilitating. It runs counter to
the optimism needed to cope with one’s ordeal. More importantly, however, if one can
avoid evoking terms like evil, one can likely endure one’s ordeal at higher intensities and
for longer durations. Thus, the process of reducing evil to harm is advantageous insofar
as it allows those suffering, the possibility of remaining optimistic about their plight.
Denial, then, is a cognitive and evolutionary advantage, a coping mechanism, wherein the
moral agent may be said to deny the existence of evil, reducing it to a more easily
understandable conception like harm, for the sole purpose of coping with one’s suffering.
The denial of evil, then, is an effective psychological requirement for the preservation of
one’s mental and physical health.
the sensation of this enduring evil must not be unremitting
– or at least, its unremitting quality must not always be
dominant – because it is inconceivable how the initial
resolve to improve could ever arise under such
circumstances…The physical aspect of punishment may
last indefinitely, but the better informed sinner will no
longer call it an evil; he will no longer consider himself
unfortunate, however painful it may be to his sensuous
nature.’ What else does this mean but that the sinner can
better himself, even if his punishment never ceases?
(emphasis added) 145
In facing the difficulties of unremitting evil, an evil as overwhelming as a genocidal or
totalitarian state, it is surprising how quickly human beings are capable of adapting to
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these new threats. If the threat is honestly recognized for what it is (a fully financed, state
endorsed, mechanism of death, with near total power within the confines of its domestic
jurisdiction) the individual moral agent recognizes his insignificance in the face of such
overarching political power, and is defeated by this recognition. In normal less personal
circumstances, the moral agent would easily identify the situation as evil, but when he is
directly experiencing, when he is a recipient of the state’s attempt to eradicate complete
portions of the population, a normal response is incongruous with an abnormal situation.
In fact, Viktor Frankl has noted:
An abnormal reaction to an abnormal situation is normal.
Even we psychiatrists expect the reaction of a man to an
abnormal situation…to be abnormal in proportion to the
degree of his normality. The reaction of a man to a
concentration camp also represents an abnormal state of
mind, but judged objectively it is a normal and…typical
reaction to the given circumstance. 146
I am suggesting that the denial of evil is a normal reaction to the overwhelming political
force used to exterminate members of a population. Moral agents are emotionally
justified in attempting to reduce evil to harm as a means of enduring their suffering, but it
does not follow that such psychological coping mechanisms, born from a very real sense
of preserving one’s own life, translate to an actual and ontological reduction of evil to
harm.
It should also be noted that this conception of denying evil through enduring one’s
suffering isn’t only a psychological aspect of human cognition. There is a resilient belief
of “redemptive suffering” throughout many religious traditions, which teach that through
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suffering one attains understanding, immortality, nirvana etc., which isn’t to suggest that
believers of these religions deny the existence of evil. However, as I will soon discuss, it
is possible to both deny the existence of evil and deny the conception of “redemptive
suffering,” the argument of which only the Christian Scientist defends.
In attempting to cope with the existence of evil, it is often necessary for potential
survivors to deny its existence for the preservation of their mental and physical health. In
denying the existence of evil, moral agents often attempt to reduce evil to easily
understandable conceptions like harm, calamity, and anguish, which is a “normal”
response to an abnormal situation. In truly discussing evil, however, it is imperative that
researchers try to understand the very difficult and complex nature of evil itself, which
isn’t to presuppose its existence from the outset, but all facts of science begin with a
hypothesis. Thus, we should suppose the existence of evil and test our theories against the
facts of the world. If our theories of evil conform to the facts, we will have forged much
needed headway into better understanding the nature of evil. If it does not, we can safely
dispose with the concept of evil as illusory.
3.3.

The Denial of Evil: The Christian Scientist
Christian Scientists traced their religious roots to 1866,
when Mary Baker Eddy spontaneously recovered from a
severe injury that authenticated her “discovery” that reality
is completely spiritual and evil is only an illusion.
Scientists had believed that Eddy had recovered the
cardinal teaching of Jesus Christ that all is good and evil
does not exist. 147
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Mary Baker Eddy was a staunch proponent of Christian fundamentalism and argued
for a Berkeleyan brand of subjective idealism, wherein the response to traditional dualism
was to affirm idealism and deny materialism. Both her cosmogony and cosmology are
constituted by the mind of God, which necessitates a world of ideas rather than objects.
Her particular brand of idealism, however, had the peculiar consequence of also denying
the existence of evil. She writes,
Man is not God, and God is not man. Again, God, or good,
never made man capable of sin. It is the opposite of good—
that is, evil—which seems to make men capable of wrongdoing. Hence, evil is but and illusion, and it has no real
basis. Evil is a false belief. 148
It is important to note that Baker equates God with goodness and suggests that, “God
never made man capable of sin.” Within the Christian tradition, sin is the means wherein
evil is introduced into the world, which is to say, without sin there is no evil. Man’s
ability to sin, his ability to transgress the will of God, is the root of evil according to this
interpretation of the scripture. Thus, in denying Cartesian dualism and embracing
idealism, Baker incidentally embraces another brand of dualism, viz., the distinction
between God and his goodness, on the one hand, and evil and sin, on the other.
Unfortunately, however, this puts Baker’s argument back in the context of a traditional
theodicy, i.e., how do we account for the existence of God in light of evil? What make
Baker’s argument and her subsequent denial of evil different from the others, is her
attempt to incorporate aspects of idealism into her denial of evil. She writes,
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Nothing is real and eternal—nothing is Spirit—but God and
His idea. Evil has no reality. It is neither person, nor thing,
but is simply a belief, an illusion of material sense. 149
Baker’s justification that, “evil has no reality” is based on her belief that God is the
source of all creation, which is merely a reflection of the ideas within the mind of God,
and as such, evil cannot exist because it would suggest that God is capable of its
conception.
The motivating force behind Baker’s refutation of evil lies in the belief of the mind’s
ability to heal. It is Baker’s belief, and the belief of all current Christian Scientists that
were evil to exist, the mind would not be able to heal the “body.” The mind is able to heal
the “body,” they argue, thus evil does not exist. Granted this can be a difficult conception
to understand, insofar as there is no direct correlation between the ability to heal and the
refutation of evil, but all Christian Scientists ascribe to this system of belief.
Unfortunately, however, this refutation of evil, in the belief that the mind is capable of
overcoming sickness has resulted in the deaths of many children. Richard A. Hughes
writes,
As the primary advocate of religious exemptions from
medicine, the Christian Science Church supports a
“theological” form of exemption…because it wants to
claim equality between medicine and spiritual healing:
indeed the Christian Science Church defines spiritual
healing as treatment, its healers as practitioners, even
though it acknowledges that these concepts are really
religious tenets. 150

149

Ibid p. 71.
Hughes, Richard A. 2004 – 2005. “Death of Children by Faith-Based Medical Neglect” Journal of
Law and Religion, Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 258.
150

164

As has been discussed, for the Christian Scientists, there is no material world, and what
we call evil is an, “illusion of material sense.” 151 If physicians and other medical
practitioners specialize in understanding the human body (as matter), and they interact
with other bodies, or they attempt to describe how chemicals affect the body, then quite
obviously the Christian Scientists is going to view contemporary Western medicine as
fundamentally a practice of illusion, since they deny the existence of physical bodies to
begin with. Evil, then, is Illusory. Matter is illusory. Therefore, Western medicine, that
has its basis in understanding matter, is also illusory.
Margaret Poloma sharpens the analysis by writing,
Christian Science accepts as an assumption that illness is a
form of evil, and all evil is an illusion. Each person has it
within her/himself to counter illusion with truth…Given
this assumption orthodox Christian Science theology
inadvertently undermines the notion of “redemptive
suffering.” Since God in no way sends or authorizes illness,
he cannot be invoked to redeem it. 152
The syllogism is simple but its conclusion is rather startling. If illness is a form of evil,
and evil is illusory, then, the Christian Scientist concludes, illness is illusory. This
conclusion further explains why the Christian Scientist refuses traditional Western
Medicine. It is not only that the practice of Western Medicine, as pertains to the human
body, is illusory, but the very “thing” they attempt to cure, viz., disease, is also illusory.
Evil manifests as disease, but evil does not exist. Thus, disease does not exist either.
Baker writes,
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Befogged in error (the error of believing that matter can be
intelligent for good or evil)…that we perceive the divine
image in some word or deed which indicates the true
idea—the supremacy and reality of good, the nothingness
and unreality of evil. 153
In attempting to understand Christian Science and its particular brand of idealism,
recognizing the role of the refutation of evil, within their religious tradition, is essential if
one is to even attempt the discussion of their defense for medical exemption. To offer an
analysis condemning Christian Scientists and their religious practices, no matter how
nontraditional, and their aversion to Western Medicine, without incorporating an equal
account of their refutation of evil, is to completely misunderstand their aversion to begin
with.
The root of the Christian Scientist’s apprehension to Western Medicine is based on
the fundamental belief that matter is illusory. Since matter is illusory, all that exists is the
mind of God. The mind of God is incapable of conceptualizing evil, thus, evil is illusory.
Illness is a form of evil, which, ultimately suggests that illness, too, is illusory. Baker
summarizes, “As mortals give up the delusion that there is more than one Mind, more
than one God, man in God’s likeness will appear, and this eternal man will include in that
likeness no material element (emphasis added).” 154 In the final chapter of this analysis, I
will return to this style of argumentation, not necessarily to a discussion of Christian
Science, and offer a refutation of this form of logic.
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3.4.

The Denial of Evil: Traditional and Nontraditional Theodicies
For centuries, theological scholars had been debating theodicy and the problem of

evil, some arguing for traditional and others nontraditional theodicies. Briefly, traditional
theodicies are such that all attempts are made to preserve God’s omnipotence in the face
of evil, while nontraditional theodicies assume that God does not, or could not, exercise
such power over the universe. There are countless defenders for the former, but the most
notable names defending the latter are Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.
A discussion of their responses to the problem of evil is beyond the scope of this
particular chapter, but their theodicies serves as the conceptual foundation for a great
debate between John Hick, embracing a traditional stance, and David Ray Griffin,
defending a hybrid, ‘Whiteheadian-Hartshornean’ nontraditional process philosophy. 155
With respect to Griffin’s approach to a nontraditional stance for the problem of evil, he
writes,
In the first part of the following chapter [chapter 18] I will
explicate Whitehead’s view as to how divine causation is
related to worldly activity…the basic formula…will
indicate how, on the basis of Whitehead’s metaphysical
intuitions, it would be impossible in principle for God
unilaterally to determine any state of affairs in an actual
world. 156
John Hick, on the contrary defends a traditional, though modified, theodicy, which
defends the omnipotence of God in addressing the problem of evil. Hick writes,
As a characterization of evil, within the framework of
Christian theology, this privative definition must be
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accepted as wholly sound. It represents the only possible
account of the ontological status of evil in the universe that
is the creation of an omnipotent and good God. From this
standpoint evil cannot be an ultimate constituent of reality,
for the sole ultimate reality is the infinitely good Creator.
Evil can only consist in a malfunctioning or disorder that
has somehow come about within an essentially good
creation…(emphasis added). 157
Many have quickly suggested without a further analysis of Hick’s argument that he is
simply denying the existence of evil by defining it as a privation of goodness, which he is
not. Essentially, Hick is offering a refutation of evil, but his analysis cannot simply be
classified as a privative account of evil. Hick then modifies the traditional conception of
evil as privation, writing,
We are therefore not authorized to draw any empirical
conclusion from the doctrine of the negative character of
evil, taken by itself. It does not entail that evil is anything
other than a real fact and a grievously oppressive
problem…it is therefore not permissible to dismiss the
privative analysis of evil [by suggesting that] evil exists
only in semblance or to say that some theist seek a solution
[to the problem of evil] by denying the reality of evil
(emphasis added). 158
Essentially, Hick’s point is that we cannot confuse the privative argument of evil as an
argument for evil as non-being, which Hick denies as a confusion of thought. To
understand Hick’s position, one cannot simply assert that this conception of privation is
synonymous with the attempt to understand evil as non-being. Hick understands, as
Russell first noted, that the human mind is such that the use of the term ‘being’ very
forcefully suggests the antithetical term ‘non-being’. The belief that since being exists,
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non-being must also exist is a linguistic confusion of ontological existence, i.e., the latter
cannot follow from the former.
In discussing negative existential propositions there are no objects that correspond
(refer) to the terms (signs) typically used to convey meaning. The paradox of negative
existential propositions is the denial of the object’s existence for which the proposition is
said to refer. For example, stating that, “there is no such thing as Godzilla,” the referent
being Godzilla, seems to refer to the very thing that is denied in the proposition.
Linguistically, we can meaningfully talk about the nonexistence of Godzilla. It makes
sense to say that Godzilla does not exist, but ontologically, it is impossible for one to
argue for the existence of nonexistence (A & ~A), i.e., the nonexistence of Godzilla
exists as a thing in the world. As mentioned earlier, such attempts are linguistic
confusions of ontological existence. Thus, the paradox of negative existential
propositions is that the very object assumed to exist is denied within the proposition
itself. Hick writes,
From the point of view of twentieth-century logic, the
notion of meontic non-being is an example of the inveterate
tendency of the human mind to hypostatize or reify
language. The term ‘being’ generates the cognate term
‘non-being’; but it does not follow that there in any sense is
or exist anything of which this is the name…Russell’s
theory of descriptions shows that…to say of some kind of
thing that it does not exist (e.g. ‘Unicorns do not exist’) is
not to locate it in any metaphysical realm of non-being, but
is simply to deny that some particular description has a
referent. 159
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Now, with respect to the greater concern of the denial of evil, Hick is suggesting, rather
methodically, that, “within the framework of Christian theology, this privative definition
must be accepted as wholly sound,” 160 because Hick is suggesting that the denial of evil
supported by his interpretation of traditional theodicy, is not the affirmation of non-being
as an ontological reality, a paradoxical and contradictory stance, but the refutation of the
existence of evil as a consequence of God’s imperfection.
Hick’s argument is critiqued, however, by David Ray Griffin, but to understand
Griffin’s critique, he first defines three key notions, viz., ‘genuine,’ ‘only apparent,’ and
‘prima facie’ evil. Griffin writes,
In order to make this point clear, I need to define the
notions of “genuine evil”[,]“only apparent evil” … and
“prima facie evil.” By “genuine evil,” I mean anything, all
things considered, without which the universe would have
been better…”Prima facie evil” is anything that may be
judged as evil at first glance…Some prima facie evils may
be considered, upon reflection, to be genuine evils. But
other prima facie evils may be judged to be “only apparent
evils.”…their badness may be may be regarded as
compenstated for by the goodness to which they
contributed. 161
Robert Mesle adds,
Griffin argues that classical theologians have tended to
equivocate on the word “evil” so as to affirm the reality of
evil in some contexts while denying it in others. He hopes
to clarify the discussion and show the equivocation by
distinguishing “prima-facie” evils into categories of
“genuine evil” and “merely apparent evil. 162
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Interestingly enough, however, Griffin does not take issue with Hick’s argument for the
paradox of negative existential propositions, which I believe constitute a substantive
portion of his defense for the denial of evil. Rather, Griffin suggests that Hick is
equivocating with his use of the term ‘evil.” Griffin uses his distinctions between
‘genuine,’ ‘only apparent,’ and ‘prima facie’ evil, to pinpoint Hick’s equivocation and to
rebut traditional theodicies in general. Since my analysis within this chapter pertains to
the denial of evil, I am less concerned with Griffin’s critique of Hick, as it pertains to this
perceived equivocation, than I am of properly understanding Hick’s denial of evil.
Griffin overlooked Hick’s argument for the paradox of negative existential
propositions and instead argued against his defense of a traditional theodicy. One of
Griffin’s main points of criticism pertains to Hick’s defense of God’s omnipotence,
which he argues, “require that there be no genuine powers besides God,” 163 For me, this
critique of Hick only plays into the traditional vs. nontraditional theodicy arguments of
the past millennium, and completely avoids Hick’s very compelling refutation of evil.
There is an ontological nature of evil, but Hick could not see beyond the confines of
his own theodicy, since both he and Griffin are still discussing the problem of evil in
terms of the existence of God and the problem it causes for his omnipotence. Thus, the
secularization of the problem is, at the very least, an attempt to address the problem of
evil, without incorporating any theological conceptions. The nature of God, the nature of
his characteristics, our fall from grace and original sin, moral evil as sin, all speak to a
very specific population, viz., Christians. Evil, nonetheless, is a problem for us all. Thus,
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an account of evil should be constructed in such a manner that it, at its most basic, its
most remedial level, affords a universal forum of interpretation. I say ‘should’ because
this will invariably be a moral account. Only then can we begin the process of
conceptualizing the ontological status of evil. Granted, we may fail in this attempt, but
success will not be measured in terms of facts of the matter, rather, success will be
measured in even attempting such a feat.
3.5.

The Denial of Evil: The Argument for Omnipotence Revised
In discussing nontraditional theodicies and attempting to account for the existence of

evil, there is deeper level of complexity that arises with the denial of God’s omnipotence.
Before the argument is explained, however, it is important to first understand the logical
structure of the argument. The argument is a form of reductio ad absurdum. We begin
with a nontraditionalist premise and assume that in accounting for God’s imperfection,
i.e., the assertion that he is not omnipotent, serves as the cause for the existence of evil in
the world. Remember, however, that I am here discussing a refutation of evil, not a denial
of God’s abilities. Thus, one must first recognize that a nontraditionalist theodicy can
never offer a refutation of evil, since the point of a nontraditionalist theodicy is to account
for evil by denying one or all of the characteristics typically attributed to God. Simply
put, nontraditionalist theodicies deny God’s abilities, while traditionalist theodicies deny
the existence of evil. 164
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The next phase of the argument is to then articulate the conditions that would arise
given the truth of the initial premise. If it is true that evil exists as a consequence of
God’s imperfection, what should follow? On the one had, the nontraditionalist would
have avoided the problem of evil by demonstrating that its existence is a necessary
consequence of God’s imperfection. On the other hand, however, we are now left with a
world wherein evil exists and the source of its existence is based in God’s imperfection.
The logical step may be to deny God’s existence, but not everyone will be willing to do
so. Thus, for those that retain their belief in God, they must enduring the sufferings of
evil and continue their faith in an imperfect God. However, to be God is not to be
imperfect. Thus, if one wishes to retain the belief in God, and is attempting to account for
the problem of evil, then one cannot begin with a nontraditionalist stance because in the
end, the believer’s conception of God is contradictory. Nelson Pike explains,
by expelling “omniscience” and “omnipotence” from the
theological thesis, one could solve, or rather avoid, the
theoretical problem of evil. But from the practical point of
view, such an adjustment would be no solution, for it would
involve changes in the believer’s attitude toward prayer and
the natural world. When God’s omniscience and
omnipotence are denied, the efficiency of prayer becomes
questionable and the universe can no longer be regarded as
a completely dependent creation…To deny the existence of
evil is not only to deny the reports of conscious, but to
make nonsense of the moral life altogether. In a world
where there is no evil…“choice is pointless and
responsibility without meaning. 165
The argument is again complicated by the affirmation of the traditionalist refutation of
evil at the conclusion of the process of the argument, insofar as the nontraditionalist
165

Pike, Nelson. 1958. “God and Evil: A Reconsideration” Ethics, Vol. 68, No. 2. Jan., p. 117.

173

theologian now has a rejoinder. If, in the construction of the argument, we begin with the
nontraditionalist stance, only to realize that it ends in a contradictory conception of God,
unsuitable for believers to hold claim, which denies the existence of evil, then we arrive
at yet another contradiction. No sense can be made of moral life for believers if their God
is imperfect and what we perceive as evil has been denied.
The argument follows a twofold reductio. It begins by assuming the nontraditionalist
stance, only to arrive at a contradictory conception of God, and then assumes a
traditionalist stance, only to arrive at a contradictory conception of morality and choice.
Both arguments are equally plausible and there are many more rejoinders to each side.
The point, however, is that in attempting to deny the existence of evil one is forced to
address morality. If evil is illusory, how, then, are we to make sense of the world?
Clearly, this is not a question for me to answer since I affirm the existence of evil. To
offer a refutation of evil without also offering a conception of morality devoid of the
existence of evil, is a burden the traditionalist must bear. Thus, it is inadequate simply to
refute the existence of evil. Henry David Aiken notes,
The most drastic, if also the most implausible, way of
dealing with the problem of evil…is simply to deny the
ethical thesis altogether. On this view, which most men
would regard as highly immoral, there simply is no evil,
and when someone says that something is evil he speaks
falsely: evil, that is to say, is merely apparent (emphasis
added). 166
Fundamentally, the denial of evil requires an alternate account of morality. If it is
suggested that evil is an illusion, then it certainly seems that this particular illusion, given
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the fact that it is utterly devoid of meaning, nonetheless, retains great meaning. Roy
Baumeister writes,
The myth [of pure evil] defines the way people think of
evil—which is in some crucial respects quite different from
the real, actual causes of violence and oppression…I
began…by noting that evil is in the eye of the beholder;
now we can add that these beholders are generally people
who suffer harm…Evil does not exist by itself but only in
relation to the good (emphasis added). 167
What Baumeister and so many others are presupposing in their attempts to reduce evil to
violence and harm, to articulate evil in terms of oppression and subordination, is that all
instances of violence are also instances of evil, which is certainly debatable. I would
argue that it is categorically false. If one uses the term ‘violence’ as a synonym for the
concept of evil, then one must assert that all instance of violence are also instances of
evil. If not, one would equivocate in using the term ‘violence,’ i.e., ‘violence’ could mean
an instance of evil or ‘violence’ could mean an instance of social protest. Logically, then,
any attempt to suggest that ‘violence’ is synonymous with evil, is also to claim that all
instances of violence are always instances of evil. Thus, all conditions used to satisfy the
use of the term ‘violence’ must be a sufficient condition for the use of the term ‘evil.’
However, if and only if any condition used to satisfy the use of the term ‘violence’ is
incompatible with the conception of evil, then any such condition cannot be attributed to
evil. If such is the case, then ‘violence’ and evil cannot be synonymous. In the final
chapter of this analysis I will offer conditions that satisfy the use of the term ‘violence’
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but do not satisfy the use of the term ‘evil’ to demonstrate both the faulty logic used to
deny the existence of evil and the erroneous attempts to reduce evil to violence.
3.6.

Denial of Evil: Understanding Denial through Genocide Studies
Many scholars and researchers have chosen to substitute the concept of evil with

conceptions like harm and violence. The difficulties with such attempts are due in part to
the complex nature of analyzing evil. It is a difficult concept to grasp and an even more
difficult concept to articulate. Nevertheless, if we are to confront the problem of evil,
whether we affirm or deny its essential existence, contemporary scholars should continue
their investigations into the problem and the nature of evil. In an attempt to address this
problem, Claudia Card explains this contemporary tendency of denying evil. She writes,
The denial of evil has become an important strand of
twentieth century secular Western culture. Some critics
find evil a chimera, like Santa Claus or the tooth fairy, but a
dangerous one that call forth disturbing emotions, such as
hatred, and leads to such disturbing projects as revenge…I
want to reverse that shift, not because I am enthusiastic
about hatred and revenge but because evils, the worst
wrongs people do, deserve to be taken seriously and to
receive priority of attention over lesser wrongs, which are
usually easier to talk about and easier to fix. 168
Historically, the debate between the traditionalist and non-traditionalist theologians over
the existence of God and the problem of evil follows a pattern; non-traditionalists
invariably articulating the imperfection of God, and traditionalists denying the existence
of evil. The non-traditionalist stance, however, has the typical consequence of also
resulting in the denial of God. If God is imperfect, and evil exists, then there can be no
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God, at least not in any intelligible monotheistic sense—an imperfect “God” would be a
mere deity. Thus, the secular humanists often uses a theological argument, specifically, a
nontraditionalist theological argument, to refute arguments for the existence of God. The
secularist, then, can embrace a world where there is no God. The question, however, that
now moves to the forefront for all secular, non-theological scholars, is: what is the nature
of evil? There are those that affirm the existence of evil, and those that deny its existence.
What Claudia Card is suggesting, is that for those who deny the existence of evil, they do
so because they view evil in mythological terms. In the second half of this chapter, I will
investigate Phillip Cole’s argument, based on this very conception. He has constructed
his analysis as an investigation into the myth of evil. This denial of evil, as mythology, is
historically rooted in a non-traditionalist affirmation of God’s imperfection, eventually
leading to a categorical denial of God, which is coupled with a contemporary denial of
evil, based on analyzing the mythology of evil.
Claudia Card is correct in her assertion that, “The denial of evil has become an
important strand of twentieth century secular Western culture.” For the discussion of evil
to continue well into the 21st century, those defending the existence of evil, those arguing
for such a reality, are burdened with the obligation of articulating its existence
independent to the existence of God, i.e., the problem of evil needs to be revamped and
secularized. The purpose of this secularization is not to refute the viability of continuing
to discuss evil in theological terms; it will always be a fruitful analysis. If, however, one
is to engage the secular humanist, the attempt must be made to “purge” the theological
underpinnings from the discussion. Simply put, a new field of discourse has to emerge in
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the discussion of evil, or any moral accounts wherein evil is utilized, if it is to have any
relevant impact in contemporary scholarship.
In the previous chapter, I discussed the concept of political evil, a concept entirely
rooted in an interdisciplinary discourse of political theory, genocide studies, and
philosophy. The articulation of political evil functions independent to any theological
concerns, and the definition is substantiated by a half century of genocide scholarship.
Within genocide studies, then, one has an ability to access the concepts, theories, and
tools necessary to investigate the problem of evil. Genocide studies and the manner in
which historians and genocide scholars have approached a discussion into the nature of
evil, is a perfect foundation wherein one can attempt to understand the ontological status
of evil. The term ‘evil’ is still used, and with meaning, among genocide scholars, which
indicates that there is a sense in which discussing evil remains pertinent and useful to
understanding the landscape of political power. Interestingly enough, however, there is a
tendency within contemporary genocide studies to deny the existence of genocide. Thus,
one can also attempt to understand the denial of evil, by investigating a denial of
genocide, which is not to suggest that genocide and evil are in any sense synonymous, as
genocide is but one form of evil. The point, then, of this comparison, is to offer the
secular humanist a means of clarifying the conception of evil and analyzing attempts to
deny the existence of evil, without grounding the analysis in a theological foundation.
Genocide scholars have been discussing the nature of denial, both in terms of evil and
in terms of genocide, for as long as they have been engaged in research. Neither the

178

philosopher nor the political scientist can afford to overlook their contributions and
attempts to understand denial. Relevant here is what Donald Millet et al. write:
We acknowledge that the discovery of something
redeeming in these tales of human tragedy has been our
defense against despair…We refuse, however, to allow
these examples of good to turn our attention from the awful
reality of genocide itself…We increasingly believe that
there is considerable truth in the statement that to deny
genocide is to repeat it…Denial of evil is a defense
mechanism that a just world simply cannot afford…denial
seems to be the final stage of most genocides (emphasis
added). 169
As noted, denial is an important aspect in the use of genocide as an effective tool. It is
often the final stage prior to political powers enacting the use of genocide against
members of its population. 170 There is an attempt, however, among historians and
genocide scholars to reconcile the problem of denial and “historical memory.”
Historical memory and its relation to genocide studies is a relatively new concept.
Unlike autobiographical memory where memory is directly tied to one’s experience of an
event, historical memory is only accessible through our records, i.e., the historical records
of the event. In researching the problem of evil, I have had numerous interviews with
survivors of the Holocaust. Their direct experience of the Holocaust forms for them the
autobiographical memory for which they access the truths of their past. Unlike the
survivors, however, members of the world population having not directly experienced the
Holocaust, have only historical records as a means of accessing the past. The problem,
however, arises when the historical records are challenged by members of the population
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having not experienced the event, which poses a threat to the historical memory of the
event. Thus, denial emerges as the historical memory is challenged.
With respect to challenging the historical memory of the Holocaust, one name stands
out among all holocaust deniers, viz., David Irving. In his account of the Irving trial,
Adam Jones writes,
Undoubtedly the most famous trail involving a genocide
denier is the libel case brought in 2000 by David
Irving…The resulting trail became a cause célèbre, with
prominent historians taking the stand to outline Irving’s
evasion and obfuscations of the historical
evidence…[Irving] was cited for nineteen specific
misrepresentations, and contended that they were deliberate
distortions to advance a denialist agenda…The spectrum of
policies toward deniers, from permissive to prosecutory, is
mirrored by the debate among genocide
scholars…stress[ing] the link between denial and genocide,
including future genocides, as well as the personal
suffering that denial inflicts on…survivors and their
descendents (emphasis added). 171
More heinous than the injuries caused to Holocaust survivors by Irving’s blatant
misrepresentation of the truth, is the potential for falsifying our historical memory of the
Holocaust. Clearly, however, no amount of denial can falsify the autobiographical
memories of specific survivors. It is not that Irving challenged and even denied the
Holocaust that made him liable in court. It was his specific fabrication of the truth that
led to his conviction. His denial, in effect, was secondary to the lie that he perpetuated.
Denial has the tendency of contributing to further instances of genocide, recognizing
that the horrors of genocide extend beyond victimization. For survivors, the denial of
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genocide discredits the nature of their suffering. It minimizes the deliberative and
methodical planning required by state sanctioned political powers, which were all an
essential component in fully recognizing a state endorsed genocide. The ultimate crime
against humanity, then, is the crime of denial. To deny acts of genocide, in the face of
overwhelming evidence is to contribute to the process as such.
Next to the deliberate, willful denial of acts of genocide in the face of evidence, there
is another, more subtle type of denial—a timid hesitance, or a diplomatic reluctance to
acknowledge genocidal events. Such was the case in the Rwanda genocide of 1994. 172 To
subvert this dilemma and properly identify the events in Darfur as genocidal events,
Secretary of State Colin Powell in his September 9, 2004 address to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee noted,
here is, finally, the continuing question of whether what is
happening in Darfur should be called genocide. Since the
United States became aware of atrocities occurring in
Sudan, we have been reviewing the Genocide
Convention…When we reviewed the evidence compiled by
our team, and then put it beside other information available
to the State Department…we concluded, I concluded, that
genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the
Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear responsibility
-- and that genocide may still be occurring.173
The simple acknowledgement that genocide was occurring in Darfur brought attention to
the victims and the Sudanese government. In making his address to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell diverted future complication that
would surely have arisen were he to deny the events of Darfur as genocidal. A
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community of activists, filmmakers, peacekeepers and so on, was now politically justified
in voicing their opposition to the Darfur genocide.
If a legitimate genocide is denied by members of the political community, one
essentially absolves perpetrators of wrong doing. This absolution, however, has the
negative effect of undermining, or at the very least discrediting, the suffering of
survivors. Genocide studies offer us an opportunity to truly recognize and acknowledge
the full extent and capacity of human destructiveness. To deny genocidal events as
legitimate uses of state authority, or to minimize the suffering of victims as a necessary
component of “purging” the state, is to risk the possibility for similar genocidal events in
the future. In this regard, Roger Smith et al, write,
Denial contributes to genocide in at least two ways. First of
all genocide does not end with its last human victim; denial
continues the process, but if denial points to the past and
the present, it also has implications for the future. By
absolving the perpetrators of past genocide from
responsibility for their actions and by obscuring the reality
of genocide as a widely practiced form of state policy in the
modern world denial may increase the risk of future
outbreaks of genocidal killings (emphasis added). 174
The denial of genocide, then, is but one aspect of understanding the denial of evil. In
denying genocide, the denier challenges the authenticity of our historical memory, which
in some sense is a healthy enterprise. The problem, however, arises if historical memory
is connected to records and records are, in part, compiled by people, and people are prone
to error and embellishing the truth, then our records and historical memories are prone to
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error. This, unfortunately, is a fact of historical memory. Historical memory is prone to
error.
If, therefore, one is attempting to understand the nature of genocide independent to
particular historical events, as theory, one need only engage with the concept of genocide.
In discussing the concept of genocide, without reference to any particular historical act of
genocide, one is now capable of offering an ahistorical analysis of genocide. If the denier
now denies the ahistorical attempt to articulate the various typologies of genocide, then
one must recognize that such a denial is a sufficient condition for the denial of all
particular accounts of genocide, i.e., all particular accounts of genocide based on specific
historical events. The prima facie denial of genocide, as a concept, not as a particular
historical event, must serve as a sufficient condition for the denial of any particular act of
genocide. Though, it must be added, it does not follow that the denial of any particular
act of genocide necessitates the denial of genocide as concept. Thus, in denying the
ahistorical concept of genocide, it must be true that such a denial suffices for all
subsequent historical denials of genocide. Furthermore, the denial of genocide as such
(independent to any particular event) cannot be substantiated in terms of theory. Steve
Chan writes,
Theory is ahistorical, as it pursues generalizations germane
to entire classes of entities or phenomena. It is uninterested
in particulars; proper nouns of people, places, or time
periods matter only to the extent that they represent specific
instances or members of a relevant category. Theory
consists of a system of statements from which one can
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deduce observable, verifiable implication. Its core elements
are concepts, axioms, assumptions and scope conditions. 175
To deny the concept of genocide only serves to deny any future use of the term to
specific historical events, which is not the same as refuting the existence of evil. The
refutation of evil, as we have seen, is only possible on an ontological level. Thus, to deny
specific acts of genocide or even to deny the concept of genocide as such, does not
translate to a refutation of evil. As I have argued in the previous chapter, evil is the
condition for the possibility of genocide. A refutation of genocide may in part, deny the
facts of the event, but unlike historical memory, one’s autobiographical memory of evil,
i.e., one’s personal experience of evil, one’s visceral and emotive response to evil, is a
valid source for engagement. Viktor Frankl describes this in the opening line of his book,
“This book does not claim to be an account of facts and events but of personal
experiences, experiences which millions of prisoners have suffered time and again.” 176
3.7.

Cole’s Denial of Evil: Chapter 1
For the remainder of this chapter I will closely analyze Phillip Cole’s The Myth of

Evil, offering a review of the literature and a critique of his analysis. Cole begins his
investigation into the problem of evil by recapping the events surrounding the September
11th attacks. He addresses President Bush’s use of the phrase “the axis of evil” and the
horrific discoveries of torture and human rights violations at Abu Ghraib. Then, he rather
jarringly shifts focus to the devil. He suggests, “the more I examined the detail of evil,
the more I sensed [the devil’s] presence—not a supernatural presence, but a political
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one.” 177 Then, again, he shifts focus to the distinction between human evil and pure evil,
suggesting that pure evil, “belongs to the supernatural” (3).
Cole then suggests the concept of evil may more appropriately be labeled as a form of
fiction and categorized as a mythology, a narrative. Narratives explain. Cole is interested
in understanding the explanation the narrative of evil discloses with respect to human
agency. Cole suggests that in narratives, not reality, the human being is capable of
enacting pure evil, but this he says is impossible within reality. He writes, “The human
figure who pursues the destruction of others for its own sake is a fictional or
mythological figure, but does not exist in reality” (7). He explores the option that human
evil, rather than pure evil, may be the only conception needed to describe evil, but he
eventually denies this possibility as redundant, e.g., “She did it because she was evil” (7).
Clearly, the statement begs the question. Cole suggests that in discussing evil, the
importance is connecting the event with human agency, evil is easily affixed to the event
but he suggests that, “once we move towards the explanation of agency, the concept of
evil becomes obscure” (7). Thus, for Cole, the challenge will be the attempt to attribute
the concept of evil to human agency and the attempt to articulate evil in terms of pure
evil.
In discussing pure evil, Cole reverts to a traditionalist theological argument, wherein
it is suggested that evil cannot be understood, not a denial of its existence—as such, as it
is a denial of our ability to understand its nature. He writes, “If we seek to understand the
social, psychological, historical conditions that act as the background for horrific acts, the
177
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notion of pure evil may disappear” (8). The requirement for knowledge that Cole
explores is necessary for our understanding of both evil and the human capacity to act in
such a manner. The acquisition of this knowledge allows us to conceptualize human
agency and the possibility of enacting evil. Thus, knowledge of evil, according to Cole,
allows moral agents to recognize their own capacity for evil.
In his attempt to articulate evil in terms of pure evil, however, Cole notes, that “the
one fact we cannot escape is that if pure evil does genuinely exist in the world, it is
human beings who put it there” (20). He argues that such a conception of evil demarcates
humans from, what he labels rather vaguely as, “inhumans” i.e., those who exercise their
freedom to purposefully enact suffering on others. In a previous clarification of this point,
Cole says, “According to the monstrous conception, these are monsters in human shape,
human/inhumans, or inhuman/humans, who are willing to inflict suffering on others
purely for its own sake, capable of pure evil precisely because of their monstrosity” (13).
I found Cole’s “argument” wholly problematic. Even the discussion of his
“monstrous conception” was a bit odd. Were he to be offering an account of evil
throughout the history of creative writing, maybe then I would understand the logical
structure of his denial of evil, but he is not. He himself concludes chapter one, by stating,
“I do not supply any decisive philosophical refutations of the pure conception, but rather
supply moral, political and psychological reasons why we should reject it. It is, I believe,
a highly dangerous and inhumane discourse and we are better off without it” (emphasis
added), (21). The title of his book, The Myth of Evil, suggests that he is going to engage
in a rigorous historical analysis of evil and sequentially deny each attempt to articulate
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the existence of evil. Instead, Cole’s discussion is without any clear directive and he
himself acknowledges its abysmal lack of philosophical rigor. With respect to his
assertion that he has provided a moral reason for rejecting the pure conception of evil, I
did not recognize any use of value, deontological, or consequentialist theory in his
analysis whatsoever. After completion of the first chapter, I was highly skeptical about
the remainder of his book.
3.8.

Cole’s Denial of Evil: Chapter 2
Chapter two is an analysis of Satan and the conception of diabolical evil, which Cole

equates with other forms of evil, “one other common description of this pure or absolute
evil is that it is diabolical” (4). Cole, then, defines pure evil as, “not only the evil of
outcomes, but the evil of intentions – it is the pursuit of the suffering and destruction of
others for its own sake” (3). Thus, according to Cole, we can define diabolical evil in
exactly the same sense as we have defined pure evil—the two are interchangeable.
Next, Cole attributes diabolical evil to Satan but refuses to acknowledge his existence
and then suggests that human beings are capable of emulating Satan’s actions. He writes
rather paradoxically, “if diabolical evil is a human possibility, although this does not
necessarily imply the existence of Satan…it does seem to imply that human beings can be
like him” (4). All of which, mind you, is done by Cole in terms of a secularist approach
in refuting the existence of evil.
Cole undertakes a biblical analysis of Satan, and attempts to draw the rather bizarre
conclusion, that since human beings have a capacity to emulate Satan, (which is
fundamentally presupposed), then any attempt to understand “Satan’s character” is an
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attempt to understand ourselves (25). Cole offers no clarification for any of these terms.
His initial premise is presupposed without any justification, and yet he professes to be
offering a secularist account for the denial of evil, which he has already stated, “does not
supply any decisive philosophical refutation” (21). He begins by tracing the accounts of
Satan throughout the Old Testament, which he later challenges; suggesting that though
the seminal elements of Satan, as deceiver, as serpent, and so on, are present in the Old
Testament there is debate over this notion. He shifts his focus to the New Testament
where he notes, “Satan is indisputably present in the New Testament” (32).
A problem arises, nonetheless, when Cole returns to the discussion of diabolical evil,
which was associated with pure evil, “one other common description of this pure or
absolute evil is that it is diabolical” (4). Now, however, he distinguishes the two
concepts, writing,
The monstrous conception can now be understood as
claiming that there are human beings who are monstrous by
nature, and it is only these humans who have the capacity
for diabolical evil, and the pure conception can be
understood as claiming that all human beings have the
capacity for diabolical evil (emphasis added), (35).
Cole’s “monstrous conception” is extremely unclear and his definition seem very
redundant. The monstrous conception is about monstrous people and only these people
have a capacity for diabolical evil. He, then, tries to differentiate the monstrous
conception from the conception of pure evil. Cole’s error in logic, however, according to
his definition, is that the monstrous conception refers to a group of people that have a
“capacity for diabolical evil” and the conception of pure evil refers to people as having a
“capacity for diabolical evil.” Thus, the basic syllogism suggests that the monstrous
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conception necessitates the conception of pure evil, i.e., it is a sufficient condition for
pure evil, which is not what he is suggesting. Cole’s argument is fundamentally flawed
and it is incomprehensible what sense is to be made of his definitions.
In the concluding sections of chapter two, Cole attempts to account for the existence
of evil within the world and supposes that the devil and his demons are the cause of its
existence. He then begins a very terse historical recapitulation of St. Augustine’s theodicy
and his account of free will, which leads to the conclusion that human beings also
contribute to the perpetuation of evil through exercising their freedom, which leads Cole
to claim, “For God to be free of responsibility for human evil, humanity must be capable
of freely choosing to be diabolically evil. But if human beings can freely choose to be
diabolically, purely, evil, Satan and his demons are redundant” (50). It is unclear if Cole
intends this conclusion to be a critique of the existence of evil or a critique of the Devil’s
purpose in the natural world. In either case, his point is unclear. Finally, with respect to
the Devil, Cole suggests that his existence is explained, “not so much as a metaphysical
presence as a literary one” (50). The problem with this statement, however, is that Cole is
constructing his analysis as a philosophical investigation, and has noted that he is, “a
devout atheist and an analytical philosopher by training” (2), yet he has failed,
nonetheless, to offer any philosophical conception of evil, either metaphysical or
otherwise. Were his analysis to be a literary account, there would be no problem, but in
suggesting that evil is a myth, Cole should support his work by a thorough philosophical
analysis.
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3.9.

Cole’s Denial of Evil: Chapter 3
Finally, in chapter three, Cole addresses the various philosophical conceptions of evil,

beginning with Immanuel Kant’s articulation of radical evil. Cole writes, “For Kant,
moral evil is any deviation from what morality demands, as expressed through our power
of reason and stated by the moral law or the categorical imperative” (emphasis added),
(58). Unfortunately, Cole has oversimplified Kant’s account of moral evil. It is not
simply that “any deviation” from the demands of morality results in deeming one evil. In
his discussion on judging moral agents, Kant’s account is certainly not as rigid as Cole
suggests. Kant writes, “A man’s maxims, sometimes even his own, are not thus
observable; consequently the judgment that the agent is an evil man cannot be made with
certainty if grounded in experience” 178 (emphasis added). Cole suggested that “any
deviation” from the demands of morality is classified as moral evil. Kant has clearly
stated otherwise, and acknowledges that sometimes one’s maxims cannot result in a
judgment of evil. Cole’s strawman argument unfairly compartmentalizes Kant’s
conception of evil and situates Kant’s moral account as a dogma rather than a philosophy.
Cole’s strawman argument continues when he distorts a quote for Kant without
properly contextualizing his citation. Cole writes,
for Kant humanity cannot reject the moral law as such,
cannot reject morality. ‘Man (even the most wicked) does
not, under any maxim whatsoever, repudiate the moral law
in the manner of a rebel (renouncing obedience to it)’ (Kant
1960: 31). No one is that depraved that they can violate the
demands of morality without feeling some degree of guilt
or misgiving (59-60).
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However, the full context for which the quote was taken, is as follows:
Man (even the most wicked) does not, under any maxim
whatsoever, repudiate the moral law in the manner of a
rebel (renouncing obedience to it). The law, rather, forces
itself upon him irresistibly by virtue of his moral
predisposition; and were no other incentives working in
opposition, he would adopt the law into his supreme maxim
as the sufficient determining ground of his will; that is, he
would be morally good. But by virtue of an equally
innocent natural predisposition he depends upon incentives
of his sensuous nature and adopts them also (in accordance
with the subjective principle of self love) into his
maxim. 179 (emphasis added).
Cole has tried to force Kant’s account of evil to agree with a strawman account he has
devised for his own end. Nowhere is Kant’s account does he suggest that man is
incapable of rejecting the moral law. Kant’s account is more attuned to a Daoist
conception, a battle between two halves, viz., the sensuous nature, which pulls the moral
agent from the moral law, and the agent’s desire to adopt the law as the supreme maxim.
This battle is not a battle to be won by sides. Rather a harmony is always reached
between the two halves of our nature. Martin Schönfeld’s entry in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a further rejection of Cole’s strawman argument.
Schönfeld writes,
In Daoist ontology, the dynamic principle (Dao) weaves the
world by “stretching out” the void (dao zhong) and that
produces things and life by individuating the resulting field
into lingering wholes. Nature and the good are opposites
but harmonize in their parallel thrust toward sustainable
complexity. Moral practice is their alignment…Kant was
ignorant of the Chinese but absorbed the Daoist motif…It
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is an irony that one of the West's greatest thinkers was first
inspired by the Dao of the East. 180
With respect to Schönfeld’s claim that, “Nature and the good are opposites but harmonize
in their parallel thrust toward sustainable complexity.” Kant acknowledges nearly the
same conception within his account of evil. Kant writes,
Natural inclination, considered in themselves, are good, that
is, not a matter of reproach, and it is not only futile to want
to extirpate them but to do so would also be harmful and
blameworthy. Rather, let them be tamed and instead of
clashing with one another they can be brought into
harmony with a wholeness which is called happiness. Now
the reason which accomplishes this is call prudence
(emphasis in original). 181
The process, then, wherein evil is harmonized, i.e., the sensuous nature within us all is
regulated, is as Schönfeld has claimed, by the process of moral practice. That specific
moral practice that regulates and establishes harmony is prudence. Prudence
accomplishes the process of harmony. Our natural inclinations, considered by themselves
are good. It is only when we attempt to incorporate these inclination into the total process
of morality that its nature conflicts. As Schönfeld has stated, “Nature and the good are
opposites but harmonize in their parallel thrust toward sustainable complexity. Moral
practice is their alignment.” What Cole has assumed is that this conflict is a fundamental
one wherein there is no resolve, wherein, as he has noted, “humanity cannot reject the
moral law”. Our sensuous nature will compel us to deny the moral law but it is checked,
and kept in harmony, so as not to dominate our being by and equally forceful inclination
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to adopt the moral law as a universal maxim. Deontological ethics is certainly more
complicated than the strawman argument Cole has erected. Behind the simplicity of
choosing to act, choosing to follow the moral law, or choosing to do otherwise, is a
complex nexus of checks and balances, all harmonized by our duty to practice morality.
Thus, again, Cole has failed in his attempt to renounce evil or to adequately conceptualize
Kant’s philosophy of radical evil.
3.10.

Cole’s Denial of Evil: Chapter 4

In chapter four of his analysis, Cole investigates Rousseau’s discussion of the
“vampire” epidemic throughout Western Europe, which lasted nearly 100 years.
According to Cole, Rousseau wanted to refute the supernatural explanations associated
with the vampire mythology, offering instead a sound scientific account of their supposed
existence. In his investigation of the vampire accounts, however, it is suggested that
Rousseau took the vampire accounts seriously (80), which is not to suggest that he
believed in the supernatural abilities associated with vampires. Rather than viewing the
vampire epidemic as a supernatural phenomenon, Rousseau interpreted the existence of
vampires as an indication of socio-political unrest.
Cole then shifts focus to a discussion of witches and witchcraft. He suggests that the
spread of witchcraft throughout Europe served as an indication that, “The Christian
community was under severe attack by Satan” (83). With the attempt to stifle the spread
of witchcraft, it is noted, that the Church and the judicial system often tortured alleged
witches, convicted of heresy and other crimes. Cole writes,
There were therefore no legal limits to the use of torture in
cases of suspected witchcraft…So we can see that the idea
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of diabolical heresy and the witch craze that followed it
arose from a sense of fear and anxiety throughout western
Christian Europe (83-84).
Cole suggests that the rise in heretical crimes and its correlation with the spread of
witchcraft throughout Europe serves as an indication that fear had established a hold of
Western Europe. Clearly, however, there was an underlying motivation in the spread of
heretical crimes as political opponents vied for power. “The pattern taken by those who
sought to gain authority in these regions was to accuse resistant groups and individuals of
heresy, and for heresy eventually to become witchcraft” (84). It is suggested, then, that
the onset of fear within a society is an indication that an enemy will arise out of that fear,
an enemy to be conquered.
The focus shifts back to a discussion of vampires and Rousseau’s attempts to
conceptualize their relation to the social and political realm, rather than a continued
investigation into their supernatural powers. Unfortunately, Cole’s analysis within this
chapter, though it is an interesting read, is quite obviously taken from a paper he
presented on an entirely different subject. The chapter has little if any relevance to the
discussion of evil, and is more closely in line with a discussion of the shifts in
supernatural accounts during the Middle Ages. Earlier, in his acknowledgments, Cole
wrote, “I also delivered a paper called ‘The Vampires of Moravia: Towards a
Philosophical History of the Undead’ (vii). I’m sure the paper was interesting as the
chapter was interesting to read, but unfortunately, the title of his book suggests that he
will be debunking the “myth” of evil and this chapter has not contributed to that goal.
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Nearing the end of the chapter, Cole attempts to tie in his prior paper into the theme of
his book writing,
What we see here is the myth of evil in action, and
specifically the myth of monstrous evil, that there are
monsters in disguise within our community who seek to
destroy it. There can be no negotiation and no compromise
against such an enemy, and certainly no redemption – they
can only be hunted down and destroyed (93).
Cole has not defined “monstrous evil.” He has not connected the concept of “monstrous
evil” to debunking the myth of evil. If his account is that in vying for political power,
many create myths of monsters to subdue the population and perpetuate fear, it does not
follow, in any sense that from this truth one has disproved the existence of evil. Granted,
it is certainly true that this is a common political strategy, but to suggest that, therefore,
evil is a myth is a non sequitur. Nonetheless, I cannot understand how, from that point,
Cole arrives at the conclusion that “What we see here is the myth of evil in action.” As to
the “argument” within chapter four, and its relation to demonstrating the “myth of evil,” I
am clueless.
3.11.

Cole’s Denial of Evil: Chapter 5

Chapter five is an account of the political use of fear. Cole suggests that fear is a
projection from within, it is externalized by that which we most fear and is more a
reflection of our psychological fears than it is a proper representation of legitimate
external threats. He then states that, “it is this internal fear that is politically exploited and
mobilised against the myth of evil in the world. And so we must explore our inner
psyches to discover the source of fear” (96). Much to his credit, Cole offers an interesting
account of the distinction between terror and horror. Terror is a greater form of fear
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because it is not attached to readily identifiable elements within the external world.
Horror, however, unlike terror, presents us with the image, the threat that serves as the
source of our fears, while terror influences our imagination to wreak havoc on our minds
by unsubstantiated fear. Cole does offer an interesting account, writing,
And so while horror may be produced by the physical
confrontation with the consequences of evil, the inability to
understand the motivations of the evil agent who has
brought about these macabre effects results in the psychic
dread not so much of the unknown, but of the
incomprehensible. Horror and terror are therefore
intertwined in our experiences of evil (97).
Much of Cole’s account of terror and horror is based on Dani Cavallaro’s analysis of
gothic fiction. Cole attempts to incorporate Cavallaro’s conception of the “dark
narratives,” i.e., a discussion of terror and horror within gothic fiction, but runs into
trouble while trying translate these conceptions into a political framework. Cavallaro
suggests that terrifying imagery alerts us and informs our consciousness. This suggestion,
however, clashes with Cole’s attempt to articulate the myth of evil and its relation to the
realm of politics. He writes, “However, if we extend the concept of the dark narrative
beyond fiction into political narratives about the world then we can see its negative
power” (98). While I disagree with Cole’s account of Cavallaro’s analysis of gothic
fiction, I do agree that he has identified an important conception in the discussion of evil,
viz., he has attempted identify the source of our fears. Cole suggests, I believe rightly,
that the conflation of boundaries, between the natural and unnatural, between the real and
the unreal, serve only to exacerbate our fears. In challenging Cavallaro’s conception that
these “dark narratives” inform our reality, Cole writes.
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[there is] no guarantee that the dark narrative will alert us
to reality – it may simply create more imaginary terrors,
and lead us to mistake those imaginary terrors for real ones.
The boundary between fiction and reality is blurred, or
rather our awareness of where that boundary lies is blurred,
and everyday life itself is framed within the fictional
constructs of our imagination or the imagination of our
political and cultural leaders (101-102).
The inability to differentiate imaginary terrors from real ones, only serves to heighten
one’s sense of fear. In his continued discussion of fear, Cole refers to Freud’s conception
of the uncanny. The uncanny is a form of fear we may develop for something familiar.
Freud discusses the unheimlich, or the ‘unhomely,’ which Cole describes as the uncanny,
eerie or spooky. The conception of the unheimlich is the revealing of that which was
hidden. It is to be made aware of what was once concealed. The terrors we most fear are
also familiar to us. Cole takes this concept of the unheimlich and mirrors his theory of the
myth of evil on a similar premise. He writes,
Here, we should note that we have an almost complete
theory of evil, that our belief in the myth of evil is an
example of the return of primitive beliefs we thought we
had overcome, but which, when certain events occur, gain
hold on us and threaten to overpower our reason (106).
Cole is arguing that like Freud’s conception of the unheimlich, the myth of evil is nothing
more than a return of repressed beliefs. It is the feeling that we get when we encounter
something of fright. He quickly changes focus, however, without further qualification,
which leaves more questions than answers. In actuality, I think Cole’s analogy fails.
In Freud’s conception of the unheimlich the source of fear is unknown, it arises from
a repressed state of consciousness. Once triggered, the fear is capable of paralyzing our
actions, as the source of terror is something familiar, something real, but the person
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terrified by this sense of fear cannot identify the specific cause of its onset. There is no
myth to this fear. If Cole is suggesting that the myth of evil is similar to Freud’s concept
of the unheimlich, he would have to explain the nature of the “myth” and its relation to
the existence of fear.
Cole attempts to discuss the relationship between particular moral agents and the
perceived existence of evil, by suggesting that we are fearful of our own capacities for
evil, which causes us to “project that capacity on to others and into fictional
representatives” (118). He writes,
But there is another answer we should consider – that we
are scared of our selves not because of our connection with
death, but because we recognise our own capacity for evil.
What frightens us is not the fragility of the boundary
between life and death, but of the boundary between our
‘civilised’ self and our ‘evil’ self. We may well project that
capacity on to others and into fictional representatives, but
it is profoundly our capacity, and this is why we find such
projections and representations so disturbing – they
threaten to destabilise our conception of our selves as
human beings, indeed our conception of humanity itself
(118).
Certainly this maybe true of a misrepresented threat. In discussing clearly defined cases
of evil, where there is no perception of threat, but an imminent and real danger, there is
no projection or representation to be had. In the case of state endorsed genocide, for
example, discussing one’s projection of one’s personal capacity for evil, which is the
very thing Cole is attempting to deny, onto the state, is utterly pointless. What purpose
does that serve in denying the existence of evil? How does this psychoanalytic example
demonstrate the myth of evil? While Freud’s conception of the unheimlich may explain
the aesthetic and psychoanalytic account of the uncanny, a point that is even debated
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among contemporary psychologists, there is no connection between a Freud’s concept
and a denial of evil.
3.12.

Cole’s Denial of Evil: Chapter 6

Within this chapter, Cole explores the conception of the “Bad Seed,” i.e., the
possibility of an “evil” child. He begins with a story of the murder of James Bulger, a two
year old toddler, abducted, mutilated and beaten to death by two ten year old boys. The
boys were subsequently found guilty of murder and were sentenced to eight years in
prison. Cole suggests that there was little attempt to explain their motives, be they
rational or not. The boys were sentenced to a minimum of eight years in prison. Cole
cites the trail judge, Sir Michael Morland as saying, ‘The killing of James Bulger was an
act of unparalleled evil and barbarity’ (125). He then cites several media sources and
their reference to this crime as an act of evil. Cole challenges Sir Michael Morland’s
determination, suggesting,
Was it an act of unparalleled evil and barbarity? The killing
of James Bulger was brutal and cruel, but in the history of
inhumanity it was by no means unparalleled as an act.
What Justice Morland was capturing was the sense of
horror that this crime was carried out by children, but even
then examples of children killing other children, while
extremely rare, are not unknown (125).
It is important to understand the severity of the boys’ crime. The crime was
committed by two ten year old boys. James Bulger was intentionally abducted from his
mother while shopping. The boys enticed James away from his mother and lured him to a
canal. They kicked him in the face and ribs. They fractured his skull with an iron pipe
and cement brick, placing batteries inside his mouth to increase the amount of damage
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inflicted by his head trauma. They doused him with caustic chemicals, and then placed
his body on a railroad track and covered it with dirt. Two year old James Bulger was then
struck by a train as his body was masked underneath the debris. This level of brutality
and torture, the sadism of James’ death is beyond explanation in and of itself, but the fact
that it was committed by ten year old boys is certainly an act of evil, a point that Cole
denies.
Cole does not view the murder of James Bulger as an act of evil and offers a rather
lengthy “psychological” account of the boys’ history, suggesting their motivations could
have been sexual, or a response to the fact they were both from a broken home, and so
on. He then suggests that the boys could have suffered from pre-teen psychosis, a rather
speculative claim. The suggestion is that we lack the proper terms to describe this level of
violence and insofar as this lack exists, we use the term ‘evil’ to describe an event that
defies interpretation. Cole writes, “We respond to the call for interpretation, but…we are
haunted by our failure. And the space of that failure, I argue, is taken up by the discourse
of evil” (127).
For Cole, then, the inability to understand, to interpret an event as terrifying as the
James Bulger murder, forces us to resort to the only conception we have that may even be
said to approximate this level of brutality. In using the term ‘evil,’ however, we still fail
to properly understand the nature of the event. In effect, the nature of the crime
transcends interpretation or it is a failure, as Cole suggests, to properly interpret the event
that forces us to label it as an act of evil.
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This form of refutation is actually quite old and has its origin in a traditionalist
theological denial of evil. It is the suggestion that we cannot understand the nature of evil
and in attempting to articulate what it is, all we are offering is a definition for that which
cannot be understood. For the theist this typically results in the denial of God, but for the
atheist it results in the affirmation of the brutality of our existence and the existence of
evil. Addressing Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik’s response to the problem of evil, Moshe
Sokol writes,
Soloveitchik argues, [that humans] respond to evil in their
lives in two stages. When evil first strikes the sufferer is
crushed, unable to make sense of anything that has befallen
him, unable to make sense of life as a whole. Following
this initial phase, the sufferer actively seeks to gain insight
into his suffering by struggling to understand the cosmos
and God’s role in its governance. For the theist, the struggle
often leads to the denial of evil, to the claim that all is
really good. Soloveitchik argues, however, that from the
perspective of human experience, this claim is simply false.
While from God’s perspective all suffering might well be
justified, and therefore good, human beings are incapable
of metaphysical reasons, of adopting God’s perspective.
Therefore, the only humanly possible response to suffering
is to acknowledge its evil. 182 (emphasis in original)
The point is simple, if one is denying the possibility of understanding the nature of evil,
and thus through this inability to understand, denies its existence, one must acknowledge
that unlike the theist who can assert that its existence serves a greater good and is
therefore only apparently evil, the secularist is not afforded the same luxury.
Cole has already claimed that he is attempting to refute the existence of evil independent
to theological refutations. The atheist cannot claim that evil is only apparently real, as it
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serves some higher purpose, but what Cole attempts to do is refute the existence of evil
on the basis of a failure of interpretation. Notice, however, that Cole fails to define in
what sense he is using the term ‘failure’. In what sense is it considered a “failure” in
classifying the brutal torture, murder, and subsequent mutilation of James Bulger as evil?
How has this ascription failed to properly identify or name the event? We needn’t evoke
conception of God either. Is Cole’s suggestion that there is no event for which the term
evil properly applies because all such events are met with a failure of interpretation? This
is clearly false as we can use the example of attribute variables to demonstrate that
understanding evil is certainly possible. The problem with Cole’s argument is that he
overlooks the propositional function of two variables suggesting that there is no event for
which the term evil properly applies because all such events are met with a failure of
interpretation.
The only way to deny the existence of evil, is to offer an ontological denial of evil,
which Cole doesn’t even approximate. Otherwise, we are debating the use of a term,
which is not what this is about. In Cole’s suggestion that, “We respond to the call for
interpretation, but…we are haunted by our failure. And the space of that failure, I argue,
is taken up by the discourse of evil” (127). There is no failure in our attempts to
effectively describe an act as evil. The brutal murder of a young James Bulger was most
certainly an act of evil. We must recognize that Cole is arguing about the use of the term
‘evil,’ not the existence of evil. He has confused his linguistic gripe about the use of the
term ‘evil’ with a viable refutation of the ontological status of evil; thus, his claim is
devoid of merit.
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3.13.

Cole’s Denial of Evil: Chapter 7

Cole begins chapter seven with an analysis of moral luck. He initially suggests, with
reference to the James Bulger murder that,
there were background factors that played a significant role
in their actions, and those background factors and the role
they played made it inappropriate to hold them morally
responsible. However, it could be argued that examining
these kinds of background contexts undermines moral
judgement in general. While I want to close the space for
the discourse of evil, it is not my intention to close the
space for any level of moral judgement, and so in this
chapter I need to explain how my approach can coherently
both show the discourse of evil to be redundant and at the
same time show that moral judgement – sometimes of the
most severe kind – is possible (emphasis added), (148).
Cole’s intention is to differentiate between the conception of moral luck and his desire to
retain the influence of moral judgments. The need to separate his theory from the
conception of moral luck is that they both rely on the “background conditions” that
influence moral agents in the actions, which suggests that moral judgments are irrelevant
in assessing the morality of the agent’s actions. Cole wishes to preserve the concept and
the importance of moral judgments while also preserving the importance of the
“background conditions,” which led to the judgment.
Cole discusses Thomas Nagel’s conception of moral luck and it typologies. In order
for a moral judgment to be fairly applied, one must be in control of one’s actions. If,
however, one’s actions result as a product of external influences, then, assessing moral
judgment becomes all the more difficult. Since Cole denied the existence of evil and has
suggested that we merely implement the idea when we fail to understand peoples’

203

actions, and he has placed emphasis on understanding the “background conditions,” in an
attempt to understand those actions, then,
as soon as we begin to focus on background conditions, we
realize that anything anybody does is subject to factors
beyond their control, such that even the most basic moral
judgement becomes impossible – we lose any concept of
moral agency. In other words, in closing the space for
judgements that people are morally evil, I have closed the
space for any kind of moral judgement at all, and this
threatens my argument with absurdity (150-151).
If there are outside influences determining our actions, should Cole consider the
background conditions that led to the act, he acknowledges that he runs the risk of doing
away with moral judgments, which is not his goal. He offers two examples of shooting a
gun in a crowded room and drinking while driving. His examples are not only weak, they
also lack clarity. In particular, it is unclear how they support the claim that background
conditions are relevant. It is also unclear how they support the claim that the inclusion of
background conditions does not weaken the moral judgment. After discussing his
argument, even Cole suggests that, “This may not be a decisive refutation of the moralluck argument, but my concern here is merely to show that we can allow the significant
role of background factors in contributing to what people do, and still have space for
legitimate moral judgment” (153). Ultimately, Cole failed in demonstrating how Nagel’s
conception doesn’t apply to either of his scenarios. If one is to include background
conditions, which are said to determine the moral agent’s actions, it is hard to see how
Cole examples of drinking and driving and shooting a gun in a crowed room preserve the
determinacy necessary to cause them to participate in such action, which were beyond
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their control and simultaneously hold them morally accountable for these acts, which
were determined as a consequence of Cole’s accounting for their background conditions.
3.14.

Cole’s Denial of Evil: Chapter 8

Unfortunately, Cole’s argument in chapter eight is lost in the unending stream of half
page citations, which run throughout the entire chapter. Cole relies too heavily on pasting
other’s work together than formulating his own conception and denial of evil. In the
chapter, he discusses “facing the holocaust” and his commentary, what little of it there is
spliced between massive chunks of citation, covers a breadth of topics so broad that it is
unclear to determine what his motivations are. On the one hand, he seems to return to the
halfhearted attempt to address the background conditions necessary in addressing agency,
a concept that refused to label the brutal murder of a young James Bulger as evil. On the
other hand, he merely offers a recapitulation of historical debates concerning the
holocaust.
Cole assumes a defeatist position within this chapter, suggesting that the magnitude
of the holocaust, the reckless destruction of human life was so great that the ethical
question arises of, “whether we ought to seek to understand the Holocaust” (174.).
Apparently, for Cole, the attempt to understand the atrocities inflicted by Nazi Germany
on countless lives, is taboo, we should deliberate whether such an attempt is ethically
sound to begin with.
Cole discusses the all too familiar role of Kapos within the concentration camps. He
suggests that,
judgment becomes more difficult when it comes to those in
commanding positions, such as the Kapos...who ran labour
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squads, the barrack chiefs, clerks and people who worked
in the administrative offices…and their power to impose
violence was unlimited (177).
It is Cole’s suggestion that our ability to understand evil is nullified by the role of the
Kapos in Nazi concentration camps. Surely, as I have discovered in my own interviews
with several holocaust survivors, I cannot expect to understand the experience of evil
within the concentration camps. I will never know, first hand, the horrors of being
malnourished, of being worked to death, of having to cope with the systematic execution
of my entire family. Certainly, I cannot understand what it is to experience these horrors.
This lack of understanding, however, does not translate into an inability for me to
determine the nature of the evil.
Evil seeks to exacerbate human suffering and death as an end in itself. There’s
nothing impossible to understand. There is no gulf beyond bridging. Cole presupposes
this lack of understanding and subsequently approaches all the review of literature, all of
his theoretical conception with the defeatist mentality that evil is too difficult to
understand, therefore it doesn’t exist. The role of the Kapos is a difficult conception to
understand in terms of prison psychology, or cultural disassociation. It is difficult to
understand how one assumes such a position or the justifications one uses to defend
holding such a position, but there is no difficulty in understanding that the concept of the
‘Kapos,’ as a concept and not as an individual human being, fulfills such a role. There is
no limit to the potential of human destructiveness. To be surprised at the capacity we
have for evil, is a refusal to acknowledge the truth of human being, to see the real
capacities we have for the eradication of our own species. Denial and suggestions that the
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concept of evil is merely a representation of our inability to understand heinous events,
like the murder of James Bulger, is a reflection of the antiquated, anti-scientific, defeatist
mentality of the dark ages. There is nothing human beings will not attempt to understand.
To suggest that evil is beyond understanding, presupposes an understanding of evil,
which is to undermine the very notion that evil cannot be understood.
3.15.

Cole’s Denial of Evil: The Final Chapter

In the final chapter, chapter nine, Cole discusses 21st century “mythologies of evil,”
wherein he writes,
I do not accept the validity of the discourse of evil when it
comes to mere description of people’s character or motives
or actions, or the consequences of their actions… Nor do I
accept that the idea of evil, while it does not explain
anything, is nevertheless an indispensable part of the moral
description of the world, helping us to understand that
world… On the contrary, the idea of evil does not help us
to understand these things at all; rather, it takes on the role
of the satan of the Hebrew Bible: it obstructs our
understanding, blocks our way, brings us to a halt. ‘Evil’ is
a black-hole concept which gives the illusion of
explanation, when what it actually represents is the failure
to understand. (236)
Cole’s continued failure to deny the existence of evil has been demonstrated throughout
my critique of his work. I was unimpressed with his methodological approach and his
justifications for denying the existence of evil. His accounts were haphazard and his
reliance of heavy citation detracted from the overall novelty his conception could have
offered. In the final analysis, Cole did not disprove the existence of evil, on ontological,
metaphysical or epistemological levels. His account failed to identify the specific failures
in our use of the term to describe a state of affairs. Were he to have been successful in
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that endeavor, I’m sure scholars would have to reassess how they conceptualize the
problem of evil. The failure of his argument, on so many levels, is not a demonstration
that his original thesis is without merit. A proper demonstration of the myth of evil would
be a revolutionary discovery. Scholars should continue to investigate the conception that
evil is a myth, as others, including myself, will address the contrary, which will only
benefit us all in a greater understanding of this ailment we called evil.
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Chapter 4: Synthesizing Evil

4.1.

The Mysteries of Synthesizing Evil
Our fascination with evil is a fascination with the mysteries of that which shuns

definition. Its existence is felt, but the solution to the problem of evil is hidden deep
beneath the murky depths of our most primal and haunting fears. The pieces to the puzzle
are scattered about a diversity of disciplines. Throughout the suggestions and inferences
of the last three chapters, there lies some notion of truth, hopefully some insight into the
abyss that is evil. The process of synthesizing evil is simultaneously introspective as it is
both historical and progressing toward a yet unknown future inevitability. Evil has been
progressing toward its fullest actualization as manifested in the act of genocide since the
beginning of time.
The horrors of the world are realized in the recognition of our personal capacity, and
may be even twisted desire to harm someone, someone who has harmed us, someone, or
anyone at all. The gravity of an analysis grounded in studying the problem of evil is
compounded by the persistent and omnipresent recognition of the frailty of human life. It
is in that recognition that we face the horrors of genocide and torture, the horrors of
unmitigated political power and a quest—at all costs—of seizing absolute power. It may
be the recognition that we, too, may fantasize of omnipotence, of subordinating and
dominating an other. Our bloodlust knows no limit. There is no quenching our thirst.
There is no mercy or solace when truly discussing evil. There is no hope and there will be
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no happy endings. There are no alternatives. Everything is definite. Everything is
absolute. Destruction is totalizing. In truly discussing evil, one must theorize through the
lens of hate and self-aggrandizement
There is in fact, another world, darker and hidden, a world that coexists alongside this
one, a world of a perverse fascination with brutality of the most deplorable forms and an
army of eager participants desperately vying to outdo the last psychopath. It is within this
historical context that we move along a timeline, wherein we are always defining,
identifying, reflecting and simultaneously introspecting on the nature of evil.
In the previous three chapters I have discussed very specific instances of evil within
social, political and psychological accounts, yet there are more questions than there are
answers, and within this final chapter I hope, as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s great fictional
detective, “Sherlock Holmes” has methodically done, to solve the problem. To do so,
however, is to review the clues, the clues necessary in finally cracking this case. Within
this chapter, then, I will introduce little if any new evidence and no new theories. It is my
belief that the answers to this problem have been addressed within the previous three
chapters, which leaves me with the responsibility of synthesizing and connecting points
of interest already discussed. As all great mystery novels reach their climax, and as I near
the conclusion of this analysis, I must return to the beginning and finally uncover the
clues to understanding the problem of evil.
4.2.

The First Boundary Condition of Evil: The Body
This final journey begins, as all journeys begin, with a single step. The step needed to

start this progression toward an ultimate understanding of evil begins with an account of

210

the self. In chapter one of this analysis, I discussed the philosophical accounts of evil
throughout history in roughly chronological order from antiquity to Kant. Within that
discussion are hidden pieces needed to understand the problem of evil, which requires
that we return to that discussion as a reflection on the philosophical accounts of evil
throughout history.
Aristotle’s discussion of arête and the moderation and balance needed to live a
virtuous life, emphasizes one’s personal and continual commitment to living within
acceptable means, neither excess nor depravity. A life of moderation reflects an inner
balance between the duality of forces ever competing for dominance within our lives.
One’s personal struggle with these polemic halves is a reflection on the continual need to
reaffirm the virtuous lifestyle. It is, for Aristotle, a style of living, a style of life that
rewards the virtuous for their willingness to continue battling these polemics of the self.
It is the “I” that chooses to engage in excess, the “I” that chooses to deny itself until the
point of depravity, and Aristotle’s account within the Nicomachean Ethics is persuasive.
He is, in effect, persuading his reader to live this style of life, continually balancing
desires with reference to the virtuous life. This reference, nevertheless, is always done
through an understanding and recognition of our capacities for excess and depravity. It is
within these capacities that we identify the endless possibilities of our existence, i.e.,
through the recognition of our capabilities, we are imbued with the responsibility to act
accordingly. Aristotle goes beyond merely calling our attention to the polemics of our
depravity and excessive nature, he offers a solution. The solution hints to the problem of
evil, as it is a problem for the self.
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The problem of evil is fundamentally a personal problem. It is a problem of choosing
to willfully self regulate one’s depravity or excesses. But moreover, it is the willingness
to do so for no other purpose than for the attainment of this style of living, this lifestyle,
i.e., a life of virtue. This style of living is a personal recognition that “I am affected by
evil.” “I can be swayed by my own excesses.” Remember, Aristotle has written, “And
also for the sake of mere life (in which there is possibly some noble element so long as
the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good) mankind meet together and
maintain the political community” (emphasis added). 183
Aristotle was directed toward the political. His account of the polemics of depravity
and excess was more than an anecdotal account for personal “wellbeing”. His account
cannot be confused with contemporary notions of “self-help” or “twelve-steps”.
Aristotle’s account of arête is directed from the individual toward the political, as noted
in the previous quote. His accounts of the political are modeled on the family, which is
substantiated in his Ethics. A life of virtue is the life worth living. It is the life that
ensures the requisite conditions for the political life. The having of political life, the
participation of members, the polis, within a political community is inconceivable
without an antecedent recognition of personal development. That development, for
Aristotle, manifests in our ability to govern our own bodies. Unlike Plato, virtue is
embodied. It can be contained and is contained within the physical. The virtuous life
exists within the individual, or at least the potential for the virtuous life exists within the
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individual. But there is a threat, a very real threat to that realization, the embodiment of
that lifestyle, the manifestation of arête within the human being, and that threat is evil.
The threat of evil is the choice we have to indulge in the excesses of our lives or to
indulge in the depravity of our depressions and apathies. Aristotle can only encourage. As
the saying goes, “You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink.” He can
articulate the conditions by which one attains a balance between these polemical halves,
but ultimately it is entirely up to the individual to embrace this style of living. Thus, it is
absolutely essential to note that it is not simply one instance of choice that defines an
individual as living the virtuous life, it is how one choose to live one’s life, or the living
of one’s life, which either accords or deviates with arête. The threat of evil is more than a
threat to the individual’s ability to properly choose to live the virtuous life; rather, the
threat of evil is a threat to the living of life. Evil undermines life. Evil is antithetical to
life. The choices that we are presented, on any given day, at any given time, are at every
moment, minute possibilities to participate in evil. It is the ability to inflate the self to
self-aggrandize, to compensate for faulty reasoning. All seemingly harmless, until that
personal defect or inclination, that propensity or will manifests through the individual
into the world at large.
Evil, then, begins with a personal experience. The core of evil is firmly grounded in
our psychological and physiological inclinations to act out of an excess or depravity.
Whether that propensity to act is governed by choice or socio-biological determination is,
here, not my concern. I am, here, only concerned with the fact that it occurs.
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The boy who is shunned by his playmates, who is ridiculed and mocked, who so
desperately wishes to fit in, yet is at every instance rejected, very often becomes the man
that wages war against assimilation. How that war is waged, however, depends on what
choices that boy made as he developed. Some constructively critique the hegemony of the
heterosexual, white normativity, and in so doing wage war against notions of
assimilation. Others, like the Virginia Tech student and mass murderer Seung-Hui Cho,
mastermind and then carry out unimaginable brutality on the very people that he
perceived to have rejected him the in first place. It appears that the depravity or excesses
of our attempts to live a virtuous life is ultimately grounded in how that battle between
those polemic halves manifests.
In analyzing the many philosophical accounts of evil throughout history, I was
surprised at how often philosophers referred to this struggle. Some saw it (that is evil) as
a struggle within the self. Others viewed it in terms of a struggle between the self and our
attachments, or the self and the other, or the self and one’s recognition of power.
However one approached this discussion of evil throughout the history of philosophy, it
was at every instance, approached as a struggle. Evil can only be understood in terms of a
struggle. There is no exception. How that struggle is fought, the conditions wherein we
come to recognize the unfolding of that struggle or the means in which the struggle
affects the world at large, will always vary, but that evil is to be understood within the
conceptual context of struggle is irrefutable.
It is the process of living that complicates our recognition of evil. We are, in effect,
blinded by our own biases. Many in the West are blinded by capitalism and luxury. They
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confuse their cultural detachment from “evil” as the spooky concept relegated to the most
abstracted levels of philosophy. But one could easily argue that such a position is blinded
by privilege. It is, as represented by the character Cypher in the Matrix film trilogy
(1999-2003) by Lawrence and Andrew Wachowski , a privilege not to know the truth, to
have a hatred for those that seek enlightenment. Such misology is fueled by ignorance.
Thus, Cypher’s famous dictum, “Ignorance is bliss.” Ignorance, however, does little to
refute the existence of evil as it does to promote its spread. Evil is spread and transferred
from one person to the other through a narrative of ignorance and like Aristotle, St.
Augustine, locates this struggle within the self.
Augustine writes,
the first evil act of will, preceding as it did, all evil works in
man, was rather a falling away from the work of God to the
will’s own works than any one work; and those works were
evil because they followed the will’s own pattern and not
God’s. Thus, the will itself, or man himself in so far as he
was possessed of an evil will, was the evil tree, as it were,
that bore the evil fruit that those works represented. 184
For Augustine, the particular human being is the source of evil. I have already discussed
Augustine’s justification for this claim, but in trying to uncover the mysteries shrouding a
fuller conception of evil, one must recognize the first boundary condition of evil, i.e., the
conception that identifies evil as a personal struggle. For Aristotle, that struggle was
between the polemics of depravity, on the one hand, and excess, on the other. The
attempt to resolve that struggle was substantiated by the virtuous life. Though
Augustine’s conception differs from Aristotle, especially how this struggle manifests and
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how it is resolved, the underlying assumption is the same, viz. evil is limited (bounded)
by one’s personal struggle. For Augustine, this struggle manifests as sin and the source of
this struggle manifests as original sin. My sin is a personal sin. It is nontransferable and
the sinner will be judged accordingly. Sin, as the manifestation of evil, is embodied, i.e.,
it is localized within a body. It is bounded by the body and when evil is ultimately
judged, the body is judged accordingly. The body is punished (in hell). To judge evil,
then, is to judge the body. It is to judge the individual person and that person’s body.
Thus, the person, i.e., the physical limitations of the person’s body, is the first boundary
condition for evil. For Aristotle and Augustine, evil is bounded; it is limited within the
body of either the moral agent or the sinner.
For Augustine, however, unlike the Stoics and so many others, the will of the human
being was fundamentally sullied by the act of original sin. Our existence would be
defined by this act of sin. We would internalize sin as a personal experience and thus
internalize evil. We embodied evil and as such became evil. It would be something for
which one would have to repent, and if penitence was differed, there was the very real
threat of personal damnation. “I could burn in hell.” “I may not go to heaven.”
Unlike Aristotle’s conception of balance and moderation, Augustine’s account of sin
required conformity of the will to the law of God. Any act of disobedience or
insubordination was ultimately subject to judgment, which meant that one could face the
penalty of eternal damnation. Evil, then, as manifested through sin, was internalized. It
became “my sins,” “my evils,” and “my responsibility to repent,” or “I” would be
damned to an eternity of suffering and torture. The boundary condition of evil was a very
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real limitation. It was not some abstracted, detached philosophical conception. Rather, the
limits of evil within my body meant that I could suffer for its presence, which is why
there are countless references to exorcisms. Demons are cast out. One is freed from sin.
Salvation becomes the act of purging oneself of sin. Evil, literally, leaves the body and in
so doing progresses beyond the body, i.e., it progresses beyond the first boundary.
4.3.

The Second Boundary Condition of Evil: The Social Realm

The second boundary condition of evil is initiated by a projection of an internal
struggle from the particular individual suffering, into a social setting. Concerns may be
voiced to a priest or a policeman, a psychiatrist or a neighbor. Concerns may not be
voiced at all. The individual may, rather, remove himself from social interactions, a key
indication of psychological and/or emotional distress.
As previously mentioned in chapter one of this analysis, the Eastern mystics and
specifically Patañjali, identified, contrary to Aristotle and Augustine, evil within the
world (an external conception) rather than within the body (an internal conception).
Where Aristotle and Augustine may have argued for moderation or penitence, Patañjali
would have argued for personal detachment to the things of this world, particularly
material possessions and our connections to loved ones.
Patañjali identifies evil in our attachments and Hobbes in the social nature of human
dynamics. Granted some may argue that perception of the other may not be constrained
to interpretations of threat or violence, but in terms of empathy and love, which are
certainly warranted. My interests, however, are quite specific; my scope is very clearly
defined. I am interested in the concept of evil, attempting to uncover the development of
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evil from its most fundamental instantiation to its largest conceivable actualization is the
sole purpose of this chapter. The difficulty in unlocking these mysteries, however, is only
complicated by the difficulties faced with interpersonal interactions.
Fear underlies this difficulty. The obsession with a fear of loss is an essential
component within any social setting for the manifestation of evil. The fear of losing one’s
livelihood may drive one to compulsively work. The fear of being attacked may prompt
someone to attack preemptively. One’s internal fears may then be projected outward.
They are articulated, made social, and ultimately internalized by other members of
society. This process is repeated with each retelling of the story. Thus, a narrative is
constructed. A caricature of that which may have been a legitimate fear, has now
morphed into the boogie man, the devil, the antichrist, the sub or nonhuman being. As
demonstrated in chapter two in the discussion of the hatred whipped up by the Rwanda
TV station Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), dehumanization serves
an essential role in legitimizing genocide to sympathizers.
Loss and death are inevitable aspects to life, the attempt to preserve that which is
bound to be lost is unnatural, i.e., such attempts run counter to nature. Fear quickly
manifests as terror and terror can easily paralyze a community. One’s terror of
damnation, for example, is projected throughout the community and becomes our terror
of damnation. Those refusing to accord with the dogma or practices established to
“cleanse” the community only serve to magnify the terror within the community, at
which point the community may turn against those individuals. This is commonly seen in
vigilantism, where the fear of the people manifests in the practice of self-policing
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targeted members of their community. Unfortunately, as was the case some many times
in history, be it the Salem Witch Trials or the lynching of African-American men in the
South, vigilantism is often a misdirected use of force on unsuspecting, often innocent
victims.
As one approaches the limits of the second boundary condition, projected violence
within the social order is less a response to perceived injustices, less vigilantism, and
more an attempt to organize and methodically eradicate a portion of the population, all of
which stems from the amplification of the narrative recycled within society, that “they”
are different from “us.” “They” are nonhuman. “We” are human. “They” are immoral.
“We” are moral. “They” are savages. “We” are civilized. As mentioned earlier, the
unmitigated fear of loss, of losing racial purity, losing social dominance or importance,
serves to catalyze a figure, an individual from within the crowd, to govern the crowd. The
leader, the sovereign, the ruler, is set in opposition to the crowd, though from the crowd.
The leader governs the crowd, and as such is given the responsibility to protect “us” from
“them.” This dynamic and fundamentally primal separation of “us” and “them” catapults
an individual into the political. Thus, the political, among other things, serves to govern
the social and protect society from “them,” whoever they may be.
4.4.

The Third Boundary Condition of Evil: The Political
The mysteries involved in understanding the concept of evil have slowly been

uncovered, beginning with an explanation of the necessary boundary conditions of evil.
The difficulty in grasping the concept of evil has been circumvented by a clear
articulation of is dynamism and fluidity between the personal and social order. It has
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been my attempt to demonstrate that evil is a dynamic force. There is a definitive
progression of evil. From the ancients to contemporary accounts of the problem of evil,
its force has actively been a progression and expansion of its totalizing, destructive
capabilities. The projection of our deficiencies and excesses, our vices and insecurities
into the world only serves to facilitate the ever expanding and exponential growth of evil.
The magnitude of evil, however, is compounded by the nearly limitless power of
political leaders and their abilities to dramatically shape the course of human civilization.
This manifestation of power, the struggle for power within the political sphere, serves to
propel the need to better understand the nature of evil to the forefront of every discipline.
To overlook the tremendous dangers presented to the citizens of every nation is to
undermine the totalizing force of evil.
Kant’s almost prophetic understanding of the requisite preconditions for multinational
tribunals and the importance of diplomacy and international peace were centuries ahead
of its time. Kant’s account of the political is derived from his Groundwork and his ability
to recognize the confluence of human agency and our varying capacities to express
freedom. It is precisely because we are free and we are social beings that evil is such a
significant problem, I would argue that it is the fundamental problem for all of humanity.
This problem arises because of the conflicts in expressing one’s freedom and as such, for
Kant, the political must be firmly grounded in the universal prescriptions of moral law—
just as the particular moral agent is so grounded. The human being is free as long as in
the expression of his freedom he does not impede the freedom of others. Kant writes,
“Act externally so that the free use of your choice can coexist with freedom of everyone
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in accordance with universal law.” 185 Those who control and use political power are
equally bounded to the moral law. The state can and should be held accountable for
violations of its power, which is precisely what is at stake in a 21st century account of
genocide and the political abuse of power.
In chapter two of this analysis I sought to outline the development of genocide studies
as a discipline and body of knowledge. What struck me as of utmost importance in
gathering the information to write the chapter, is the degree of nearly unlimited power
wielded by corrupt governments and their ability to effectively justify the brazen and
calculated extermination of human life. The question at stake, the mystery surrounding
the application of such political power, lies in understanding where that power is
localized. Political power is localized power, but within the confines of that locality, it is
nearly limitless. I was astounded as I read time-and-time-again of the use of propaganda
and the airwaves, the use of the media and the demonization of the intended victims of an
ideology of exclusion, that I then realized as Arendt had before me, that political evil, i.e.,
evil as manifest through political power, was limited by borders. The geographic borders
of a state mark a very real scope of state sovereignty. Within those borders international
legislative bodies have great difficulties enforcing international law, because to do so, on
the one hand, is to undermine state sovereignty, but to avoid doing so, one the other hand,
is to turn a blind eye, to indirectly condone the barbarism of an uncompassionate state,
thus, the catch 22. The personal fear of “contamination” as demonstrated in my analysis
of Shaw’s account reverberates within the psyche of a man. It is projected as a hatred for

185
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the other, for their “infections” and the alleged threat they pose to the integrity of one’s
society. The boundary condition of evil quickly shifts from the personal to the social in
this act of directed hatred. It manifests within the social as fear, fear of being
contaminated, fear of being subverted, and fear of being oppressed.
The more one’s social narrative of the other is structured in terms of fear, the more
one will come to perceive the other as a threat. Perception is reality. Thus, the more that
threat is perceived as real, the more real that threat becomes. Eventually, fear spread like
a wildfire through various communities and individuals react to this fear by attempting to
exterminate the other. The fear which began as a personal fear has been amplified and
mirrored in the other’s existence. Thus, “our” fear is directed, it is essentially embodied
in “their” being, as defined obsessively. Killing them, and killing them all, is the only
pacification for the fear firmly rooted within one’s self. Again, a boundary condition is
met, insofar as the calculated and methodical attempt to exterminate an entire population
of people, and, moreover, to justify this attempt, requires not only precise and deliberate
planning, it requires the resources, the power, and the military ability to enact such an
ideology of exclusion.
The progression of evil, from the personal and through the social order, now
manifests a political evil. The power of political evil is the recognition of its limitations.
Political evil is limited, as discussed in chapter two, by the confines of the state’s
domestic jurisdictions. Knowing this fact, and ensuring that state sovereignty is confined
within those borders, means that annihilating an entire population of people is only
limited by the state’s ability to expeditiously carry out such measures. Once intended
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victims flee the state, however, the state cannot “track them down” without infringing on
the sovereignty of surrounding states. Even in discussing genocide, there are rules.
Infringing on a surrounding state’s sovereignty to purify not only one’s respective state
from those deemed contaminated, but the world, is to directly challenge the sovereignty
of another state, which will invariably result in war between states.
Political asylums threaten the sovereignty of the state, because the state is harboring
those slated for execution. As the threat of war becomes increasingly evident, the final
boundary condition is met. The progression of evil has grown beyond the confines of the
political. There is a disregard for the rules, if you will. Evil seeks to destroy not only
those within the confines of the state’s jurisdiction. It seeks to destroy those slated for
extermination, wherever they reside. The actual attempt to achieve this goal, i.e., the total
eradication of a people wherever they may flee, necessitates a disregard for state
sovereignty and geographical borders. I am arguing that this very specific attempt is the
ultimate manifestation of evil.
4.5.

On the Concept of the One-World State
Once the third boundary condition has been breeched, once the state purposefully

disregards the sovereignty of surrounding states for the purpose of “cleansing the world”
of a targeted group, the state, in effect, must expand its borders. If political dissidents flee
extermination to an adjacent state and that state chooses to harbor those dissidents, then
that state becomes a threat. To kill those dissidents requires the destruction of that state.
Thus, war is waged on that state. Once that state has been absorbed, all original dissidents
within that former state are executed. Those that flee to adjacent states are hunted and
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killed. As the borders of state sovereignty are increased those targeted for extermination
will be absorbed from the surrounding area, interned and ultimately exterminated. Ian
Kershaw describes:
…Polish laborers were commandeered by the SS to
construct a camp at Belzec in eastern Poland…Initially, the
aim was to use Belzec, whose murderous capacity was in
the early months relatively small, for the gassing of Jews
from the Lublin area who were incapable of wrok. Only
gradually did the liquidation of all Polish Jews become
clarified as the goal. 186
In absorbing Poland, SS troops gradually sought the extermination of “all Polish
Jews,” which serves to demonstrate how the state’s expansion yielded higher fatalities.
Theoretically, then, there is a very real possibility that a state could grow so powerful that
it absorbed all other states, destroyed all other state borders, eliminated the sovereignty of
all other states, and thereby increased its own borders, until the point at which all that
existed was a one-world state. The power to annihilate any population of people could
never be mitigated by international law, because international law would cease to exist
once the state reached total global dominance. Once such a one-world state came to
power, there could be no possibility of moving beyond or outside of the state’s domestic
jurisdiction, because that jurisdiction would include the totality of the world. All former
nation states would have been absorbed into the one-world state, which gives rise to a
consolidation of power.
Hitler only approximated that which he desired most, the total eradication of Jews.
His attempt to actualize evil transcended the physical limitations of his body. It grew
186
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beyond the borders of the German state and was set to consume every state. If left
unchecked, Hitler would have approximated the greatest manifestation of evil in the
formation of a one-world genocidal state. The inversion of his desire, in Kantian terms,
was accomplished by his attempt to universalize a maxim for personal gain, which as we
have seen in chapter one nullifies the benefits that would otherwise be preserved prior to
universalization. Kant describes this process of nullification in the following example. He
writes,
Then I soon became aware that I could indeed will the lie,
but by no means a universal law to lie; for in accordance
with such a law there would properly be no promises at all,
since it would be futile to avow my will with regard to my
future actions to others who would no believe this
avowal…as soon as it were made a universal law, would
have to destroy itself. 187
Since one’s personal boundary condition of evil is an approximation of universal evil,
and the progression from one boundary condition to the next is a result of its continual
manifestation through time, and since the original source of fear and hatred begins at a
personal level and is projected outward, then once that fear is located in the social and the
political, once that fear is mirrored in the existence of the other, and once “they” are all
conceivably killed in a one-world genocidal state, the only possible remnant of that
original source of fear and hatred remains with the person determined to eradicate that
fear wherever it manifests. Thus, universal evil must result in the destruction of itself, as
it would destroy all human life, which gives credence to Aristotle’s claim that, “excess
can be manifested in all…yet all are not found in the same person. Indeed, they could not;
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for evil destroys even itself, and if it is complete becomes unbearable” (emphasis
added). 188

188

Ross, W.D., revised by J.O. Urmson. The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford
Translation, vol. 2, Jonathan Barnes, ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Ethics, Book IV,
Part VI. 1125b35.

226

References

Abisaab, Rula Jurdi. 2004. Converting Persia religion and power in the Safavid Empire.
International library of Iranian studies, 1. London: I.B. Tauris.
Acton, H. B., and J. W. N. Watkins. 1963. “Symposium: Negative Utilitarianism”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 37, p. 83-114.
Aiken, Henry David. 1958. “God and Evil: A Study of Some Relations Between Faith
and Morals” Ethics, Vol. 68, No. 2. Jan. p. 77-97.
Alfarabi trans. Charles E. Butterworth. 2001. The Political Writings. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Anselm, trans. Brian Davies, and G. R. Evans. 1998. “On the Fall of the Devil.” In The
major works. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Arendt, Hannah. 1973. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York, Harvest Books.
Aristotle trans. Benjamin Jowett. 1900. The Politics of Aristotle. New York: Colonial
Press.
Aristotle, trans. Jonathan Barnes. 1984. The complete works of Aristotle: the revised
Oxford translation. Bollingen series, 71:2. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press.
Aristotle, trans. W. D. Ross, and J. O. Urmson. 1988. The Nicomachean ethics.
(Oxfordshire): Oxford University Press.
Augustine trans. Henry Bettenson, 1984. Concerning the City of God, against the
Pagans. New York: Penguin Press.
Baumeister, R.F. 1997. Evil: Inside human cruelty and violence. New York: W.H.
Freeman.
BeDuhn, Jason. 2000. The Manichaean body in discipline and ritual. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.

227

Bonaiuti, Ernesto and Giorgio La Piana. 1917. “The Genesis of St. Augustine’s Idea of
Original Sin” The Harvard Theological Review. Vol 10. No. 2 (April), p. 159-175.
Card, Claudia. 2002. Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Chalk, Frank Robert, and Kurt Jonassohn. 1990. The history and sociology of genocide:
analyses and case studies. New Haven: Yale University Press
Chan, Steve. 2002. “On Different Types of International Relations Scholarship” Journal
of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 6. Nov. p. 747-756.
Cole, Phillip. 2006. The myth of evil. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Confucius, Mencius, trans. James Legge. 1900. The four books: Confucian analects, the
great learning, the doctrine of the mean, and the works of Mencius, with English
translation and notes. Shanghai, China: Commercial Press.
Cowie, Anthony Paul, and A. Evison. 1986. Concise English-Chinese, Chinese-English
dictionary. Beijing: The Commercial Press.
Dower, John W. 1986. War without mercy: race and power in the Pacific war. New
York: Pantheon Books
Eddy, Mary Baker. 1875. Science and health with key to the scripture. Massachusetts:
The First Church of Christ, Scientist.
Edwards, John Le Bosquet. 1912. “The Evil One: A Development” The Harvard
Theological Review, Vol. 5, No. 3. Jul., p. 371-384.
Empedocles, trans. M. R. Wright. 1995. Empedocles, the extant fragments. London:
Bristol Classical Press.
Empiricus, Sextus trans. Benson Mates. 1996. “Outlines of Pyrrhonism,” The Skeptic
Way: Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism, New York: Oxford University
Press.
Empiricus, Sextus trans. R.G. Bury 1997. Against the Physicists, Against the Ethicists.
Mass: Harvard University Press.
Evans, Gillian. 1981.“Neither a Pelagian nor a Manichee” Vigiliae Christianae, Vol 35
No 3. Sep., p. 232-244

228

Feng, Youlan, and Derk Bodde. 1952. A history of Chinese philosophy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Fiedler, Leslie A. 1984. “The Tyranny of the Normal” The Hastings Center Report, Vol.
14, No. 2. Apr. p. 40-42.
Frankl, Viktor. 1959. Man’s Search for Meaning. Boston: Beacon Press.
Gert, Bernard. 1965. “Hobbes, Mechanism, and Egoism” The Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 15, No. 61, Oct., p. 341-349.
Greene, William Chase. 1936. “Fate, Good, and Evil, in Early Greek Poetry” Harvard
Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 47. p 1-36.
Griffin, David Ray. 1976. God, power and evil: A process theodicy Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press.
Grossman, Dave. 1995. On killing: the psychological cost of learning to kill in war and
society. Boston: Little, Brown.
Guignon, Charles B. 2004. On being authentic. Thinking in action. London: Routledge.
Guthrie, W.K.C. 1952. “The Presocratic World-Picture” The Harvard Theological
Review, Vol. 45, No. 2. Apr. p. 87-104.
Hick, John. 1966. Evil and the God of love. Revised Edition. New York: Harper & Row.
Hintjens, Helen M. 1999. “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda” The Journal of
Modern African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2. Jun. p. 241-286.
Hinton, Alexander. 1998. “Why did the Nazis Kill?: Anthropology, Genocide and the
Goldhagen Controversy” Anthropology Today, Vol. 14, No. 5. Oct. p. 9-15.
Hitler, Adolf, trans. Alvin Saunders Johnson, and John Chamberlain. 1939. Mein kampf,
complete and unabridged, fully annotated. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock.
Hobbes, Thomas, and Richard Tuck. 1996. Leviathan. Cambridge texts in the history of
political thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hughes, Richard A. 2004 – 2005. “Death of Children by Faith-Based Medical Neglect”
Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 247-265.
Jones, Adam. 2006. Genocide: A Comprehensive introduction. New York: Taylor &
Francis Routledge.

229

Kant, Immanuel. 1960. Religion within the limits of reason alone. La Salle, Ill: Open
Court Pub. Co.
Kant, Immanuel, trans. Mary J. Gregor. 1998. Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals.
Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press.
Kant, Immanuel, trans. Allen W. Wood, and George Di Giovanni. 1998. Religion within
the boundaries of mere reason and other writings. Cambridge texts in the history of
philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Kant, Immanuel, trans. Martin Schönfeld 2009. “Concerning Creation in the Total Extent
of its Infinity in both Space and Time,” Universal History of Nature and Theory of
the Skies Collapse 5.
Kershaw, Ian. 2000. Hitler, 1936-45: nemesis. New York: W.W. Norton.
Kissi, Edward. 2006. Revolution and genocide in Ethiopia and Cambodia. Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books.
Laozi, trans. Stephen Mitchell. 1988. Dao te ching: a new English version. New York:
Harper & Row.
Leibniz, G.W. 1998. Theodicy. Chicago: Open Court.
Lemkin, Raphael. 1973. Axis rule in occupied Europe; laws of occupation, analysis of
government, proposals for redress. New York: H. Fertig.
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Nisbet, Hugh Barr. 2005. Philosophical and theological
writings. New York Cambridge University Press.
Mackie, J.L. 1990. “Evil and Omnipotence” The Problem of Evil. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Melson, Robert. 1992. Revolution and genocide: on the origins of the Armenian genocide
and the Holocaust. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mesle, Robert. 1986. “The Problem of Genuine Evil: A Critique of John Hick's
Theodicy” The Journal of Religion, Vol. 66, No. 4. Oct, p. 412-430.
Miller, Donald E.; Miller, Lorna Touryan. 1993. Survivors: An oral history of the
Armenian Genocide Berkeley: University of California Press.

230

Osborne, Cathrine 1987. “Empedocles Recycled” The Classical Quarterly, New Series,
Vol. 37, No. 1. p 24-50.
Patañjali trans. P.N. Mukerji. 1983. Yoga philosophy of Patañjali containing his Yoga
aphorisms with Vyāsa's commentary in Sanskrit and a translation with annotations
including many suggestions for the practice of Yoga. Albany: State University of
New York Press.
Pike, Nelson. 1958. “God and Evil: A Reconsideration” Ethics, Vol. 68, No. 2. Jan., p.
116-124.
Pines, Shlomo, Tuvia Gelblum, Al-Bīrūni and Patañjali.1966 “Al-Bīrūnī's Arabic
Version of Patañjali's "Yogasūtra"” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London, Vol. 29, No. 2. p. 302-325.
Plato, trans. Edith Hamilton, and H. Cairns. 1978. The collected dialogues of Plato,
including the letters. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Bollington Series LXXI.
Poloma, Margaret M. 1991. “A Comparison of Christian Science and Mainline Christian
Healing Ideologies and Practices” Review of Religious Research, Vol. 32, No. 4. Jun.
p. 340-341.
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, trans. Moses Hadas. 1968. The stoic philosophy of Seneca;
essays and letters of Seneca. New York: Norton.
Schoepflin, Rennie B. 2003. Christian science on trial : religious healing in America
Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press.
Schönfeld, Martin. “Kant’s Philosophical Develpoment” The Standord Encyclopedia of
Philosophy at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-development/>
Schönfeld, Martin, “Kant’s Early Cosmology,” Bird, Graham. 2006. A companion to
Kant. Blackwell companions to philosophy, 36. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
Shaw, Martin. 2007. What is genocide? Cambridge: Polity.
Smith, Roger W. 1989. "Genocide and Denial: The Armenian Case and Its Implications,"
Armenian Review 42, no. 1. Spring. p., 1–38.
Smith, Roger W., Eric Markusen, and Robert J. Lifton, 1998. “Professional Ethics and
the Denial of the Armenian Genocide” Hovannisian, Richard G. Remembrance and
denial: the case of the Armenian genocide. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

231

Sokol, Moshe. 1999. “Is There a “Halakhic” Response to the Problem of Evil” The
Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 92, No. 3. Jul. p. 311-323
Spinoza, Benedictus de, trans. Samuel Shirley, and Seymour Feldman. 1992. The ethics ;
Treatise on the emendation of the intellect ; Selected letters. Indianapolis: Hackett
Pub. Co.
Stroumsa, Sarah and Gedaliahu G. Stroumsa. 1988. “Aspects of Anti-Manichaean
Polemics in Late Antiquity and under Early Islam” The Harvard Theological Review,
Vol. 81, No. 1 Jan., p. 37-58.
Stroumsa, Gedaliahu G. 1992. “Titus of Bostra and Alexander of Lycopolis: A Christian
and Platonic Refutation of Manichaean Dualism” In Neoplatonism and Gnosticism
Studies in Neoplatonism. V6. New York: Albany State University of New York Press.
p. 340-341.
Sung-peng, Hsu. 1976. “Lao Tzu's Conception of Evil” Philosophy East and West, Vol.
26, No. 3. Jul. p. 301-316.
Tooley, Michael. 1991. “The Argument from Evil” Philosophical Perspectives. Vol. 5,
Philosophy of Religion, p. 89-134.
Uvin, Peter. 1998. Aiding violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda. West
Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
Walker, R. B. J. 2002. “International/Inequality” International Studies Review, Vol. 4,
No. 2, International Relations and the New Inequality Summer. p. 7-24
Wallenstein, Joshua. 2001. “Punishing Words: An Analysis of the Necessity of the
Element of Causation in Prosecutions for Incitement to Genocide” Stanford Law
Review, Vol. 54, No. 2. Nov. p. 351-398.
Zhuangzi, trans. Burton Watson. 1968. The Complete Works of Zhuangzi. New York:
Columbia University Press.

232

About the Author

Jason J. Campbell is a husband and father of two. He is a son and eldest of six children.
Jason completed his undergraduate degree at Florida International University receiving a
B.A. in philosophy and graduating magna cum laude. Jason completed both his graduate
degrees at the University of South Florida in Tampa, Florida. Jason is currently an
Assistant Professor of Conflict Resolution and Philosophy at Nova Southeastern
University in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Visit his site at www.jasonjcampbell.org

233

